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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Improvement of energy efficiency is one of the important options for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. According to the Third Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, hundreds of technologies 
for improving the end-use energy efficiency make up more than half of the 
global potential for greenhouse gas emission reduction in the short and medium 
term (2010 - 2020). (IPCC, 2001; see also WEA, 2000). An important next 
question is how these options can actually be deployed. More specifically, one 
may ask what role governments can play by using policy instruments to 
promote the deployment of energy efficient technologies.  
In this introductory Chapter, we will first set out the aim of the research 
described in this book. Then we will discuss the various policy instruments that 
may play a role in energy-efficiency improvement. Next the various aspects 
important for characterising policy instruments will be discussed and the 
various disciplinary approaches are listed. Finally, the outline of the complete 
book will be given. 
 
 
1.1 Aim of the research 
 
According to recent international reports (WEA, 2000; IPCC, 2001) there 
are substantial potentials for energy-efficiency improvement. Moreover, these 
potentials often can be achieved at low or negative costs. It is also 
acknowledged that many barriers exist; this is considered the biggest problem 
for addressing climate change. The IPCC report states that national responses 
may deploy a portfolio of policy instruments, including - according to national 
circumstances - emissions/carbon/energy taxes, tradable or non-tradable 
permits, subsidies, deposit/refund systems, technology or performance 
standards, product bans, voluntary agreements, government spending and 
investment, and support for research and development. Although some general 
statements can be made about the characteristics of the various policy 
instruments (e.g. "market based instruments are cost-effective in many cases"), 
it is important to note that the knowledge about the effectiveness of policy 
instruments in specific national situations is limited. Policymaking requires a 
strategy of "act, then learn, then act again". 
Energy-efficiency policy making has been widely spread since the early 
seventies (Farla, 2000). In the past decade we have seen a revival of energy-
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efficiency policies, with the application of both old and new instrument types. 
It is important to learn from these experiences. Improving the understanding of 
the extent to which policy instruments can help enhancing the energy efficiency 
is the focus of this book. The aim of the research was to study the applicability 
(to what extent and how can policy instruments be applied in specific 
situations?) and effectiveness (do policy instruments lead to actual energy-
efficiency improvement?) of some potentially major policy instruments 
directed at energy-efficiency improvement in firms. The scope is limited to 
energy-efficiency improvement in firms (i.e. excluding households and the 
transport sector). Energy use in firms in agriculture, manufacturing industry 
and the commercial sector makes up more than half of final energy use in 
industrialised societies. In the research, the focus has been on: economic 
instruments, voluntary agreements, normative instruments and instruments for 
R&D promotion (see Section 1.2). There are substantial differences in 
knowledge on the various policy instruments. E.g. on energy taxation a wide 
body of theoretical economic literature exist, whereas an instrument like 
voluntary agreements is relatively new, and the amount of published literature 
is limited. 
So, the starting points for the research is different for the various policy 
instruments and we hence had to pose quite different specific research 
questions for the various instruments. These detailed research questions will be 
elaborated in the various Chapters (3 - 6).  
A specific question is how the various policy instruments compare with 
each other and whether some combinations may perform better than the 
individual instruments. This question will also be addressed (Chapters 7 and 8). 
 
 
1.2 Policy instruments for energy-efficiency improvement 
  
If one wants to influence the behaviour of an actor, e.g. to persuade a firm 
to adopt energy-efficiency measures, in general three basic incentive types can 
be considered (see, e.g., Van den Doelen, 1989): 
• Communication: providing information to the firm in order to change the 
knowledge about the options or influencing the appreciation of the options; 
• Economic incentives: influencing the decision making process of firms by 
changing the economic characteristics (costs or benefits) of an option; 
• Normative incentives: changing the decision making process by declaring 
specific behaviour compulsory or forbidden.  
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In practice, most practical policies consist of a combination of these incentive 
types. Various policies are possible and have been applied. Investment 
subsidies or tax deduction possibilities (fiscal instruments) for energy-
efficiency equipment have been widely applied in energy-efficiency policies in 
many countries. Energy and carbon taxes are applied in some countries in 
Europe, but in most cases large consumers are exempted. European Union wide 
taxes were discussed as of the early nineties, but agreement on this is still 
pending. Emission trading is heavily discussed in the literature; for greenhouse 
gas emissions, trading schemes are on the edge of implementation now in 
various countries and firms. Energy-efficiency standards have hardly been 
applied for firms, except for the thermal integrity of buildings. Voluntary 
agreements - also named negotiated agreements or co-operative instruments - 
are relatively new; for energy efficiency they were first introduced around 
1990, but they become increasingly popular in European countries. Support of 
research and development (R&D) is not one instrument, but can in fact appear 
in each of the previous forms. R&D subsidies have been in place in virtually all 
OECD countries, but also here co-operative R&D instruments are increasingly 
being considered more and more. 
 
In this book we will pay specific attention to: 
• Economic instruments, with the emphasis on subsidies 
• Voluntary agreements 
• Energy-efficiency standards 
• Policy instruments to promote R&D 
 
An important reason for focussing on these instruments is that for all these 
policy instruments experience exists in the Netherlands and other European 
countries. This means that a lot of empirical material can be gathered on the 
experience with these instruments. 
 
 
1.3 The characterisation of policy instruments 
 
Characteristics of policy instruments which are important in making the 
choice for one specific instruments are (see, e.g., CPB, 1997): 
• effectiveness  
• cost-effectiveness 
• social acceptability.  
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A policy instrument is effective if it contributes to reaching the target set 
out by the policy. In general the question to the effectiveness of a policy 
instrument needs to be split into two sub-questions. The first is: what is the goal 
achievement - to what extent is the target set reached? The second is the actual 
effectiveness - what did the instrument contribute to such achievement? In 
general the effectiveness can be expressed in amounts of energy saved or 
greenhouse gas emissions avoided. 
For determining the cost-effectiveness of a policy instrument the benefits 
of the policy instrument need to be compared with the costs. The benefits, of 
course, are energy conservation and avoided emissions, but there may be 
auxiliary benefits as well (improvement of productivity or product quality). 
Costs are primarily out-of-pocket expenses, but there may also be other 
disadvantages (e.g., loss of market position, decrease of product quality). 
The cost-effectiveness can be considered from various perspectives: from 
the point-of-view of the government, from the point-of-view of the firms 
regulated, or from the point-of-view of society as a whole. 
Related to the concept of cost-effectiveness is the concept of efficiency, 
which is often quoted in economic literature. A policy instrument is efficient if 
it leads to the lowest costs for society as a whole; in the analysis also external 
costs may be included. In the analysis of cost-effectiveness the scope often is 
more limited, since it merely looks at the perspective from the point of view of 
a specific actor, without explicitly including external costs.  
Finally, the social acceptability is important. Policy instruments that may 
encounter fierce opposition are less likely to be implemented successfully. 
 
In this book some attention will be paid to all these characteristics, but 
mostly to the first one: effectiveness. This is an especially important question 
for energy-efficiency policies. Energy efficiency has a historic tendency to 
improve (Farla, 2000), also without the presence of policy instruments. A 
policy instrument can contribute to the enhancement of the rate of energy-
efficiency improvement. This does not make it easy to separate the effect of a 
specific policy instrument from the so-called autonomous developments (which 
are developments that would occur without policy intervention) and from the 
effect of other policies in place. 
 
It is important to recognise that policy instruments are not working in 
isolation; there are many other actors involved (e.g. business organisations, 
energy companies, research institutes). The use of the metaphor policy 
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instrument refers to the traditional idea that the government has a toolbox of 
instruments that it can apply at choice to steer the behaviour of actions into the 
desired direction. More recent policy research has shown that this so-called 
rational-instrumental approach is too simple. In practice, more actors turn out 
to be involved, who all influence each other to some extent. The corresponding 
metaphor is the system or network (see, e.g., Chapter 5 on voluntary 
agreements and Chapter 6 on R&D mechanisms). 
Policy instruments try to influence existing situations in firms. Also 
without application of policy instruments, there are mechanisms that govern 
adoption behaviour of firms. A first step in research is often to get a better 
understanding of these mechanisms. For energy-efficiency investments, it is 
especially important to have knowledge on the economic decision making of 
firms, but other aspects, like information provision and existing government 
regulation may be important as well. To some degree such knowledge had 
already been provided in previous research work (Gillissen et al., 1995). 
Thirdly, not only the type of policy instrument determines its operation, but 
perhaps even more important is the way it is applied, i.e. the design of the 
policy instrument in a specific situation. One important design element is the 
strength, e.g. the level of a carbon tax or the toughness of an energy-efficiency 
standard. But other elements are important as well, such as accessibility, 
information provision and accompanying policies. In some cases, it is even 
questionable whether suitable applications can be designed for the specific type 
of policy instrument, e.g. in the case of energy-efficiency standards. In that case 
design questions have to be studied first. 
 
Note that there are other aspects that may be relevant (e.g., the government 
cannot be considered as a monolithic institution; there are other influences, like 
NGOs and public opinion), but those selected here are considered most relevant 
for practical implementation of policy instruments (see Figure 1.1). 
 
1.4 Disciplinary approaches 
 
It is impossible to study policy instruments in their full richness from a 
purely disciplinary viewpoint. In this interdisciplinary work analytical 
approaches from a number of disciplines will be used, including energy 
analysis, economics, policy theory and innovation theory. 
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Figure 1.1 Schematic description of the concepts used in this research project. 
 
Energy analysis is important as one needs to have detailed knowledge of 
energy use and energy-using equipment in firms in order to get a good 
understanding of the replacement of equipment and the introduction of new 
equipment. It is also important to use methods from energy analysis to measure 
levels of energy efficiency and the rate of energy-efficiency improvement. 
Economic theory is important because it can help, among others, to 
understand cost benefit decision mechanisms in firms better, as well as the 
factors which influence these decisions, and the effects of decisions taken on a 
micro-level. 
We use various elements from the theory of government policy in this 
book; both the rational-instrumental approaches and the network approaches 
turn out to be helpful in characterising and analysing how policy instruments 
affect the behaviour of actors. 
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Innovation theory is especially important as the knowledge mechanisms 
discovered in this area of scientific research may help improve our 
understanding of how process innovations in firms develop. 
 
 
1.5 Outline 
 
Chapter 2 of this book sets out with a description of the theories and 
empirical knowledge on adoption mechanisms for energy efficient technologies 
in firms. Chapters 3 to 6 describe the results of the research for the main policy 
instruments, whereas Chapter 7 provides cross-cutting results on the adoption 
behaviour of firms. Chapter 8 is devoted to a quantitative simulation of the 
effectiveness of (the combined application of) policy instruments, using a 
newly developed simulation model. Chapter 9 provides conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING THE 
ADOPTION OF ENERGY-EFFICIENT 
TECHNOLOGIES1 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Associated with economic development are increases in energy use and 
harmful emissions. Changes in total emissions can basically be decomposed 
into three components. The first component is associated with macroeconomic 
growth that, ceteris paribus, results in increased emissions. The second 
component is associated with structural change. As economies develop, their 
sector composition changes. Sectors are characterised by their own intensity 
and development of emissions over time. Changes in sector composition 
therefore, ceteris paribus, imply changes in macroeconomic emissions. The 
final component is technological change. Technological improvements tend to 
result in reduced emission-output ratios and thus, ceteris paribus, decrease 
macroeconomic emissions. Over the last decades, world-wide emissions have 
increased tremendously. These developments have, among others, resulted in 
concrete policy goals set out in the Kyoto protocol. These goals have prompted 
countries to develop policies oriented towards sustainable development, 
sustainable energy use and a reduction of emissions, such as CO2, CH4 and 
N2O. Adoption of energy-efficient technologies by firms is one of the most 
important and promising means to reach these environmental goals (see, for 
example, de Groot, 1999a).2 A key question in the development of policies is 
therefore how firms respond to policy measures aimed at stimulating adoption 
                                                     
1
 This chapter was written by Henri L.F. de Groot. It draws on a set of papers that was written on 
the adoption of energy-saving technologies. These are de Beer et al. (2000), Canton et al. (2002), 
de Groot and van Soest (1999), Mulder et al. (2000), de Groot et al. (2002), and Koetse and de 
Groot (2000). The chapter benefited from useful comments by Arjen Gielen, Mark Koetse, 
Machiel Mulder, Peter Mulder, Peter Nijkamp, Martin Patel, and Erik Verhoef.  
2
 This statement does not deny the importance of developing new technologies. The reason to 
focus the attention on adoption is that (i) adoption is, in our view, at least equally important in 
steering technological progress than innovation (for example, Jovanovic, 1997), (ii) adoption 
behaviour is easier to stimulate directly with policy measures and (iii) insight on barriers to adopt 
is relatively limited and has - at least in the majority of economic literature - received relatively 
little attention, due to often pre-supposed rational behaviour that predicts adoption of  'profitable' 
technologies. For a more extensive discussion of the development of energy-efficient 
technologies and the possibilities for government intervention strategies, we refer to Chapter 6. 
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of energy-efficient technologies. A good understanding of adoption behaviour 
is, in other words, a prerequisite for the development of effective policy 
measures. The aim of this chapter is to build a framework within which 
adoption behaviour of firms can be analysed. This framework will be used in 
subsequent chapters to evaluate the effectiveness of policy measures. 
It is widely recognised that many of the available energy-efficient 
technologies are cost-effective at current prices. It therefore seems strange that 
the diffusion of many of these technologies has in general been very slow up 
till now (a phenomenon known as the energy-efficiency paradox or the energy-
efficiency gap). Empirical studies on adoption rates and diffusion patterns 
convincingly show that very high implicit discount rates are needed to explain 
the slow diffusion of technologies (see, for example, Howarth and Andersson, 
1993 and Fawkes and Jacques, 1985). In the literature, different possible 
barriers to adoption have subsequently been proposed in order to explain this 
paradoxical behaviour. Also, difficulties in measuring costs and benefits of 
adoption have been proposed as possible explanations for the paradox. 
The aim of this chapter is to present a simple, unifying economic 
framework that incorporates most of the available insights on the complex 
process of technology adoption. In doing so, we deliberately restrict the 
attention to a positive analysis aiming at explaining the energy-efficiency 
paradox. Normative implications will only be mentioned in passing and will 
explicitly be discussed in Chapters 3-7. The framework forms, in other words, 
the starting point from which the effectiveness and efficiency of policy 
instruments aimed at stimulating the adoption of energy-efficient technologies 
will be assessed in Chapters 3-6. Empirical evidence on the relevance of the 
framework and the relevance of the barriers presented in the framework and 
proposed in the theoretical literature will be provided in Chapter 7. It is also at 
the heart of the model that has been developed to assess the effectiveness of 
policy measures in the Netherlands which will be the topic of discussion in 
Chapter 8.  
For this aim, we use a simple and stylised adoption framework. At the heart 
of this framework is the concept of the Net-Present-Value (NPV) which reflects 
the 'profitability' of technologies. A brief discussion of this concept will be 
provided in Section 2.2, along with the empirical problems of correctly 
assessing the true costs and benefits associated with adoption. As is already 
evident from the previous discussion, the performance of the simple NPV 
framework in describing and exploring actual adoption decisions is limited. 
Various extensions or modifications to this basic framework have been 
provided. These will be discussed in Section 2.3. These modifications 
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essentially focus on additional factors that influence adoption behaviour and 
that should be taken into account when analysing adoption behaviour. These 
factors range from the availability of information and funds to the complex 
ways in which firms in practice take complex decisions. Section 2.4 concludes 
with a critical assessment of the usefulness of a modified or extended NPV 
framework for determining a technology’s profitability and analysing actual 
adoption behaviour.  
 
 
2.2 The net-present-value framework 
 
This section explains and discusses the concept of Net-Present-Value 
(NPV), which is used intensively in assessments of profitability of 
technologies. It also elaborates on the empirical problems of correctly assessing 
the true costs and benefits associated with the adoption of new technologies.  
 
2.2.1 The basic framework 
 
As a starting point, we assume that firms are aware of all (relevant) energy-
efficient technologies and their characteristics in terms of costs and benefits, 
that there are sufficient internal and/or external financial resources to finance 
investment in these technologies, that there is no uncertainty regarding the 
performance and costs of the technology and, finally, that firms behave 
rational. In such a world, firms will adopt a technology as long as it adds to 
their profits. The standard approach for empirically assessing the profitability 
of technology i is to determine its NPV (using a critical discount rate r) which 
equals:3 
(1) ( )∑
=
+
−
+−=
N
t
t
itit
ii
r
CSINPV
1 1
    
where Ii is the initial investment cost of technology i (at t=0), N is the (econo-
mic) lifetime of the installed capital, Sit are the (energy) savings to be achieved 
by adopting technology i during period t (in monetary values) and Cit are 
operating and maintenance costs during period t (in monetary values). As can 
                                                     
3
 An alternative measure for profitability is the payback period. This measure determines the 
number of periods that a technology should function for the accumulated (net) benefits to be 
equal to the costs of the technology. A critical payback period is the maximal number of periods 
that firms accept before the technology becomes profitable. The Net-Present-Value and Payback 
period are directly related to each other as is shown in Appendix I.   
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be seen, an NPV computation basically compares the initial investment costs 
with the discounted future (net) benefits of the technology under consideration. 
Any technology with a positive NPV should, according to this framework, be 
adopted. From the NPV-formula, we can straightforwardly derive a closely 
related figure that characterises the profitability of an investment, namely the 
internal discount rate (rI). This discount rate is equal to the discount rate for 
which the NPV would be equal to zero. Rational firms will invest in a 
particular technology as long as the internal discount rate exceeds the critical 
discount rate imposed by the firm. For practical empirical work, the internal 
discount rate is a preferable measure to determine the profitability of a 
technology, as it has the characteristic of being insensitive to the size of the 
investment (in contrast to the NPV). It can therefore be used to rank and 
compare the profitability of technologies with different investment costs.4  
The incorporation of market-based policy measures into this basic 
framework is straightforward. Market-based instruments are those instruments 
that foster the adoption through market signals. The best-known examples are 
pollution charges, subsidies, tax deductions, etc. These instruments directly 
affect the costs of investment and/or the benefits and maintenance costs of new 
technologies and therefore affect the NPV and hence the decision whether or 
not to adopt the technology (we will elaborate on this in the chapters dealing 
with the various policy instruments). Command and control regulations such as 
standards are less straightforward to incorporate. Technology-based standards 
are characterised by a limited flexibility for firms in choosing the means of 
achieving goals and they have a tendency to force firms to adopt a particular 
behaviour. They can - taking the framework very literally - be considered as 
standards that attach an infinite benefit to the adopter (and will thus be adopted 
if enforcement is sufficiently strong). Performance standards are very difficult 
to incorporate as they yield firms some freedom in how to meet the target that 
is imposed. One way would be to include the required standard as a constraint 
in the firm's profit maximisation problem (or cost minimisation problem), as 
was done in Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999). We refer to Chapter 4 for an in-
depth analysis of energy-efficiency standards. 
                                                     
4
 On the side, we would like to remark at this stage that the rationality, which is assumed in this 
framework, can be questioned. Empirical research has, for example, revealed that in the 
Netherlands about half of the firms indicates not to use a Payback period or a critical discount 
rate when deciding on investment opportunities (see Chapter 3). We will discuss this more 
extensively in Section 2.3.4 and in Chapter 3. 
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The model discussed so far is static in nature. It cannot explain one of the 
most prevalent stylised facts in literature on technology adoption, namely the 
S-shaped diffusion of technologies over time. Two broad approaches can be 
discerned in the literature that tries to explain the gradual diffusion of 
technologies (see, for example, Jaffe and Stavins, 1994b). The first combines a 
gradual improvement of technologies (in terms of lower costs or better 
performance) over time with heterogeneity among the potential adopters. When 
the technology under consideration is still in an early phase of development, 
only those firms that gain relatively much from adoption will invest. As 
technology gradually improves, more and more firms will find the adoption 
profitable. The technology will thus diffuse gradually throughout the economy. 
The class of models that relies on this approach is known in the literature as 
probit or rank models (see, for example, David, 1969; Karshenas and 
Stoneman, 1995). Strong empirical evidence exists, showing that firm size and 
market share are relevant indicators of heterogeneity that add to explaining 
differences in adoption behaviour (see, for example, Griliches, 1957; 
Mansfield, 1968). The second approach emphasises the relevance of 
information. It rests on the assumption that at low rates of penetration, the 
knowledge about the existence of a technology is also limited. Therefore, the 
technology is only considered by a limited number of firms. As penetration 
increases, more firms will realise the potential of the technology and 
subsequently adopt the technology. The class of models employing this 
approach is known as epidemic models in the literature (see, for example, 
Griliches, 1957; Stoneman, 1983).  
A well-known problem with this framework is that many energy-efficient 
technologies have been estimated to be cost-effective (that is, profitable) 
according to standard NPV computations using ‘reasonable’ discount rates (i.e., 
discount rates in the range of 10-15%; the interest rate plus a risk premium), 
but are nevertheless not adopted (we refer to, for example, the report of the 
Interlaboratory Working Group (1997) for a comprehensive list of such 
technologies). It is beyond the scope of the current chapter to discuss and 
assess the complete literature that emerged in trying to explain this so-called 
energy-efficiency paradox (a term introduced by Shama, 1983). Instead, we 
will try to categorise the explanations. A first rough distinction is between 
explanations that stick as close as possible to the basic framework just 
described and essentially explain the existence of the paradox by relying on the 
relevance of costs or benefits that are not accounted for in the empirical 
analyses. These explanations that rely on hidden costs (of which transaction 
costs are a component) will be discussed in the remainder of this section (see 
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also Ostertag, 1999). In Section 2.3, we turn to deeper or more fundamental 
explanations that cast doubt on the assumptions on the basic framework of 
rational behaviour, absence of uncertainty, etc.  
 
2.2.2 Hidden initial investment costs 
 
Apart from the 'direct' costs of technology, costs of information gathering, 
research, negotiations on contract terms and of decision-making should also be 
considered as initial investment costs, which are, however, often difficult to 
obtain empirically. It is likely that costs used in standard NPV calculations 
differ from reality in this respect, since these costs will to a large extent be firm 
specific, depending mainly on economic, organisational and human capital 
factors (economies of scale, expertise, etc.). It is, for example, likely that 
standard NPV calculations underestimate these costs for especially Small and 
Medium sized Enterprises (SME’s) given their limited possibilities for 
exploiting economies of scale and scope in gathering information (see, for 
example, Hein and Blok (1995) for an assessment of the degree with which the 
share of information costs decreases with the size of the investment). When 
considering the adoption of a technology in isolation, the underestimation of 
costs tends to result in the overestimation of the degree of adoption. Note that 
when comparing the adoption of different technologies, it is the difference in 
hidden costs that matters for explaining adoption behaviour and not the 
presence of hidden costs per se (see Ostertag, 1999). These differences are 
relevant when considering, for example, the switch from a technology that is 
currently being used to a completely new technology on which no knowledge 
exists in the firm considering the switch.  
 
2.2.3 Hidden annual costs  
 
Also in assessing annual costs, problems can arise. Capital costs including 
costs of raising funds tend to differ between firms. For example, it is known 
that SME’s (among which are many starters) generally face higher business 
risk (see Ballantine et al., 1993). This tends to result in higher interest rates 
being charged in firm-specific contracts. Empirical information on the precise 
terms of the contract is often difficult to obtain. Some evidence for this is 
provided by Ballantine et al. (1993) who show that the level of the discount rate 
is larger for SME’s than for large(r) companies, corrected for the different risk-
return ratios of these two categories.  
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Costs that also may be underestimated are annual costs of maintenance and 
operation associated with the technology. Related to this is that many 
technologies are largely indivisible and are characterised by a minimum 
(efficient) scale of operation. Or, alternatively, high-capacity appliances are 
often cheaper per unit of capacity than low-capacity appliances. Also, small 
firms tend to be short of human resources, know-how and expertise (see, for 
example, Kleinknecht, 1989). These factors - referring to the limited 
possibilities of exploiting economies of scale - should appropriately be 
accounted for when determining the profitability of adopting a particular 
technology. We refer to Ostertag (1999) for a study in which she illustrates the 
relevance of such costs for a variety of cases.  
A final cost-related problem could be that currently used technologies have 
to be depreciated before new technologies are purchased. In essence, the annual 
depreciation costs of the old and not yet fully depreciated technology should be 
considered as annual costs of the new technology. Results by de Groot et al. 
(1999) and Velthuijsen (1995) show that this can be an important barrier to 
implementation of energy-efficient technologies. It should be mentioned 
however, that this barrier does not influence the discrete adoption decision but 
rather the timing of adoption. It is therefore possible that it is just a matter of 
time before certain technologies will be implemented (ceteris paribus).5  
 
2.2.4 Hidden annual savings 
 
One of the variables influencing the savings potential of a technology is the 
total amount of energy currently used in a firm (and the price paid for energy). 
There is evidence that in many firms the total use of energy and energy costs 
are too low to be of interest. This essentially means that the energy base over 
which savings can be made is too low for the technology to ever be profitable 
(taking into account information costs, set-up costs, etc.). Also perceptions of 
firms are important in this respect. Even though for firms with a low energy bill 
certain investments may be profitable, energy costs are often seen as part of 
'other costs' such as furniture, telephones, etc. and receive little attention in 
investment decisions. Results by Gillissen et al. (1995) confirm that a small 
current energy bill is an important barrier. Velthuijsen (1995) also provides 
                                                     
5
 This explanation obviously suggests that NPV calculations are being performed 'wrongly' by 
researchers studying the problem, in the sense that they typically ignore the fact that economic 
lifetimes are smaller than technological lifetimes. Clearly, most of the issues explored in Sections 
2.2.2-2.2.4 can in the end be reduced to measurement issues that are not appropriately controlled 
for in the applied analyses. 
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significant evidence that the size of the current energy bill is a factor of large 
influence in the investment decision. Furthermore, large energy users pay 
relatively low prices in most countries for energy based on special contracts 
with energy suppliers, which should appropriately be accounted for in the 
application of the NPV framework (as is often done in applied work; see, for 
instance, Chapter 3).  
 
 
2.3 Extensions of the standard framework 
 
So far, we have strictly considered the simple NPV rule. Empirical 
evidence has quite convincingly shown that this simple framework does not 
fully suffice to explain empirically observed adoption behaviour. Though 
relevant, measurement problems as discussed in the previous section are 
unlikely to fully explain the lack of explanatory power of the simple 
framework. In this section, we therefore turn to a discussion of contributions to 
literature on technology adoption that have provided alternative or additional 
factors that have to be considered when describing adoption behaviour. Most of 
these contributions can be seen as extensions or modifications of the 
conventional NPV framework discussed in Section 2.2.  
 
2.3.1 Information as a precondition  
 
Information is an essential precondition for developing sound investment 
strategies (see, for example, Howarth and Sanstad, 1995). The gathering of 
information regarding the existence of technologies is the first essential step in 
any adoption process. The relevance of information (or the absence thereof) for 
understanding adoption practices has especially been emphasised in relation to 
technology adoption by SME's (for example, Kleinknecht, 1989; Gillissen et 
al., 1995; Velthuijsen, 1995; de Groot et al., 1999). These studies all reveal that 
a significant part of the total available energy-efficient technologies is unknown 
and that this information gap is especially large in small firms facing limited 
competition and spending relatively little on investments (see also Chapter 7). 
It seems fair to conclude from these studies that size and also the typical 
environment in which firms operate, contribute to an explanation of the 
magnitude of the information gap.  
Apart from the knowledge on the existence of energy-efficient 
technologies, many firms also turn out to be uninformed about policy 
instruments and institutions for innovation support. Kleinknecht (1989) for 
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example shows that a large number of Dutch companies has been uninformed 
about instruments and/or institutions which try to stimulate the adoption of 
environmentally favourable technologies in the Netherlands.  
As to the reasons for the (large) information gaps, a number of factors can 
be discerned. Kleinknecht (1989) refers to the difficulties of finding technical 
information and know-how, especially for small firms. Others mention a lack 
of financial as well as human capital resources (see, for example, McGregor 
and Gomes, 1999; Bianchi and Noci, 1998; Lybaert, 1998). This is consistent 
with the strong reliance of SME’s on their own accumulated experience when 
making decisions (Rice and Hamilton, 1979). All these factors are in one way 
or the other related to the limited possibilities for exploiting economies of scale 
and scope and can to a large extent explain the large information gap regarding 
the existence of energy-efficient technologies.  
There is an evident role for the government or government agencies to 
provide the information which has important elements of a public good. This 
can be done directly by, for example, information campaigns, labelling, etc., or 
more indirectly via stimulating co-operation among firms by using, for 
example, negotiated agreements (see Chapters 5 and 7). 
 
2.3.2 Capital as a precondition 
 
A second precondition that has to be met, before adoption can take place, is 
the availability of capital. There are some strong indications that firms, and 
especially SME’s, are restrained in their financial resources (often related to 
specific risks that SME's face). Kleinknecht (1989) shows that a lack of capital 
is the most important barrier regarding general innovation investments. Lack of 
capital not only appeared to be a large constraint in SME’s in absolute terms,6 
it also appeared significantly more important in SME’s than in large(r) firms 
(see also Winker, 1999). Although these results relate to innovation in general, 
they are suggestive for lack of capital being an important barrier to investing in 
energy-efficient technologies as well.7 More specifically focused on barriers to 
adoption of energy-efficient technologies in the Netherlands, Velthuijsen 
(1995) provides evidence on the relevance of financing constraints as a barrier 
to adoption. 
                                                     
6
 The study by Kleinknecht reveals that of firms with 10 to 19 (20 to 49) employees, nearly 60% 
(50%) considered lack of capital an important barrier.   
7
 See also Bianchi and Noci (1998) and Hirst and Brown (1990). 
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Apart from the importance of financial constraints in general, the lack of 
internal capital appears to be a larger constraint than the lack of external capital 
(Winker, 1999). This result is confirmed by Gillissen et al. (1995). Their results 
show the significance of missing financial resources, especially internal ones. It 
is unclear, however, if and to what extent a lack of internal financial resources 
is a constraint in itself or whether it reflects the fact that a lack of equity 
induces credit rationing by banks, thus resulting in an external financial 
constraint in the end (see Chapter 7 for more empirical evidence). 
In case banks and other financial institutions are unwilling to finance 
seemingly profitable investments, we can conclude that the capital market 
possibly contains some failures. The assertion of failures in the financial 
markets should, however, be carefully made since we have limited information 
on the exact reasons for credit rationing. It is well possible that certain financial 
requirements (such as liquidity and solvability) prevent banks to lend (more) 
money because of the overall risk of default, to which the (perceived) risk 
attached to energy-efficiency investments only contributes to a small extent.  
 
2.3.3 Uncertainty and the option value of waiting 
 
The simple and stylised NPV-framework presented in Section 2.2 assumes 
the absence of uncertainty. This subsection emphasises the importance of 
appropriately accounting for uncertainty. The basis logic according to which 
uncertainty affects the decision whether or not to adopt is simple (see, for 
example, Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Presupposing some degree 
of irreversibility of the investment,8 uncertainty creates an option value of 
waiting. That is, in the presence of uncertainty it pays for a firm to wait for new 
information to arrive. The NPV that firms require when taking into account 
uncertainty is larger than the NPV that results in the absence of uncertainty. 
Firms in others words require a compensation for the uncertainty that they face. 
This essentially results from the fact that firms want to avoid investing in 
technologies that ex post turn out to be non-profitable in combination with the 
fact that more or new information becomes available over time. This logic 
results in firms putting a mark-up on the critical discount rate that they apply. 
Box 2.1 briefly explains the theory of investing under uncertainty.  
                                                     
8
 The idea that investments in energy-saving projects have some important elements of sunkness 
is widely accepted. Blown-in wall insulation, for example, cannot be resold. In addition, one can 
rely on Akerlof’s Lemons principle according to which investments cannot easily be resold (see 
Metcalf, 1994, for this argument). 
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Box 2.1 Investing under uncertainty. 
 
The aim of this box is to derive in a very simple and basic framework under 
what conditions uncertainty and growth of the value of a project can result in 
delaying an investment by fully rational and profit-maximising firms. For this 
aim, a model is presented that can be seen as a slight generalisation of the 
model developed in Chapter 3 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). This exercise 
serves two related goals. First, it gives some intuitive feeling for the effects that 
uncertainty has on decisions (not) to invest. Secondly, it enables us to explain 
the ways in which option values are computed, a concept that plays a central 
role in theories of investment under uncertainty. 
The model that we develop extends the basic framework of Section 2.2.1 to a 
stochastic setting in which there is uncertainty about future payoffs. Suppose a 
firm can invest in a project at a cost equal to I. The returns to this project are 
uncertain and are taken to be equal to the price of the product that can be 
produced by investing in the project (i.e. there are no operating costs for 
simplicity and without loss of generality). At time t=0, the return is equal to V0. 
From time t=1 onwards, the return equals (1+u)V0 with probability q, and      
(1–d)V0 with probability (1–q). We assume, without loss of generality, that the 
project is not profitable if the return ends up low (that is, we assume       
I>V0(1–d)(1+r)/r). The risk-free interest rate is taken to be equal to r. The firm 
basically has three opportunities. Either it invests immediately, or it will invest 
tomorrow, or it will never invest. Let us calculate the Net-Present-Value of 
these three options. Investing immediately yields in expected terms and 
constant prices of time t=0 
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where the index I indicates that the firm will invest immediately. Waiting one 
period and investing then will only be done if the return has gone up (since the 
project was assumed to be not profitable in the case the return decreases). This 
yields in constant prices of time t=0 
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In case NPVW > NPVI, waiting is optimal for the firm. The costs of waiting 
consist of foregone revenues at time t=0. The benefits are that at time t=1 
information is revealed which has value to the firm in that it enables the firm to 
avoid investing in a project which looks profitable ex-ante but turns out to be 
unprofitable ex-post. In addition, the present discounted cost of the project is 
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lower when investment is delayed. The difference in the return to the two 
investment strategies can be called the ‘value of waiting’ and equals 
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Differentiating this value with respect to the relevant parameters reveals that 
this option value of waiting positively depends on the sunk cost that has to be 
made, the potential downward jump in returns, the risk free rate of interest and 
negatively on the return on the project at time t=0, and the probability that the 
return on the project will increase. It is interesting to note that the option value 
of waiting does not depend on the size of the potential upward jump in the 
return on the project. Provided that the ex-post return to the project is positive 
if the return increases, the firm does not worry about the extent to which the 
value of the project will increase in its decision whether and when to invest. 
This is an example of the bad-news principle as spelled out by Bernanke 
(1983). 
In this slightly extended framework of Section 2.2.1, two reasons can be 
discerned for rational firms to optimally delay their investment in new 
technologies:  
 
• Growth of value of the project 
Let us, for the time being, suppose that there is no uncertainty and that the 
return to the project will increase during the next period (so the NPV is and will 
remain positive at any point in time).9 More precisely, we assume that q=1 and 
u>0. In this case, firms will invest at t=1 instead of investing immediately if the 
ratio between the cost of the project and its return at time t=0 exceeds some 
threshold. More precisely, delaying the investment is optimal if I/V0>(1+r)/r. 
The optimality of delaying the investment is thus more likely; the larger the 
cost of the investment project, the larger the interest rate (i.e., the larger the 
future is discounted off) and the smaller the initial value of the project will be. 
This can be explained, since delaying the investment yields the firm a gain in 
terms of a reduced (discounted) cost of the project. If this return is large 
relative to the cost in terms of the foregone return on the project at time t=0, the 
                                                     
9
 A more extended version of such a model in which costs and benefits are surveyed further can 
be found in de Groot (1999b). Another deterministic (and richer) framework is provided in Jaffe 
and Stavins (1994a). 
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firm will favour a delay of the project. One can, of course, easily see that a 
similar result will apply if the future cost of the project will strongly decrease.10  
 
• Uncertainty 
We now turn to the effects of uncertainty on the option value of the investment. 
The expectation and variance of the return at time t=1 are equal to 
E(V1)=V0[q(1+u)+(1–q)(1–d)] and V(V1)=E(V12)–E(V1)2=q(1–q)(u+d)2, 
respectively. Now consider the special case in which q=d/(u+d). In this special 
case, an equi-proportionate increase in both u and d leaves the expected return 
on the investment as well as the probability of an upward swing in the return 
unaffected, while it increases the variance of the return. This is exactly the type 
of experiment we would like to perform when considering the effects of 
uncertainty of investment behaviour. We have just seen that an increase in the 
size of the downward jump of the return will result in firms being more likely 
to delay the investment. Hence, an increase in uncertainty, caused by an equi-
proportionate increase in u and d (leaving the expected return on the project 
and the probabilities of upward and downward jump unaffected) will, ceteris 
paribus, result in more projects being delayed. This is the basic result of the 
theory of investment under uncertainty. It can be shown to generalise to more 
realistic and complex settings as shown in, for example, Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994), Farzin et al. (1998) and de Groot et al. (2002).  
 
The relevance of uncertainties associated with energy-saving technologies 
is easy to illustrate. First, there is uncertainty regarding the future prices and 
qualities of currently used and future technologies. If a certain technology has 
just been introduced to the market, it can be worthwhile for a firm to wait for 
its price to go down. In this case, a firm has to weigh the savings in costs 
against the foregone savings of the technology during the period of delay. 
Second, there is uncertainty regarding the future level and the volatility of 
interest rates and the interest costs associated with them (see, for example, 
Calcagnini and Iacobucci, 1997, for the impact of interest rate volatility on 
investment demand). Again, in case a firm faces large uncertainty regarding 
future interest rates, it may be worthwhile to delay the investment and wait for 
new information to arise. Third, the potential savings of energy-efficient 
                                                     
10
 To illustrate this, suppose that a project yields a certain return in any period equal to V0  and 
that the cost of the project equals I at time t=0 and decreases to (1–d)I at time t=1. In this case, it 
is easily shown that the project will be delayed in case I(r+d)/(1+r)>V0. This result indicates that 
a sufficient decline in the cost of the project in combination with a large discount rate and a low 
return that is foregone by delaying the investment will favour delays. 
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technologies are uncertain. Standard NPV calculations assume the price of 
energy to be predictable, which is not the case in reality. Moreover, the 
performance of the technology in terms of energy saving is usually uncertain as 
well (see, for example, Hirst and Brown, 1990). Unforeseen drops in energy 
prices and unexpectedly low energy savings can make a technology 
unprofitable ex-post, opposed to its expected profitability ex-ante. Finally, 
there is uncertainty regarding future policies. This policy-induced uncertainty is 
particularly relevant in relation to environmental problems given the 
uncertainty with respect to the timing and implementation of the Kyoto 
protocol, subsidy schemes, the stringency of environmental regulation, etc.  
Firms can, however, reduce the risk associated with energy-price 
uncertainty. Other investments, either real or monetary, whose profitabilities 
are negatively correlated with the profitability of energy-related investments, 
could provide a hedge against the risk of energy-related investments. The risk 
associated with energy-related investments is then highly overestimated. 
Howarth and Sanstad (1995) argue, however, that especially households and 
small firms’ account for the high Implicit Discount Rates (as a proxy for 
uncertainty and risk) found in the literature. These economic agents do not have 
the financial resources and scale of operation to hedge, and therefore must bear 
the full risk of energy-related investments.  
Empirical studies assessing the relevance of uncertainties for explaining 
investment behaviour have recently been reviewed in Bo and Sterken (2000). 
They emphasise that uncertainties are difficult to measure, that various 
measures have been used in empirical practice and that assessing the relevance 
of irreversibilities is empirically difficult. The empirical evidence that they 
discuss clearly indicates a negative effect of uncertainty on investments.11  
An attempt to illustrate the potential empirical relevance of uncertainty for 
the diffusion of energy-efficient technologies was made in a study by van Soest 
and de Groot (2000). They assess the consequences of the liberalisation of the 
US gas market for the penetration of energy-efficient technologies. On the basis 
of price developments on the gas market, they hypothesise that the 
liberalisation has resulted in a drop in gas prices and an increase in the 
volatility of gas prices. The lower gas prices clearly have a depressing effect on 
the profitability of investments in energy-efficient technologies. The increased 
volatility of energy-prices – according to the theory of investing under 
uncertainty – will increase the option value of waiting which also tends to delay 
                                                     
11
 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the studies that have been done on assessing 
the effects of uncertainty on investments. We refer the interested reader to, among others, Ghosal 
and Loungani (2000), Price (1995), Ferderer (1993) and Huizinga (1993). 
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the investment in energy-efficient technology. Based on a stylised simulation 
exercise, they derive that the increased uncertainty decreases the probability 
that adoption of a postulated superior technology takes place within 10 years 
from 90% to 79% whereas the lower energy price further reduces this 
probability to 41%. Although tentative, these conclusions give some feeling for 
the empirical relevance of the contribution of uncertainty to explaining the slow 
diffusion of energy-efficient technologies. 
Despite the appeal of the logic of the theory of investing under uncertainty, 
its relevance for explaining the energy-efficiency paradox is not uncontested. 
Most criticisms relate to the strong assumptions underlying the theory, and 
which are necessary to explain the high implicit discount rates. Jaffe and 
Stavins (1994a) emphasise that the theory of investment under uncertainty 
assumes that the only cost of delaying the investment is the foregone energy 
saving. This is obviously not always true. Firms that struggle early with the 
investments may, for example, gain first mover advantages, and learning-by-
doing and learning-by-using may be important fruits of early adoption (see de 
Groot (1999b) and de Groot (2002) for a survey on the potential justifications 
for early and late action aimed at curbing climate change). Furthermore, they 
argue that there may be simply no way of disentangling theoretically and 
empirically the effects of discounting, uncertainty over price developments, and 
informational and principal-agent based problems on the implicit discount 
rates.12 In the end, the conclusion regarding the relevance of uncertainty for 
understanding the energy-efficiency paradox is that the jury is still out. 
Empirical evidence exists that strongly indicates the existence of a negative 
relationship between uncertainty and investments, the contribution of 
uncertainty to explaining the relatively high hurdle rates is substantial, but at 
the same time some of the assumptions on which the theory rests can be 
criticised.  
 
2.3.4 Non-rational behaviour  
 
Our analysis so far presumed rational behaviour of firms deciding on 
whether or not to invest in technologies. The best-known critique on this 
framework goes back to the seminal work of Simon (1955). He casts doubt on 
the possibilities of firms to acquire and process all relevant information 
regarding current and future possible states of the world that are needed to 
                                                     
12
 A similar remark has been made by Sanstad et al. (1995) on the usefulness of uncertainty-
based explanations for high implicit discount rates applied by consumers.  
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rationally decide on the adoption of a technology. Instead, he proposes that 
firms often behave according to a 'satisficing principle', where they look for 
‘satisfactory profits’ instead of maximum profits, and apply rules of thumb and 
routines. This approach has been elaborated upon in the evolutionary theory 
(for example, Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Some evidence on the relevance of such theories is provided in, for 
example, Jaffe and Stavins (1995) and Hassett and Metcalf (1995). They show 
that adoption subsidies, which are granted upon adoption of the technology, are 
a factor three to eight more effective than ‘equivalent’ energy taxes which 
accrue to the firm over the lifetime of the technology. Financial analysis 
building on the rational-behaviour hypothesis would suggest that they should 
be the same. The results reveal that adoption decisions are more sensitive to up-
front cost-benefit considerations than to longer-term benefits (Jaffe et al., 
2000). Non-rational behaviour is clearly the most logical candidate to explain 
this result.13  
 
2.3.5 Complementarities among technologies and network externalities 
 
The basic framework of Section 2.2 considered technologies in isolation. 
This assumption can be challenged on the basis of at least two considerations. 
First, different technologies within a firm often do not function in isolation. 
The presence of a particular technology can reinforce the performance of 
another technology and thus affect the Net-Present-Value of that technology. In 
general, good arguments can be made for the existence of returns to diversity 
(an idea building on seminal papers by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier 
(1982) and subsequently explored intensively in the endogenous growth 
literature; see, for example, de Groot and Nahuis, 2002; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990). The consequences of such returns to diversity 
for the diffusion of energy-efficient technologies were recently explored in 
Mulder et al. (2000). They show that in the presence of complementarities and 
gradually improving technologies, firms continue to invest in relatively old 
technologies which – when considered in isolation – are inferior to newer 
technologies. This results in only a gradual 'phasing out' of old technologies, 
instead of the immediate replacement that would be predicted by this type of 
model when not considering the complementarities.  
                                                     
13
 Note that also uncertainty can play a role here as explained in Section 2.3.3. Uncertainty 
‘implicitly’ increases the discount rate and thereby also increases the weight attached to current 
benefits as compared to future benefits.  
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Second, the performance of a technology in one firm can be reinforced by the 
presence of that same technology in another firm. In this case, there are 
network-externalities (see Besen and Farrell (1994) and Katz and Shapiro 
(1994) for seminal contributions). Network externalities can explain why it is 
difficult for a diffusion process to get started initially. At the other extreme, 
technologies subject to network externalities are sensitive to ‘lock-ins’ in 
inferior technologies once the diffusion process has sufficiently progressed. 
Theories building on these network externalities have especially been applied 
so far to issues related to information and communication technologies. They 
are, however, relevant for understanding diffusion patterns of any sort of 
technology, including environmental technologies. Reliability and service of 
suppliers of technologies and economies of scale and scope for suppliers of 
technologies are just two examples to illustrate their relevance (see, for 
example, Chapter 6).  
 
2.3.6 Learning and the dynamic evolution of technological performance  
 
In its simplest setting, the framework developed in Section 2.2.1 assumes 
the costs and benefits of technology adoption as constant over time (or, more 
precisely, to be independent of the adoption time). This assumption is at odds 
with a wealth of empirical evidence revealing the gradual decline of costs (or 
the gradual improvement of performance) of technologies. This empirical 
evidence has been gathered in studies determining so-called learning curves or 
experience curves (see OECD/IEA, 2000, for a survey of knowledge on 
experience curves with regard to energy-efficient technologies). What this 
literature has shown is that the decline of costs or the improved performance is 
conditional upon the penetration of the technology. From an analytical point of 
view, it is relevant to make the distinction between learning that is internal to 
the firm (that is, the returns only accrue to the firm adopting the technology) 
and learning that is external (that is, adoption results in an overall decline of the 
costs that accrues to all subsequent investors in the technology). In the former 
case – assuming predictability of the development of the technology – the 
learning effect can be incorporated in the assessment of the profitability of the 
technology and the standard framework is still valid. In the latter case, 
however, firms can have an incentive to wait for other firms to adopt and to 
only buy the technology after it has sufficiently improved (see also Box 2.1). 
This can create a co-ordination problem in the sense that no firm is willing to 
start adopting the technology (for example, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983).  
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2.3.7 Vested interests, resistance to technology adoption and the 
distribution of benefits 
 
A final (implicit) assumption in the framework of Section 2.2 is that the 
‘total’ NPV of a technology is relevant for determining whether or not a 
technology is adopted. This assumption neglects the potential relevance of the 
distribution of the benefits of adoption of various actors that are affected by the 
adoption.14 There is a wide variety of arguments that can be put forward as to 
why these distributional issues are relevant for understanding actual adoption 
behaviour and technology diffusion. These arguments are generally classified 
under the heading of agency problems.  
The simplest and best known example of an agency problem regards the 
relationship between a landlord and a tenant in which the landlord pays for the 
investment in, for example, insulation, while the tenant pays for the utilities 
(and thus reaps the benefits of the investment). Unless the landlord can acquire 
(a sufficiently large) part of the savings by, for example, increasing the rent of 
the apartment, he will have no incentive to invest in the insulation. Agency 
problems can also exist within a firm. A simple example is the situation of a 
firm with different departments, each with their own budget, in which one 
department is responsible for the acquisition of equipment and another 
department is responsible for the payment of utilities. Again, situations can 
arise in which the department that buys the equipment resists the acquisition of 
energy-efficient but relatively expensive technologies since these do not pay-
off in terms of the performance of the department (see, for example, DeCanio, 
1998).  
Agency problems can also have important temporal aspects. Take the 
above example of the landlord and the tenant. It would be optimal for both the 
landlord and the tenant to agree in advance about a distribution of the benefits 
of the insulation in such a way that both would be willing to accept the 
insulation. Signing a contract ex-ante in which the tenant agrees to pay a higher 
rent once the apartment has been insulated could do this. Signing such a 
contract is ex-ante profitable for the tenant. However, ex-post he has an 
incentive to renege on the contract since once the insulation is there, it cannot 
be made ineffective by the landlord. This problem is known as the ‘hold-up’ 
                                                     
14
 The distribution is in a purely rational framework argued to be irrelevant. If the ‘total’ NPV is 
positive, there is always a distribution of benefits feasible for which none of the actors are the 
worse. It is in the interest of those actors who are strongly affected in a positive way by the 
adoption to propose such a distribution of benefits in order to let the adoption take place.   
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problem. It is evidently more relevant the larger the difficulties of signing a 
contract between the parties engaged.  
A second class of agency problems arises in the light of the age distribution 
of the actors involved. This has been emphasised in Canton et al. (2002). Their 
basic claim is that the adoption of a technology tends to affect different age 
groups differently. Younger workers are generally more flexible and have more 
time to recoup the costs associated with the adoption of a superior technology. 
Older workers on the other hand are less flexible, have already gained 
experience in working with old, inferior technology and have relatively little 
time to experience the gains associated with the new technology. This may, for 
example, partly explain why the QWERTY keyboard is still in use. It is well 
known that switching to a keyboard with an alternative ordering of keys would 
improve the efficiency of typewriting. There are, however, costs of transition 
involved since ‘old’ typists would have to get acquainted with a new keyboard. 
Therefore, they have an incentive to resist the adoption of the new technology. 
For ‘young’ people, however, the costs of adoption would be negligible since 
they would still have to learn to type from scratch.  
 
 
2.4 Evaluation and conclusion 
 
The economists’ framework for analysing adoption behaviour regarding 
energy-efficient technologies is often criticised. Arguments against its 
relevance that have been put forward are that owners and managers of firms 
lack the time, the personnel and the resources to make decisions on adopting 
energy-efficient technologies in the manner an economist would expect a 
rational agent to do. Low planning procedures (Matthews and Scott, 1995), 
unstructured and unplanned processes, reliance on intuition (Peterson, 1988) 
and extensive reliance on own accumulated experience (Rice and Hamilton, 
1979) seem to be common in most firms. Furthermore, the notion of 
‘satisficing’ instead of maximising behaviour in complex environments may 
sometimes be more suited to describe the reality of decision making in 
especially SME’s (see, for example, DeCanio, 1993). Also the relevance of 
uncertainties, distributional issues, informational, learning effects and capital 
constraints are often not incorporated in analyses based on the conventional 
NPV framework. As indicated in Section 2.3, important steps forward have 
been made, however, in trying to assess and incorporate the relevance of such 
factors. This has not resulted in one uniform and integrated framework, but it is 
easily established that the different theories complement each other.  
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In the end, we think that the simple framework laid down in this chapter 
with the modifications and extensions that were proposed, is well suited for 
describing crucial elements of actual adoption behaviour, which are consistent 
with insights from empirical research. The extensions focussed especially on 
the key role of availability of information and funds as preconditions for 
adoption to take place, the importance of taking into account uncertainties, 
complementarities and (dynamic) learning effects, and the importance of the 
division of benefits among the various stakeholders that are involved in the 
decision-making process regarding adoption of new technologies. These 
elements are not intrinsically incompatible with NPV calculations, but are often 
ignored in these calculations primarily due to their theoretical and empirical 
complexities. Taken together, however, these factors can bring us reasonably 
far in explaining the energy-efficiency gap and resolving the energy-efficiency 
paradox. 
Using the insights from this chapter, we will now turn to the evaluation of 
the effectiveness of three specific policy instruments that have been used in the 
Netherlands. Chapter 3 focuses on subsidies that aim at improving the 
profitability of technology adoption and also have a function of indirectly 
providing information on available energy-efficient technologies (a so-called 
demonstration value). Chapter 4 deals with energy-efficiency standards. It 
emphasises the difficulties of appropriately designing normative instruments in 
situations where there is asymmetric information between the regulator (the 
government) and the firms that will be subjected to the standards. Chapter 5 
studies in-depth the effectiveness of negotiated agreements. An important 
mechanism through which the negotiated agreements result in improved energy 
efficiency is that it improves the information of firms participating in the 
agreement on the available technological options. They can help, in other 
words, in ameliorating the information problems emphasised in this chapter. 
Asymmetric information is again an important potential problem in effectively 
designing the agreements. Chapter 6 shifts the attention from technology 
adoption towards technology development. By means of an in-depth analysis of 
four technology case studies, the importance of complementary benefits that go 
beyond energy-efficiency is illustrated. Also the relevance of uncertainties and 
risk-taking behaviour in these stages of development of new technologies are 
found to be pervasive. The empirical part is concluded with an overall survey 
of adoption behaviour of individual firms. This chapter pays attention to the 
importance of the external environment of firms, both for understanding 
differences in adoption behaviour as well as for understanding differences in 
the effectiveness of various policy measures. Also the relevance of firm 
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heterogeneity in terms of size, energy-intensity, information availability, etc. as 
argued to be relevant in this chapter are empirically tested. The study is 
concluded with a modelling exercise in Chapter 8. The model is built on the 
framework developed in this chapter and fed with empirical regularities 
established in the several chapters.     
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
3  SUBSIDISING THE ADOPTION OF ENERGY-
EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGIES: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FREE-RIDER EFFECT15 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Subsidies are intensively used to steer the adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies. Their cost-effectiveness is disputed for a variety of reasons. First, 
in a competitive economy, subsidies increase aggregate emissions, which is 
essentially caused by the income transfer implied by the subsidy (and the 
associated entry of new firms or enlargement of existing firms). Subsidies - in 
other words - do not provide an incentive to reduce aggregate utilisation of 
energy. Taxes are in this context a more effective instrument in the sense that 
they result in declining aggregate emissions (for example, Baumol and Oates, 
1988). Second, taxes generate revenues that can be used to reduce other 
distortionary taxes and to increase welfare (see the literature on the double 
dividend as discussed in, for example, de Mooij, 1999).  Third, subsidies 
involve administration costs that tend to be larger than those for tax measures. 
These costs increase with the specificity of the subsidy program. Fourth, 
subsidies are often considered to be inefficient since they involve free riders. In 
this context, free riders are defined as agents who make use of the subsidy, but 
would have undertaken the subsidised action anyway - and without any delay 
(see, for example, Train, 1994). We will use this definition throughout this 
chapter. Because of these free riders, large public expenditures can be required 
per unit of effect, raising an issue of feasibility of granting subsidies in the 
presence of fiscal constraints (for example, Jaffe et al., 2000). Advocates of 
subsidies emphasise the information constraints that can be overcome by the 
provision of subsidies. They emphasise the relevance of demonstration effects 
that can result from subsidy programs. Furthermore, evidence exists that 
adoption subsidies are a factor three to eight more effective than ‘equivalent’ 
energy taxes, although financial analysis would suggest that they should be the 
                                                     
15
 This chapter has been written by Rob Aalbers, Henri L.F. de Groot, Ioulia V. Ossokina and 
Herman R.J. Vollebergh. Senter is gratefully acknowledged for providing us with the data. This 
chapter builds on a study performed in the context of an IBO (Interdepartementaal Beleids 
Onderzoek) of the Dutch government. This study was done jointly with Ecofys, Utrecht. Arjen 
Gielen, Aafke Reinders, Karin Michels and Peter Mulder provided useful comments.  
 
  
 
 
 
32 CHAPTER 3   
  
 
 
same (see, for example, Jaffe and Stavins, 1995, and Hasset and Metcalf, 1995 
for empirical analyses revealing this result). Adoption decisions are thus, 
according to these insights, more sensitive to up-front cost-benefit 
considerations than to longer-term benefits (Jaffe et al., 2000). Note that these 
results suggest that (up-front) taxes on the purchase of inefficient appliances 
are to be preferred above energy taxes and can be equally effective as up-front 
subsidies.  
The basic aim of this chapter is to determine the number of free riders in 
the population of agents who participated in two Dutch subsidy programs 
aimed at stimulating the adoption of energy-efficient technologies, taking into 
account the potential relevance of informational mechanisms. For this aim, we 
use two distinct methods. The first method classifies agents on the basis of a 
confrontation of actual and required profitability of investment projects (in this 
case, energy-efficient technologies). In this method, agents are classified as free 
riders if they obtained the subsidy, while judging the technology profitable 
according to their own investment criteria in the absence of the subsidy. The 
classification in the second method is based on stated behaviour obtained by a 
survey. In both methods, the relevance of demonstration effects is determined 
using survey methods by which firms are asked about their information set 
before and after the introduction of the subsidy program. The analysis is based 
on a tax rebate scheme in the profit sector and a subsidy programme in the non-
profit sector in the Netherlands. Both methods enable us to explicitly 
distinguish between (i) firms that had the information about the technology and 
knew it was profitable (rational firms), (ii) firms that learned about the 
technology as a result of the subsidy program and then realised that the 
technology was profitable (information-constrained firms), and (iii) firms for 
which the technology was not profitable anyway. This distinction allows us to 
draw conclusions - among others - on the relevance of the demonstration effect 
that subsidies can have. After the classification, we empirically determine the 
cost-effectiveness of subsidy schemes by calculating the amount of energy 
saved per guilder of subsidy. An overview will be given per technology, both 
with and without controlling for free riders. The results obtained can be used 
for evaluating and re-designing the subsidies in order to improve their 
efficiency. 
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 concisely 
discusses the related literature. Section 3.3 describes the two methods that we 
use to classify firms. The data are discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents 
the classification of firms. In Section 3.6, we make an attempt to determine the 
cost-effectiveness of subsidies controlling for free riding and the possibility of 
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subsidies having a demonstration value. The analysis distinguishes between 
different subsidised technologies and discusses the possibilities for redesigning 
and improving the cost-effectiveness of subsidies. Section 3.7 offers a 
conclusion. 
 
 
3.2 Literature review 
 
Research by economists on the subject of the effectiveness of subsidies in 
stimulating the adoption of energy-efficient technologies dates back as far as 
1986, when the seminal theoretical paper by Downing and White appeared, 
comparing the effects of different instruments on technology adoption. A large 
body of theoretical literature followed the paper on the subject (see Carraro, 
1999, for an overview). Empirical studies on the effectiveness of subsidies are 
scarce. Some exceptions are studies that assess subsidy programs directed on 
the stimulation of new technology adoption (for example, Ropke and 
Jorgensen, 1992) and Demand Side Management (DSM) programs16 in 
especially the electricity sector (for example, Hirst, 1992, Joskow and Marton, 
1992 and Malm, 1996). The studies compare the costs and benefits (in terms of 
the energy savings) of the programs, and estimate the fraction of free riders in 
them. The results of the free rider estimations vary considerably (between 17% 
and 89%), just as the estimation methods do.  
Studies estimating the number of free riders can usefully be separated into 
two groups: those based on surveys and those using non-survey-based methods. 
Studies of the first group consider the subsidy program participants and 
determine whether an agent is a free rider on the basis of his answer to the 
question whether the investment under consideration would have been 
undertaken anyway (that is, also in the absence of the subsidy; see, for 
example, Haugland, 1996). A considerable advantage of this approach is the 
relatively limited data requirements since the analysis is made on the basis of 
the group of participants in the subsidy program. This group is relatively easy 
to define, and the authorities supervising the subsidy program usually gather 
the information concerning its members. The problems with the approach under 
consideration are those common to ex-post survey-based estimates. Well-
known problems include response bias, poor customer recall and the bias 
associated with survey wording (see Tolkin and Rathburn, 1992, and Krause, 
                                                     
16
 DSM projects directed to energy saving are projects started by electricity companies in order to 
promote the energy saving by consumers. These projects most often use discounts on the 
investment costs of energy efficient technologies and information provision (see, for example, 
Eto et al., 1996). 
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1993). The studies of the second group aim at estimating the probability that an 
agent is a free rider. For this aim, they determine the probability of buying the 
subsidised technology anyway (the pre-disposition to buy the energy-efficient 
technology) and the probability of participating in the subsidy program. The 
probability of being a free rider is then simply derived as the multiple of the 
two latter probabilities. This approach avoids the need to use survey techniques 
to determine the number of free riders, and thus prevents the problems 
mentioned above. However, to determine the probability of taking part in the 
subsidy program, which is necessary for implementing this approach, data are 
not only required on the subsidy program participants, but also on the non-
participants. This raises a difficult issue of the definition of the group of non-
participants,17 and the need to acquire data on them. Also, determining the pre-
disposition to buy energy-efficient technologies anyway requires data, that are 
not readily available. The solution to this data problem may be either using 
simulated data or using surveys to obtain some intermediary inputs to the 
analysis. Train (1994) used the former approach. Although it illustrates the 
mechanisms that are relevant in determining the number of free riders, it does 
not allow for conclusions about ‘real’ existing subsidy schemes. The latter 
approach was used in, for example, Malm (1996).  
In addition to increasing the benefits (or reducing the costs) associated with 
the adoption of an energy-efficient technology, a subsidy can also provide 
information about the existence of (new) technologies to the agents. This 
demonstration effect of subsidy programs - or alternatively, the attention value 
effect - has so far to our knowledge not been studied explicitly in the 
framework of the estimation of the number of free riders. The importance of 
the effect of information dissemination for technology adoption is, however, 
widely acknowledged in the literature on technology adoption (see, for 
example, Dosi and Moretto, 1997; Griliches, 1957; and Stoneman, 1983 for 
illustrations of the so-called epidemic diffusion models and Chapter 2). 
Empirical evidence has been provided by Morgenstern and Al-Jurf (1999) and 
Koomey (2000). The study of Koomey estimated the demonstration effect of a 
tax credit on the adoption of specific technologies (that is, an effect that is 
independent of the size of the subsidy and only requires the provision of a 
subsidy per se). Koomey showed that the demonstration effect was 
considerable  (30% and 24% for two different technologies), and comparable to 
the estimated direct price effect of the tax credit. The relevance of information 
effects is, however, not undisputed in the literature (see, for example, Jaffe and 
Stavins, 1995). 
                                                     
17
 See Train (1994) for an extensive discussion of this specific question. 
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3.3 The approach used 
  
In the introduction, we defined free riders as agents (companies and 
households) who acquired a subsidy, but would have adopted the subsidised 
technology anyway and without a delay. Implicit in this definition is the 
requirement that the subsidy has had no demonstration value (that is, the 
information set of the agents was not affected by the subsidy). The approach 
used in the analysis underlying this chapter uses both methods discussed in the 
previous section to classify free riders. In the first method, we determine the 
number of free riders on the basis of objective characteristics of the subsidised 
technologies and information on the critical discount rates (derived from a 
survey). In the second method, we use a survey to determine the number of free 
riders based on participants’ perceptions regarding their own behaviour. This 
section discusses the methods that we have used to determine the number of 
free riders and the relevance of demonstration value in evaluating the efficiency 
of subsidy instruments.  
In the first method, our classification of agents proceeds in two steps. First, 
we determine the profitability of a technology both with and without the 
subsidy.18 This measure of profitability is confronted with the minimal required 
profitability as expressed by the firms. If the profitability of the technology 
without the subsidy exceeds the required profitability, the agent is called a free-
rider (not yet controlling for the potential existence of demonstration value). 
Second, we determine the number of agents for whom the subsidy had 
demonstration value. The latter is based on information derived from a survey 
held among the subsidised agents. The combination of the two steps results in 
our preferred measure for the number of free riders.   
The determination of the profitability of a technology is based on an 
elementary cost-benefit analysis. We refer to Section 2.1 for an explanation of 
the cost-benefit analysis used in this study and Chapter 2 in general for a 
critical discussion of the use of cost-benefit analysis in the context of the 
energy-efficiency paradox. For the subsidised technology, we obtained 
information from technology experts on the energy savings achieved by 
adopting the technology (compared to a reference technology if applicable). In 
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 Note that in this measure for profitability we did include other subsidies (that is, other than the 
EIA or the EINP). We, in other words, addressed the question whether the EIA or the EINP was 
the subsidy that finally triggered firms to adopt the technology (after already having received 
other subsidies). Information on other subsidies received was obtained via the survey that was 
sent to the firms that obtained an EIA or EINP subsidy. 
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doing so, we controlled for sector-specific energy prices. The costs of adoption 
were obtained from the application for the subsidy and included installation and 
operation and maintenance costs. Finally, information was gathered on the 
(average) economic lifetime of the technology and the critical discount rate or 
the critical payback period applied by the firm (that is, the investment criterion 
on the basis of which actors decide whether or not a technology is profitable). 
The information on critical discount rates was obtained on the basis of a survey 
(the survey (in Dutch) is available upon request from the authors).19 On the 
basis of this information, we determined the rate of return on the adoption of 
the technology (the discount rate for which the Net Present Value of adoption is 
equal to zero) or the actual payback period of the technology.20 We compared 
these calculated payback periods with the critical payback periods adopted by 
the firms. On the basis of this method, we were able to classify the subsidised 
agents in three groups. The first group consists of agents for whom the 
technology is profitable even without the subsidy. These are labelled as free 
riders. The second group consists of agents for whom the technology became 
profitable due to the provision of the subsidy and was thus triggered to adopt. 
The final group consists of agents for whom the technology is unprofitable 
according to their investment criterion even after receiving the subsidy. Those 
are labelled as ‘irrational’. The second step in our analysis is the determination 
of the number of agents for whom the subsidy had an informational effect or 
demonstration value. Agents are not necessarily aware of all the technological 
options available at the moment and/or their characteristics.21 It is therefore 
possible that agents started considering the technology only after they were 
informed about the technology via - for example - the subsidy prospectus. This 
demonstration value may have been relevant for agents that were classified as 
free riders in the first step of the analysis. Since the provision of information is 
a potentially important effect of a subsidy, it is important to single out those 
                                                     
19
 The economic literature that explicitly models adoption and determines the influence of 
environmental policy instruments on technology adoption usually takes an aggregate perspective. 
It often assumes some (mostly linear) distribution of the critical investment criteria (see, for 
example, the theoretical studies of Albrecht, 1999, Saracho and Usategui, 1994, Jorgensen and 
Zaccour, 1999). For empirical applications, it is relevant to take account of heterogeneity of 
agents. We therefore obtained data on the individual critical payback period or rate of return by 
asking the agents directly in the form of a survey.  
20
 The choice for a critical payback period or critical discount rate was dependent on the 
investment criterion applied by the firm. As explained in Chapter 2, these measures are equal 
under appropriate assumptions.  
21
 A possible reason for the presence of the incomplete information on the existing technological 
options are the costs of the information gathering (expressed in, for example, trouble, time and 
money), which are not always outweighed by their benefits; see Chapter 2. 
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agents. Information on the relevance of the demonstration value was obtained 
from a survey to which we turn in Section 3.4. Summarising the first method, 
two conditions must hold for an agent in order to be classified as a free rider. 
First, her net financial return to the investment before the subsidy should be 
larger than her critical investment criterion, and second she should have been 
aware of the existence of the subsidised technology before getting information 
about the subsidy. 
The second method is much simpler than the first one and requires less 
information. The classification resulting from this method is based on a survey 
question in which firms had to answer with which statement they agreed most: 
(i) without subsidy the investment would not have been undertaken; (ii) without 
subsidy, another technology would have been chosen; (iii) without subsidy, the 
same investment would have been done at the same time, or (iv) without 
subsidy, the same investment would have been done at a later time. Clearly, 
those agents opting for option (iii) are to be labelled as free riders (not yet 
controlling for demonstration value). As in the first method, we next assessed, 
based on the survey, for which firms the subsidy had potential demonstration 
value, resulting in the preferred measure for the number of free riders.  
 
3.4 Description of the data  
 
In this chapter, we determine the fraction of free riders in two Dutch 
subsidy programs, the Energy Investment Deduction program (EIA) and the 
Energy Investment Deduction for the Non-Profit Sector (EINP).22 Both are 
directed towards achieving energy savings through stimulating the investments 
in energy saving company assets and sustainable energy. The first program was 
developed for companies, whereas the second applies to non-profit 
organisations. Both programs subsidise the purchase of energy-efficient 
technologies, though in a slightly different way. While the EIA allows a 
deduction of a predetermined percentage of the investment cost from the 
                                                     
22
 The choice for these two subsidy programs was mainly steered by the availability of data. For 
these two programs, micro-data were available that allowed us to use the methodology discussed 
in Section 3.3. For other Dutch subsidy programs, no micro-data are available (see de Beer et al., 
2000, for details and analyses of other subsidy programs). Furthermore, the confrontation of the 
EIA and the EINP allows for confronting the results for subsidy programs focused on profit 
(EIA) versus non-profit (EINP) organisations on the one hand, and subsidy (EINP) versus tax-
deduction (EIA) programs on the other hand. Finally, both programs subsidise the investments in 
specific technologies (a list of the technologies, which fall under the programs, is published 
every year by the Dutch authorities). This allows us to analyse the role of specific technologies 
on the severity of the free rider problem.  
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taxable profits, the EINP provides a direct subsidy to the investor.23 Only 
investments in energy-efficient technology itself are applicable for 
subsidisation. Accordingly, Senter (the government institution supervising the 
subsidy program) is screening all applications. On average, investors obtain a 
subsidy of 16 to 18 percent of their investment.  
 
The data we used for the purpose of classifying the agents using method 1 
fall in three broad classes: 
• Data describing the purchased technology, the investment costs, and the 
subsidy obtained. This information was obtained from Senter;  
• Data to assess the costs and benefits of the investment, and its energy 
saving at the moment of purchase of the technology. These data concern 
the technological and economic information available to the investor at the 
time of the investment decision.24 Since the analysed subsidy programs 
subsidise specific technologies, it is possible to obtain the required 
information on energy savings from experts (in quantity and in monetary 
terms by applying a sector-specific energy price), and costs and benefits of 
a reference technology25;  
• Data on the critical discount rate or payback period and the information set 
of the firm prior to the introduction of the subsidy program. This type of 
information was obtained from the survey, in which the agents provide (ex 
post) information about their decision making process. 
The data needed for the second method were straightforwardly obtained from 
the survey on the basis of the questions as discussed in the previous section.  
 
Table 3.1 describes some of the key characteristics of the subsidy program. 
In total, 13946 (1181) agents obtained a subsidy in the context of the EIA 
(EINP) program. These agents were located in 46 (11) sectors of industry and 
they obtained subsidies for 15 (12) distinct technologies. With regard to the 
EIA-program, we took a stratified sample of 2352 agents who were sent a 
                                                     
23
 Among others, this implies that the EIA only works as an (effective) subsidy when the firm 
applying for the subsidy earns a profit (now or in the future) and that the size of the subsidy 
depends on the tax regime that applies to the firm under consideration.   
24
 The economic information also includes information on other subsidies obtained after 
investing in the technology (see Section 3.3).  
25
 For technologies for which a clear alternative is available, we did not consider the costs and 
benefits of the technology in isolation, but instead compared the costs and benefits compared to 
the available alternative. In most cases, this boils down to assessing the additional costs of a 
more energy-efficient technology with the energy savings obtained by investing in this 
technology.  
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survey. The response was 622, and was representative for the sample in terms 
of size, sector and technology (details are available upon request). For the 
EINP, we sent a survey to all participants resulting in a response of 210.  
 
Table 3.1 Key characteristics of the subsidy programs. 
 
Subsidy 
program 
Sectors of 
industry 
Techno-
logies 
Original 
population 
Sample Response 
EIA 46 15 13946 2353 622 
EINP 11 12 1181 1181 210 
 
In the remainder of this section, we describe the technologies and the 
critical payback periods that are being used as investment criteria by the 
participants in the subsidy programs. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 give an overview of 
the subsidised technologies. These tables provide information on the average 
cost of the investment for the particular technology, the investment costs in 
excess of investment in the relevant reference technology (if applicable), the 
average amount of subsidy (both from the EIA/EINP and other sources of 
subsidy), the annual energy savings, and the critical payback periods with and 
without subsidies.26 The tables clearly illustrate the huge variation in 
profitability in the various techniques ranging from highly unprofitable 
techniques as isolation to highly profitable techniques as flue gas condensers.  
 
Regarding the critical payback periods, a first relevant notion is that in both 
the EIA and EINP program, over half of the responding participants (55 and 60 
percent, respectively) indicated neither to use a critical internal discount rate 
nor a critical payback period.27 For those firms that did indicate to use critical 
                                                     
26
 Note that the derived payback periods only apply to the average investment as described in the 
Tables. For individual cases these are, of course, different due to different sizes/costs of the 
investment and different amounts of subsidies.    
27
 This result came as a surprise, since we had expected a much larger fraction of firms to adopt 
an investment criterion like an internal discount rate or critical payback period. On the basis of 
the available information, it is difficult to assess what the reason is for the huge number of firms 
indicating not to use a critical discount rate. It can be due to misunderstanding of the question as 
posed in the survey (which is unlikely since in an accompanying survey by phone no 
misunderstanding arose), it can be due to the fact that firms consider this information as sensitive 
(though this is unlikely given the anonymity), or it can be because many firms simply do not use 
such investment criteria (from literature, we know no other indications of the amount of firms 
using investment criteria). Clearly, this result warrants further investigation which is, however, 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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payback periods, the average was 6.7 and 9.4 years, respectively.28 The critical 
payback periods follow the familiar skewed distribution known from earlier 
studies as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (for example, Gillissen et al., 1995, and 
Grüber and Brand, 1991).  
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 5 10 15 20 25
PBP
EIA EINP
 
 
Figure 3.1 Cumulative distribution of PBP’s for EIA and EINP.
                                                     
28
 When agents indicated to only apply a critical discount rate, this was transformed into a critical 
payback period according to ∑
=
+
=
T
0t
tr)(1
1PBP  (see Appendix I for details). 
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3.5 Results 
 
This section classifies the participants in the subsidy programs into free 
riders, agents that were triggered to adopt a technology because of the subsidy 
and so-called irrational agents. This classification will be made on the basis of 
two distinct methods, which will subsequently be confronted with each other. 
These methods are as described in Section 3.3. The first method – the critical 
PBP method – can obviously only be applied for those participants that 
indicated to apply a critical payback period. As explained in Section 3.3, 
confronting the actual payback period of a technology with the critical payback 
period applied by the firm, we can classify the agents into one of the three 
groups. The results are given in Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4 Classification of agents based on Method 1. 
 
 Free Riders Triggered to adopt “Irrational” 
EIA 181 (64%) 27 (10%) 73 (26%) 
EINP 57 (68%) 13 (16%) 14 (17%) 
 
A sensitivity analysis has been performed on these results for two reasons. 
First, the information on energy saved per technology is rather imprecise. 
Second, we had no information on energy prices at the firm level. Especially 
for large firms this can be problematic, since those are known to have special 
contracts with energy suppliers. As an unavoidable consequence, the 
information on energy savings in monetary units used to classify the agents in 
Table 3.4 may be imprecise. To illustrate the sensitivity of our classification for 
these data-problems, we recalculated the number of free riders both under the 
assumption that energy savings were 20 percent higher than those of our base 
case and that they were 20 percent lower than those of our base case. When 
energy savings are 20 percent higher, the percentage of free riders is equal to 
72% and 74% in case of the EIA and EINP, respectively. When energy savings 
are 20 percent lower, the percentage of free riders is equal to 49% and 54% in 
case of the EIA and EINP, respectively. These figures can be seen as rough 
estimates for the lower and upper bounds of the percentage of free riders.29      
The second method we used to classify adoption behaviour relies on the 
stated behaviour by agents as indicated in the survey. Based on this method, we 
found 52% of free riders in the EIA and 51% in the EINP (not controlling for 
demonstration value). The conclusion on the number of free riders seems less 
                                                     
29
 The results of more extensive sensitivity analysis are available upon request from the authors.  
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‘pessimistic’ in the method using the stated behaviour. This result comes as no 
surprise since one expects firms to underreport the extent to which they engage 
in ‘undesirable’ behaviour (see Section 3.2). There is, however, a more 
fundamental problem with the comparison of the two methods that becomes 
clear by considering Table 3.5. A substantial number of agents is classified as 
free rider on the basis of the critical PBP method, while according to their 
stated behaviour they are not. More worryingly, a substantial number of agents 
are classified as free riders on the basis of their stated behaviour, while the 
critical PBP method suggests they are not.  
 
Table 3.5 Classification of agents on basis of two methods (EIA and EINP combined, EIA 
in brackets). 
 
 Method 2  
  Free Rider No Free Rider Total 
Free Rider 110 (90) 128 (91) 238 Method 1 No Free Rider 52 (45) 75 (55) 127 
 Total 162 203 365 
 
The analysis so far implicitly assumed away the potential relevance of the 
demonstration value. On the basis of the survey, we were able to determine the 
number of free riders for which the subsidy (might have) had a demonstration 
value. Information was obtained on questions regarding the knowledge of firms 
about the technology under consideration. For firms that indicated to be 
unaware about the technology they chose before they were informed about the 
subsidy, we concluded that the subsidy had a demonstration value. For firms 
that were informed about the subsidy after they decided to invest in a particular 
technology, we concluded that the subsidy could not have had a demonstration 
value. This resulted in the classification presented in Table 3.6.  
 
Table 3.6 Demonstration value. 
 
 Demonstration value No demonstration 
value 
Uncertain 
EIA 18 (3%) 250 (40%) 354 (57%) 
EINP 8 (4%) 82 (39%) 120 (57%) 
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3.6 Cost-effectiveness of subsidies 
 
We finally assess the effectiveness of the subsidy instruments in terms of 
saved energy per monetary unit of subsidy, both with and without accounting 
for free riders. The results are described in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, where a 
distinction is made between the different techniques. All results on free riders 
control for the potential importance of demonstration value. Range values have 
been reported because of the large group of agents that could not be classified 
(see Table 3.6). The upper bound of the range for the percentage of free riders 
reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 is derived under the assumption that non of the 
non-classified agents in Table 3.6 experienced attention value, whereas the 
lower bound is derived under the assumption that all non-classified agents 
experienced demonstration value.   
The results in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 clearly demonstrate that free-rider effects 
can be dominant when subsidising particular technologies. From the huge 
variation in actual payback periods, this should come as no surprise. Evidently, 
subsidies on technologies characterised by many free riders are not very cost-
effective. This ineffectiveness can arise either because technologies are 
characterised by low payback periods (the so-called low-hanging fruits) or 
because they tend to be adopted by firms that apply a low critical payback 
period. At least two observations suggest that the adoption of a number of 
technologies may indeed be low hanging fruit. First, a number of technologies 
are characterised by relatively high investment costs of alternatives meaning 
that the additional investment relative to the alternative is much smaller than 
the investment itself. Since the subsidies are awarded on the basis of the 
investment itself instead of the additional investment, the subsidy may in some 
cases be larger than the additional investment. Second, a substantial number of 
agents also applied for (and obtained) other subsidies besides the EIA/EINP. In 
a number of cases, the total amount of subsidies obtained was even larger than 
the additional investment required (those for which the payback period with all 
subsidies accounted for is negative). In order to assess the cost-effectiveness of 
the subsidy schemes, we determine several indicators. The first is the amount 
of subsidies paid to free riders. The second is the amount of energy saved by 
installing the subsidised technologies, both with and without controlling for 
free riders (pseudo-effectiveness and actual effectiveness, respectively). The 
third is the amount of energy saved per guilder of subsidy granted, again both 
with and without controlling for free riders. These indicators are again 
determined for two distinct cases, namely the case in which the firms that could 
not be classified in Table 3.6 are (i) all free riders and (ii) all non-free-riders. 
This leads to the ranges for subsidies paid to free riders and the indicators for 
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the actual effectiveness. Evidently, controlling for free riders substantially 
reduces the cost-effectiveness of subsidies. For the EIA, cost effectiveness is 
reduced from 50 kg CO2 avoided per guilder of subsidy to 20 kg (or 42 kg) 
when controlling for free riders (the reduction depending on the assumption 
regarding the agents which could not be classified as having experienced 
demonstration value or not). For the EINP, the reduction is from 17 kg CO2 
avoided to 9 kg (or 13) again depending on the assumption regarding the agents 
which could not be classified as having experienced demonstration value or 
not.   
 
3.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter analysed the cost-effectiveness of subsidy programs by estimating 
the number of free riders involved in these programs. The free-rider fractions 
have been determined for two Dutch subsidy programs, directed towards 
achieving energy savings by stimulating investments in energy-efficient 
technologies and sustainable energy. We classify an agent as a free rider if (i) 
his net financial return to the investment before the subsidy was larger than his  
critical investment criterion and (ii) the agent was aware of the existence of the 
subsidised technology before getting information about the subsidy. For this 
aim, we constructed a unique micro-database linking information on 
technology characteristics with information on the information set of firms and 
their investment criteria.  
The empirical results support the belief that subsidies, and more specifically, 
subsidies on the adoption of energy-efficient technologies, may involve a 
considerable number of free riders. It is essential that this is taken into account 
when designing the subsidies. The results reveal that the type of technology 
that is being subsidised is an important factor influencing the probability for an 
agent of being a free rider. The estimated free-rider fractions differ 
considerably for different technologies. This suggests that technology-specific 
subsidies can be substantially improved in terms of their effectiveness by 
avoiding the subsidisation of technologies that are already profitable without 
the subsidy. In other words, the characteristics of the subsidised technology 
have to be an important steering factor when designing subsidy programs. The 
last recommendation may, however, have to be corrected for possible greater 
administration costs involved in technology-specific subsidies (although for the 
subsidy programs considered in this chapter the administration costs are
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rather limited: they are in the range of 1 to 7% of the total granted subsidies). A 
trade-off has to be faced between specific subsidy programs with high 
administration costs but low numbers of free riders on the one hand and generic 
subsidy programs with high numbers of free riders but low administration 
costs.  
There are obviously many more dimensions along which free-rider effects 
might differ. For a given subsidy rate, for example, one could hypothesise that 
free riders are especially dominant among large firms since those tend to 
benefit more from the adoption of the technology due to economies of scale 
and scope, lack of capital restrictions reflected in higher critical payback 
periods, etc. Assessing the relevance of such heterogeneities is left for future 
research. 
 
4 ENERGY-EFFICIENCY STANDARDS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The regulatory or ‘command and control’ approach has often been the 
preferred way of achieving objectives in environmental policy, even though the 
economic approach is becoming more important. The command and control 
approach consists of the promulgation and enforcement of laws and 
regulations, prescribing objectives, standards and technologies polluters must 
comply with. This preference for direct regulation is due to the theoretically 
high degree of precision and effectiveness possible for this type of instrument. 
However direct regulation can entail a large number of drawbacks and problem 
First of all, there is a large burden of enforcement of direct regulations. An 
adequate monitoring of compliance with the regulations and the imposition of 
sanctions in case of non-compliance is necessary. Administrative costs can 
therefore be inevitably high in this respect. Another drawback of direct 
regulations is that the public authorities require a great deal of specific 
knowledge on polluters and their technologies, also entailing large transaction 
costs. Regulations are not only costly from the government point of view; for 
the private sector compliance to direct regulations is not efficient in economic 
terms either, since the regulations do not minimise abatement costs. An 
additional major drawback of direct regulation is that an incentive for polluters 
to adopt more environmental practises is lacking; once the polluters comply 
with the regulations there is no direct need for further emission reductions. 
Moreover technical progress will not easily become embodied in new 
regulations. Finally, it is often said that direct regulations may too
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new regulations. Finally, it is often said that direct regulations may too easily 
be subject to bargaining and negotiations between public authorities and the 
private sector. 
Despite the large number of drawbacks, direct regulation plays an 
important role in energy policies world wide. However, energy standards for 
energy conservation or improving the energy efficiency are rarely used in 
energy policy for firms. In this chapter the focus is therefore on the latter type 
of instruments.30 Energy standards are defined as regulations that prescribe 
minimum technical requirements for energy conversion systems and energy 
end-use systems. Energy standards have often been unilaterally declared by the 
government, often put restrictions on products or processes at the disaggregated 
level and offer low flexibility for the companies to comply with.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore two main aspects of energy standards. 
The first is a design question: how can we come to energy-efficiency standards 
that reasonable from an economic point of view, that are technologically 
feasible and also improve the environment sufficiently? The second is on 
effectiveness: are energy-efficiency standards effective? The fact that energy-
efficiency standards have not been widely used is the cause of our analysis 
having an explorative character; not much empirical evidence is available yet to 
support our analysis.  
In this chapter we will first give a categorisation of regulatory policy 
instruments for industrial energy conservation in the Netherlands (4.2) and then 
we will explore the current use of energy-efficiency standards for firms world 
wide (4.3). Next, we will focus on the design question: what are the guidelines 
for constructing reasonable standards. On the basis of the ICARUS technology 
database an analysis will be made of the effects of applying such standards 
(4.4). Finally, we will explore the effectiveness of energy-efficiency standards 
in a case study for the Netherlands (4.5 and 4.6). 
 
 
4.2 Categorisation of regulatory instruments for industrial 
energy conservation 
 
In the Dutch energy policy the following types of policy instruments are in 
use that are definitely command-and-control, but in which standard-setting 
plays a role (see Figure 4.1): long-term agreements on energy-efficiency 
improvement, benchmarking agreements on energy efficiency, environmental 
                                                     
30
 Negotiated agreements will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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permits and administrative orders setting requirements on energy conservation 
and energy labels. Only the latter two are standards as defined in Section 4.1.  
The different types of instruments for industrial energy conservation can be 
divided in the following categories of standards31:  
 
1) Process standards specify the characteristics of production processes or 
the type of emission reduction equipment a polluters must install. Good 
examples of process standards in the industrial energy policy are covenants or 
long-term agreements on energy efficiency and the benchmarking covenant. 
Both instruments set requirements to the energy efficiency of the overall 
production process.  
2) Product standards define the characteristics of potentially polluting 
products. Product standards are widely applied to set requirements to energy 
efficiency or energy use of specific appliances and equipment, such as the 
minimum efficient standards for hot water boilers and energy labelling schemes 
for refrigerators and freezers (see 4.3).  
3) Emission standards prescribe the maximum discharges of pollutants into 
the environment (from fixed points). CO2 emission allowances or tradable CO2 
emission permit are not used yet in Dutch environmental policies. However in 
2005 a European emission trading scheme for greenhouse gasses is likely to be 
introduced. 
4) Management standards are environmental standards progressively 
introduced (at an international level) for promoting satisfactory environmental 
corporate management. Examples of management standards are NEN-EN-ISO 
and EMAS. Energy management is generally not explicitly integrated in those 
systems at the moment. Long-term agreements and the Benchmarking 
agreement are primarily process based standards but also set requirements for 
the energy management of firms. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the categorisation of the different regulatory energy 
policy instruments in the Netherlands and the guidelines for target-setting  that 
were used to set these standards (see Section 4.4). 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
31
 In environmental policies also so-called ambient quality standards are used. These standards 
set requirements to the quality of the physical environment. 
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Figure 4.1 Categorisation of regulatory policy instruments for energy conservation. 
 
The energy labelling schemes and the energy-efficiency requirements set in 
the environmental permit and administrative orders are two examples of energy 
standards for energy end-use systems applied in the Netherlands. 
 
 
4.3 Energy-efficiency standards for firms worldwide 
 
Energy standards for appliances and equipment are widely used, especially 
in the USA, to improve the efficiency of home appliances and office 
equipment. They are increasingly being considered for electric motors, home 
entertainment electronics and lighting equipment.32 At present standards exist 
in 34 countries.33 The most prominent example in the USA is the corporate-
average-fuel-efficiency standard adopted for the automotive sector in 1975. 
These standards provide flexibility by setting requirements for the sales-
weighted average of each manufacturer rather than for individual vehicles. The 
specific fuel consumption was to decrease from 13 litre per 100 km in 1978 to 
8.5 litre per 100 km in 1985. Actual energy use more or less followed these 
requirements. In the mid-1970s minimum energy-efficiency standards for 
refrigerators were adopted in California. National standards became effective in 
                                                     
32
 No standards have been designed which prescribe energy requirements for the production of 
the appliances. 
33
 See IEA (2000) for an overview of standards and labels that are currently used in IEA 
countries. 
category Guideline
Process Product Emission Management Technology Economical Performance
LTA1 O o x X
LTA2 O o x x X
BM O x X
Energy AmvB/EP O X
Standards Lab. O X
EA/ET* O X
O = primary category, o = secundary catgeory X = primary criteria, x = secundary criteria
LTA1 = 1st Long Term Agreement, LTA2 = 2nd Long Term Agreements, BM = Benchmarking Agreement, AmvB = Administrative Order
EP = Environmental Permit, Lab. = Energy Labels, EA = Emission Allowances, ET = Emission Trading
* Not in use yet
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1990. The average rated electricity use of new refrigerators declined from 1725 
kWh in 1972 to around 685 kWh in 1993 (Geller and Nadel, 1994).  
Also in other world regions energy-efficiency standards for cars and 
household appliances have been widely used. Japan has adopted minimum 
energy-efficiency standards for cars, by weight class. Recently, in this country 
the so-called top-runner approach was adopted for electric appliances. The 
interesting aspect is that this approach is inherently dynamic because the 
standard levels are being adapted to the performance of the best available in the 
market every few years. 
The European Union adopted energy-efficiency standards - first for 
refrigerators and freezers - in 1994 (effective in 1995). 
In all these cases standards are set for mass consumer goods, that are 
relevant to households rather than firms. 
Another area where standards were widely applied world wide is for the 
thermal integrity of buildings. These standards were applied first to the 
residential sector, but also more and more for non-residential buildings. So here 
we find standards relevant for firms as well. 
A world wide survey, carried out in 1992 (Janda and Busch, 1994) revealed 
that out of 57 countries surveyed, 35 have standards for non-residential 
buildings. Virtually all OECD countries have such standards, but in some (parts 
of the) countries they have a voluntary character. In some countries the 
standards are prescriptive (e.g., prescribing the maximum heat transmission 
through walls), some are performance-based (giving requirements for the 
overall energy performance of the building). In most of the cases the standards 
apply only to buildings in the service sectors, and sometimes they are even 
more restricted, merely concerning, for instance, office buildings, schools or 
hotels. Industrial buildings are often not included.  
Most regulations are directed at the insulation of roofs, walls and 
fenestration. In other cases also floor insulation, air infiltration, lighting and 
mechanical equipment were included. Most countries set the requirements of 
the standard at a level more stringent than the average practice; however, this 
turned out not to be the case in all countries.  
Regimes for checking compliance differ from country to country. In most 
cases compliance-checking is part of the approval process, before building can 
be started. Verification during construction occurs in one third of the countries 
and verification after construction in half of the countries. Many respondents 
considered their regulation to be effective, but quantitative information about 
this subject is scarce. 
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Appliance standards have been proposed for specific equipment, e.g. for 
the efficiency of electric motors, but have never, to our knowledge, been 
introduced somewhere. 
 
 
4.4 Guiding principles to fix standards 
 
When setting standards decision-makers are confronted with 
environmental, technological, economical and political constraints. First of all 
regulations should maintain or improve environmental quality or reduce 
emissions to considerable extent. Secondly, standards are only enforceable to 
the extent that technical possibilities are available or are likely to be developed. 
Thirdly, the implementation of measures to meet the standards should be 
economically affordable for the industry. Finally, decision-makers have to deal 
with a number of political constraints, like the equity, acceptability and 
simplicity of environmental regulations. 
In this section we will explore the guidelines for setting energy standards 
and discuss the possibilities how we can come to reasonable criteria for setting 
standards from an economic point of view. 
 
4.4.1 Technological criteria 
  
In many environmental laws technological criteria are used as a guiding 
principle for setting specific environmental standards. Technology based 
standards refer to the state of the technology that should be applied by the firm 
subjected to environmental regulation. The energy-efficiency requirements set 
in environmental permits and administrative orders are primarily based on 
technology standards. When setting energy-efficiency requirements in the 
benchmarking agreement and the Long-term agreements technology standards 
play a less prominent role. 
 
ALARA 
Since the introduction in the Environmental Management Act in the 
Netherlands (1993) the ALARA concept (As Low As Reasonable Achievable) 
is used as a guiding principle for setting requirements and duties that should 
contain the necessary conditions to protect the interest of the environment. The 
ALARA principle originates from the decree ‘radiation protection nuclear 
energy act’ (Besluit, 1986). In the Environmental Management Act this is 
described as follows (Environmental Management Act, 1993): 
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A licence shall be subject to any regulations which are necessary to 
protect the environment. If any adverse effects on the environment caused 
by making the licence subject to such regulations cannot be avoided, the 
licence shall be made subject to such additional regulations as may be 
necessary to provide the greatest possible protection to the environment 
from side effects, unless this cannot reasonably be required. 
 
The governmental explanatory memorandum (Tweede Kamer, 1990) 
provides the following interpretation of the article above: 
 
1. A license should contain the necessary requirements to protect the 
environment and thus avoid negative environmental impacts; 
2. In so far as a negative impact on the environment cannot completely be 
avoided and the request for a permit is not dismissed, those 
requirements should be included in the permit providing the best 
possible protection unless it would not be reasonable to prescribe such 
conditions. Here it is assumed that the best technical means34 are used; 
3. If it is not reasonable to prescribe such conditions the best practical 
means35 must be prescribed as a minimum standard. 
 
Best Technical Means and Best Practical Means 
In this context a clear definition of the concept of ‘best technical means’ 
and ‘best practical means’ is required. According to the principle of Best 
Technical Means, described in article 7.10 paragraph 3 in the Environmental 
Management Act, the environment must be protected with the best technical 
means in the case that negative impacts to the environment cannot completely 
be avoided. The economic capacity of individual firms is in this principle less 
relevant for the determination of the permit conditions. Moreover, measures 
must have been implemented at least once: the prescription of these measures 
in a concrete case must be realistic in technical sense. In this respect a thorough 
knowledge and up-date of the state of the technique is required. Only if costs of 
these measures in the sector are considered to be too high, the best technical 
means cannot be reasonably asked. In that case the best practicable means are 
prescribed. According to this principle those measures must be implemented 
that provide the best environmental protection, however taking into account the 
costs that can in fairness be asked of an average profitable and financial healthy 
                                                     
34
 In Dutch: ‘best bestaande of best beschikbare technieken’. 
35
 In Dutch: ‘best toepasbare of best uitvoerbare technieken’. 
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firm. The prescription of the best practical means is considered as a minimum 
standard (Tonnaer, 1994).  
 
State of the Technique 
Since the introduction of the Circular ‘Energy in the environmental permit’ 
by the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM, 
1999) the concepts of ‘best technical means’ and ‘best practical means’ are no 
longer the leading principles for setting energy standards in environmental 
permits or decrees (administrative orders). Since then those measures must be 
implemented that meet the ‘State of the Technique’ standards. Measures that 
meet this standard have been implemented successfully by a company of 
average financial health in the same branch and those that have been practised 
on an industrial scale in other processes or demonstration projects. 
 
Best Available Technique Not Entailing Excessive Costs 
This list of technology standards can be extended with numerous other 
examples, such as the internationally acknowledged BATNEEC (Best 
Available Technique Not Entailing Excessive Costs) principle. The technology 
in question should be Best at preventing pollution and Available in the sense 
that it is procurable by the operator of the activity concerned. Technology itself 
includes techniques and the use of techniques, such as training and 
maintenance. NEEC sets out the balance between environmental benefit and 
financial cost. 
 
4.4.2 Environmental performance-based criteria 
  
From the previous section it may be concluded that technology-based 
criteria cannot easily be applied without taking into account the environmental 
performance and economic consequences of technical measures. Environmental 
performance standards set quantitative requirements to the environment 
improvement of industrial processes and products. This criterion of 
environmental performance is used in most of the regulatory policy instruments 
such as the Long-term agreements, benchmarking agreements and energy 
labels.  
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4.4.3 Economic criteria  
  
In case the energy-saving measures imposed by the regulations are 
technological feasible, the crucial elements remains that firms can only comply 
with these standards if measures are economically reasonable. 
In this section we will pose ourselves the question whether it is possible to 
translate this qualitative criteria of ‘reasonability’ to quantitative criteria (with 
in mind the application for greenhouse gas emission reduction through energy-
efficiency improvement). Some possibilities are the following. 
 
1. The most straightforward solution is to compare the direct financial costs of 
a measure to its benefits. In case of energy-efficiency improvement the 
benefits can be expressed in terms of saved energy or avoided carbon 
dioxide emissions. The general rule then should be that all measures be 
taken that show specific mitigation costs below a certain value (expressed, 
e.g., in $/tC or $/GJ). 
Use of such a criterion has the important advantage that it - in principle - 
leads to the lowest costs for society as a whole. However, for individual 
companies the burden may be substantial if a large part of the emission 
reduction potential is present within these companies. This is even more the 
case in a situation where standards are not applied internationally and 
distortion of competition may occur. 
 
2. Another possibility is to look entirely from the perspective of the private 
firm and use decision criteria familiar to private firms as a criterion for 
deciding upon which is best practice and which is not. Examples can be 
found in Dutch energy conservation policy practices where criteria occur 
such as the following: 
- all measures should be taken that have a pay-back period less than 5 
years (Environmental permit and General Administrative Order) 
- all measures should be taken that have an internal rate of return better 
than 15% (Benchmarking Agreement) 
Although these criteria may be better matched with private firm decision 
making criteria, it should be noted that, also in this case, the burden - in 
terms of requirement of investment capital or effect on competitiveness - 
may be unequally distributed between e.g. energy-intensive and energy-
extensive industries. Another disadvantage of these criteria is that it is 
never possible to prescribe measures that have no benefits (or very minor 
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benefits related to the investment), although such measures may be very 
attractive from the point of view of society as a whole.  
 
3. A third possibility is to also start from the point-of-view of the firms and 
prescribe all measures that do not substantially affect the market position or 
competitiveness of firms. This approach best reflects the answer to 
questions of the type: "what are excessive costs?" or: "what can we 
reasonably ask from firms?" This can be reflected in the phrase ability-to-
pay. 
Possible ways to apply such criteria are, for instance: 
• the share of costs of energy conservation measures should be small 
compared to the total production costs of a firm; 
• the costs of an energy conservation measures should not make up more 
than a certain fraction of the profit margin of a firm; 
• the investment associated with an energy conservation measures should 
be small compared to the total investment budget of a company (this 
may apply if access to capital would be an important limiting factor). 
The most important disadvantage of such approaches may be that it might 
be hard to find criteria that are valid in the same way for all the sectors 
(some sectors may experience harsh competition, whereas in other cases 
competition is limited or not so much based on costs). 
 
Of course, a combination of criteria may also be applied, measures could 
e.g. first be selected on the basis of societal desirability, but would not have 
to be pursued if the total requirements exceed the companies’ ability-to-
pay. 
 
4.4.4 The effect of the application of various best-practice concepts 
 
Apart from the theoretical discussion in the previous section on what are 
the best ways to translate best-practice concepts in practical guidelines, it is 
also important to examine the practical effects in terms of saved energy and 
costs for companies. On the basis of ICARUS, the database on energy 
conservation technologies (De Beer et al., 1994) an analysis of the effect of 
applying the various criteria was made. We have examined the three types of 
criteria mentioned in the previous section: 
• Private profitability perspectives: all measures with a pay-back period less 
than 5 years should be taken. 
  
 
 
 
 ENERGY-EFFICIENCY STANDARDS 59   
 
• National costs perspective: all measures with specific mitigation lower than 
20 or 100 Euro per tonne CO2 should be taken.  
• Maximum costs perspective: all measures should be taken unless the total 
costs of the measures exceed a certain fraction (0.2 or 0.5%) of the total 
costs of a company. 
The selection of the latter criteria needs some explanation. It is not clear 
what can be considered as acceptable levels of costs imposed on firms. To this 
end we have analysed the costs that, presently, are already imposed on firms 
due to environmental regulation as a fraction of total production costs. These 
are presented in Table 4.1. It turns out that for the total industry this fraction is 
0.9%, but for the sector with the highest share it is 2.3%. Taking into account 
that climate change is considered to be an important environmental problem, 
we assume – as a rule of thumb – that in the end only one of the problems is 
that costs for climate change are allowed to be about one fifth of these (average 
or maximum) values, i.e. 0.2 and 0.5%. 
The analysis was carried out using the database ICARUS (De Beer et al., 
1994). In this database technical and economic characteristics of energy 
 
Table 4.1 Costs for environment (incl. energy conservation) as a fraction of the total 
production costs in a sector (CBS, 2001).  
 
Industrial sector Environmental costs as a 
percentage of total production 
costs in the sector 
Food, beverages and tobacco industry 0.6 
Textiles and leather industry 1.1 
Paper and board production 1.3 
Petrochemicals production 1.8 
 
Other chemicals production 2.4 
Building materials production 1.1 
Basic metals production 2.3 
Other metal industry 1.7 
Other industry 0.1 
Total industry 0.9 
conservation measures are given. In total information is included for 350 
measures that together represent the full energy conservation potential of the 
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Many energy conservation measures show negative net costs, even if a 
25% discount rate is used. In case of the maximum shares in costs, only the net 
costs of measures that show positive net costs are included. The results of the 
calculations are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
The results of these calculations lead to the following observations. The 
criterion ‘pay-back time less than five years’ leads to similar results as the 
criterion ‘mitigation costs less than 20 Euro/tCO2’. This is mainly caused by 
the high discount rate used in the calculation for the latter criterion. 
The criterion ‘mitigation costs less than 100 Euro/tCO2’ leads to 
substantially higher savings than the same criterion with the 20 Euro/tCO2 cut-
off. However, the effect strongly differs from sector to sector; this reflects the 
differences in the distribution of measures over the various cost categories. 
Most interesting is the comparison of the last two columns with the former 
three. We see that for most sectors the use of even the weakest criterion, i.e. 
‘share in total costs less than 0.2%’ leads to higher savings than the criterion 
‘mitigation costs less than 100 Euro/tCO2’. This means that even high 
requirements regarding specific mitigation costs do not lead to exceptional 
costs for most of the sectors.  
There are, however, a number of exceptions: the sugar industry, the beer 
industry, the paper and board industry, the organic and inorganic chemicals 
industry, the building materials industry and the iron and steel industry. These 
are generally the more energy-intensive sectors. It is evident that exactly for 
these sectors the costs associated with achieving substantial energy-efficiency 
improvement may be considerable; hence, for these sectors (additional) criteria 
that limit total costs may be useful. 
 
Conclusions 
It does not seem appropriate to apply private sector profitability criteria for 
the selection of measures that have to be taken in the framework of energy-
efficiency regulation.  
economy. We used the data that were compiled for the energy conservation 
with respect to a frozen-efficiency level in a 10-years time period.36 
In all cases a discount rate of 25% is used for the calculations, reflecting 
private company cost perspectives.37  
 
                                                     
36
 This time period is the period 1990 - 2000. Although this represents older data, we are 
confident that similar results will be obtained for comparable periods. At present a new version 
of ICARUS is under construction. 
37
 In the case of the specific mitigation costs alternatively a social discount rate (e.g., 4 - 10%) 
might have been used in order to reflect governmental time preferences. 
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Specific mitigation costs may be used as a criterion and do not lead to 
excessive costs, except for the energy-intensive sectors. Here, such criteria may 
be backed up by additional criteria that limit total expenditures of the 
companies concerned. 
 
 
4.5 The effectiveness of energy-efficiency standards: 
methodological issues 
 
Most analysts, who have to determine the effectiveness of energy-
efficiency standards implicitly or explicitly assume full compliance, see e.g. 
Swisher et al. (1994) and Blok and Turkenburg (1994).  
Such analysis departs from the exact requirements of the regulation, e.g. for 
what part of the equipment or the companies is the regulation valid; is it valid 
for the new stock only or also for the existing stock; what energy-efficiency 
levels or other requirements are imposed. Provided that knowledge is available 
of the energetic quality of the existing stock, on the relevant distribution of 
equipment or of firms, on growth and replacement rates, etc., one can 
determine what the effect of the regulation will be. Hence, the effect of the 
regulation can be determined, assuming that the behaviour of the regulated will 
be exactly according to the standard. 
In practice, this will not be the case; there may be a number of reasons why 
full compliance will not occur. Before a regulation really becomes effective, it 
has to go through various ‘arenas’.  
We may distinguish: 
1. Compliance by the regulating agency. Once a regulation is accepted by 
a government, the regulation has to be carried out by some government 
or government-related agency. In general such an agency has to 
interact with the regulated companies, e.g. to inform them about the 
regulation, to elaborate on the regulation for their specific case and to 
check compliance with the regulation. If this interaction does not occur 
or not in the way it was projected in the regulation, under compliance 
at this level occurs. 
2. Compliance by the energy user. Also if the regulating agency works 
according to the prescriptions, it may be that the regulated companies 
do not behave according to the standards. It may be that the energy user 
does not comply, e.g. because the system of compliance checking is not 
strong enough; monitoring prescriptions are inadequate, sanctions are 
not present, etc. 
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Table 4.2 Energy conservation by sector that would be enforced by different criteria. The 
energy conservation is given as a percentage energy conservation that would be achieved in 
the year 2000 relative to the 1990 frozen-efficiency level. 
Sector Criterion 
 Simple pbp Specific costs Maximum share in 
costs 
 < 5 yr < 20 
Euro/tCO2
<100 
Euro/tCO2
<0.2% <0.5% 
Horticulture 36 36 37 
Agriculture 35 35 46 }36 }38 
Dairy 39 39 50 50 50 
Sugar 20 20 29 20 29 
Meat 24 24 37 39 39 
Beer 14 14 28 14 28 
Starch 14 14 18 18 18 
Margarine 28 28 42 42 42 
Fodder 30 30 38 43 43 
Other Food 26 26 26 - - 
Textile 20 20 40 40 40 
Wood 16 16 24 24 30 
Paper 18 18 26 20 20 
Paper converting 17 17 23 23 30 
Print 24 24 24 24 30 
Organic 20 20 22 20 20 
Inorganic 4 4 12 4 12 
Other chemical 21 21 25 25 25 
Building materials 17 18 36 19 29 
Iron & steel 4 4 8 5 6 
Non-ferrous metal 8 8 8 8 8 
Other metal 18 14 26 20 26 
Fertiliser 32 45 45 
Other industries 16 16 19 }10 }13 
Buildings 28 28 28 28 28 
Commercial Offices  24 24 30 35 42 
Non-commercial 
Offices 
19 19 23 24 29 
Catering 21 21 25 26 26 
Health care 17 17 24 28 40 
Retail trade 19 19 22 24 27 
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3. Technical compliance. A third reason for non-standard behaviour is 
that for specific equipment the actual energy use may differ from the 
energy use under standardised test conditions. Although the equipment 
is installed according to the standard, the actual energy use may not be 
according to expectations, because the conditions may differ, but also 
because the installation is not carried out in an adequate way.  
4. Rebound effects. A final effect that may play a role is that the 
behaviour of the regulated companies changes due to the changes in 
costs of energy services. If an energy service becomes cheaper due to 
energy-efficiency improvement, the use of this energy service may 
increase; or more money becomes available for other (possibly energy 
consuming) expenditures. 
 
 
4.6 A case study on the effectiveness of energy-efficiency 
standards in the Netherlands 
 
A key question is of course: are energy-efficiency standards effective? To 
this end we analyse - as a case study – an energy-efficiency standard that was 
recently introduced in the Netherlands. 
Dutch companies are either restricted by General Administrative Order38  
(AmvBs) or they are obliged to have a permit by virtue of the Environmental 
Management Act (‘Wet Milieubeheer’). Licences are designed for specific 
companies whereas AMvBs are more general regulations for business branches. 
Both the licenses and the AMvBs cover general restrictions for safety, 
environment and energy use.39 In this section we will evaluate the 
implementation of AMvBs and thereby focus and the compliance of the 
regulating agency (see section 4.5). 
An evaluation of setting energy requirements in environmental permits was 
carried out recently by Tholen and Boswijk (2000). The main conclusions are 
that 1) there is limited technical knowledge for setting energy-efficiency 
requirements; 2) there is a lack of capacity for issuing and enforcing 
environmental permits for an effective energy policy; 3) there is lack of support 
for implementing energy policy measures by firms.  
                                                     
38
 Translation from Dutch: “Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur”. 
39
 In practice energy is only considered as a relevant issue if the yearly consumption exceeds 
25,000 m3 natural gas or 50,000 kWh.  
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In 1995 plans were made to revise the AMvBs because of a change in 
environmental policy from a regulative towards a more de-regulative 
approach.40 As a result of these changes the companies now have to comply 
with a duty of care, instead of complying with safety and environmental rules. 
This means that a company has its own responsibility to operate in such a way 
that risks, environmental pollution and energy use are as low as reasonable 
achievable; the government may perform inspections and demand that all 
reasonable measures must be implemented. State of technique (see section 4.4)  
and the interference with the company’s normal activities set the boundaries of 
reasonability (VROM, 1999). This means that all energy saving measures in 
buildings, facilities and processes that have a payback period of 5, 3 and 3 
years respectively should be implemented, unless this cannot reasonably asked. 
This new regulation is introduced in 1988 for “sport and recreation” and for 
“hotel and catering” (Milieumagazine, 1999). 
To comply with the new duty of care the availability of information on 
environmental friendly and energy efficient technologies and measures is 
essential for firms. Different agencies act as intermediate between the 
government and the companies supplying companies with information and 
advice. Two examples of these organisations are NOVEM and Infomil. Both 
publish information brochures on the subject of energy-efficiency measures. 
 
 
4.6.1 Methodology 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness AMvBs has been performed through 
interviews on a municipality level. The questions were presented to the 
municipality environmental inspection department. The questions are listed in 
Table 4.3. 
In order to get results from different types of municipalities, three sizes of 
municipalities were selected for the interviews: 5 large (> 100,000 inhabitants), 
4 middle (20,000 - 50,000 inhabitants) and 2 small municipalities (5,000 – 
10,000 inhabitants).  
All eleven respondents work at the environmental inspection department of 
their municipality either as inspector or as manager of the environmental 
inspection department. The main results will be reported and clarified in the 
following section.  
                                                     
40
 This change in policy was based on the governmental decision on “Competition, deregulation 
and legislative quality (MDW)”. 
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4.6.2 Results of the survey 
 
Inspection 
Most municipalities inspect the companies according to the so-called 
BUGM (Implementation of Municipality Environmental Tasks Act)41 
frequently, depending on the environmental impact or hazard of the company. 
The frequency of inspection varies from once every ten years to twice a year. 
The inspections are performed in an integral way, meaning that during 
inspection all environmental aspects are taken into consideration. The 
respondents made critical comments on the BUGM and the integral approach. 
Most respondents complained that they are not practical and that the new, less 
regulatory, environmental policy is more time consuming than the old 
regulatory approach. The extra time is needed for communication with the 
companies instead of simply laying down the rules. Of the interviewed 
municipalities, two (Amsterdam and Amersfoort) have implemented - or are in 
the process of implementing - new inspection systems. 
 
Dominant sectors 
According to the respondents the dominant AMvB sectors are hotel and 
catering, service and retail, agriculture and offices. This is confirmed by Dutch 
national statistics presenting leasing and business services, retail and 
agriculture as the dominant establishments (CBS, 2001). 
 
Knowledge level 
According to the respondents the knowledge level of the companies that are 
subject to AMvB regulation depends largely on the size of the firms; large 
companies are much better informed than small companies. Respondents 
mention also that differences among the sectors can be observed. The 
companies’ information sources, mentioned by the respondents, are the 
municipalities and the branch organisations. Only two respondents confirm that 
the companies are in the possession of the information magazines of Infomil. 
Of the eleven respondents four municipalities confirm receiving questions from 
the companies concerning the AMvB regulations. 
The majority of the municipalities consider their own knowledge on energy 
conservation to be adequate for setting energy-efficiency standards. However, 
                                                     
41
 Translated from Dutch: Besluit Uitvoering Gemeentelijke Milieutaken. 
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almost all the respondents indicate that the knowledge level ‘can always be 
improved’. 
 
Workload and desired capacity 
The average number of AMvB companies per staff member of the 
municipal inspection team is about 175. However, the workload varies from 50 
to about 400. Furthermore, the results suggest that the workload of the large 
municipalities is a bit lower than the workload of the middle and small 
municipalities. However, this could be inaccurate because the workload is 
expressed only in the number of companies and not in the complexity or size of 
the companies. 
All municipalities indicate that an increase in inspection capacity is 
considered necessary. The municipalities that made quantitative statements on 
this issue reported that the capacity should be increased with 20 to 100%. An 
exception to this might be the relatively high desired personnel increase (300%) 
in one of the smaller municipalities. The results from the interview suggest that 
Table 4.3 Questionnaire 
 
The questions are to structure the conversation. They are not interview questions 
Municipality, department, function 
1 Background 
1A How many AmvB companies and how many licenses are in your municipality? (if 
necessary give an estimation) 
1B What is the most common AMvB sector? 
1C There are different aspects in the AMvBs: Energy saving, water saving, waste prevention, 
waste separation, and waste water. Could you 
1 Give the hierarchy in which they receive attention 
2 Indicate whether they receive enough attention 
3 Indicate which should receive more attention 
1D How many companies have a relevant energy consumption (>25.000 m3 natural gas /yr of 
>50.000 kWh/yr)?  
How do you retrieve this information? (if necessary give an estimation) 
1E What is the most common sector? 
2 Knowledge 
2A What is the AMvB registration procedure and how do the companies receive information? 
2B Are the companies informed? If so, how? 
2C Have the companies received the Infomil documentation? If so, through the municipality? 
2D Do you receive questions from the companies? If so, concerning what subject? 
2E Are there projects being performed or have there been projects that stimulate the 
environmental care of the companies? If so, what role was there for energy saving? 
2F Are there aspects that need more attention (for example energy-efficiency improvement)? If 
so, which? 
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3 Inspection 
3A Is there a periodical inspection of the companies? If so, what is the inspection frequency? If 
not, why? 
3B Are the aspects inspected separately or all at the same time? 
3C With what frequency and how often are companies requested to perform an energy 
analysis? 
3D Has there been a company that did not comply with the rules? If so on what subject? 
3E In the case of non-compliance, does you municipal intervene or is it accepted? 
3F What is the personnel and knowledge capacity of your environmental inspection 
department (if possible specify in for example how many legal, technical, etc.) 
3G Is this capacity sufficient to operate? What should the capacity be? 
4 Improvements 
4A What measures are being taken or have been taken to improve the inspection and 
communication? 
4B Is there, in your opinion, a municipality that has a better inspection and communication 
system than your municipality? 
4C In your opinion, what should be done to improve inspection and communication? 
5 Other and additional comments 
 
there is a structural workload problem throughout the municipals. This 
observation is supported by the fact that the current inspection capacity is based 
on the outdated BUGM approach, whereas the new de-regulative approach to 
environmental policies requires much more time consuming implementation 
and enforcement efforts. 
Priority given to energy issues 
Most municipalities consider waste prevention and safety as the most 
important environmental themes. Only three of the eleven respondents consider 
energy efficiency to be the most important theme in their municipal’s policy. 
These three municipalities include the large municipalities Almere, Amersfoort 
and Amsterdam. The other municipalities do not mention energy as an 
important theme. However, six of these respondents are of the opinion that 
energy does not receive enough attention. 
All but five respondents either do not know if there are companies that have 
a relevant consumption or, they are of the opinion that there are no AMvB 
companies within their municipality with a relevant energy consumption. This 
level can easily be reached by, for example, a hotel. Therefore, the absence of 
companies with a relevant energy consumption might be correct for the two 
small municipalities, but it is very unlikely for the middle and large municipals 
involved.  
This lack of energy-efficiency priority is confirmed by the frequency in which 
the municipalities have requested companies to perform an energy analysis, and 
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the estimations made of the number of AMvB companies for which energy 
consumption is a relevant issue.  
Only two respondents mentioned that there have been requests for energy 
analysis. Amersfoort requires energy analysis in approximately 90% of their 
inspections (Amersfoort has its own inspection system) and Amsterdam has an 
average of 500 requests per year (out of 9500 relevant companies). 
 
Recommendations by the respondents 
Respondents suggested three dominant improvements. The first is an 
increase of staff to relief the current workload (mentioned nine times). 
Secondly the respondents suggest that the procedures for setting requirements 
must become more clear and uniform (mentioned five times). The third 
suggestion concerns the improvement of communication between the 
municipality and the companies (mentioned three times). 
 
Conclusions on the case-study 
We have examined regulation directed at small and medium enterprises in 
the Netherlands. We found that in the overwhelming majority of the cases the 
responsible agency (i.e., the municipality) is not very active in enforcing 
compliance. The agency’s knowledge on the problem seems to be limited and 
low priority is given to energy-efficiency improvement.  
The findings suggest that in this case the normative instrument does not 
seem to be effective (although examining what actually happens in the 
regulated companies can only provide the final answer to the question of 
effectiveness). But, anyway the case shows that full compliance of direct 
regulation should not be taken for granted. 
One of the obvious solutions is to increase staffing of the municipal 
agencies involved. However, it seems more important that in the design of 
direct regulation, the issue of compliance by the regulating agency (rather than 
the compliance by the end user of energy) is already taken into account. 
 
 
4.7    Conclusion 
 
Standard setting is not at all a new instrument in environmental policy, but 
in the area of energy-efficiency improvement it is relatively new (except for 
new buildings and specific new equipment). 
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From this preliminary analysis it turns out that both the design and the 
implementation of energy-efficiency standards is not as simple as is often 
assumed. 
The basic approach for the design of standards is to use best-practice 
criteria. We analysed various ways to translate these criteria into practical 
standards. If we follow the logic of terms like ‘not exceeding excessive 
costs’strictly it turns out that, for energy-extensive firms, far-reaching energy-
efficiency measures can be called for. For energy-intensive firms governments 
should restrict themselves in their requirements. 
For a specific case of energy-efficiency legislation in the Netherlands, it 
turns out that the first bottleneck for legislation to be effective lies in the 
compliance by the regulating agencies (in this case the municipalities). If new 
legislation is introduced, much more attention needs to be paid to the design of 
normative instruments and the accompanying implementation and enforcement 
strategies of the agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
5 NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Negotiated agreements - also often indicated as voluntary agreements - can 
be defined as ‘agreements between government and a sector in the national 
economy to facilitate voluntary action with a desirable social outcome, 
encouraged by the government. This action is undertaken by the participant, 
based on the participant’s self-interest’ (OECD, 1996). Once the agreement has 
been negotiated parties are bound to (fixed) procedures and rules. Negotiated 
agreements on energy efficiency in firms have become popular in many OECD 
countries. They exist in some form in at least in Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the USA (IEA, 
2001).  
Among the oldest negotiated agreements on industrial energy efficiency are 
the Long-Term Agreements (LTAs) in the Netherlands, that have existed since 
the early nineties. Much of the empirical material presented in this chapter is 
based on studying the Netherlands' agreements. Therefore, we will start with a 
brief introduction to these agreements (Section 5.2). 
A negotiated agreement is a policy instrument in which many intervention 
mechanisms are combined: communication plays an important role, but also 
economic and normative mechanisms play a role. The mechanisms will be 
elaborated upon in Section 5.3. 
A key question is: are negotiated agreements effective? Do such agreements 
really lead to action on top of what would have been done anyway? This 
question will be treated in two steps. In Section 5.4 the goal achievement is 
discussed; Section 5.5 discusses the effectiveness. Section 5.6 deals with the 
related question of the cost-effectiveness of the agreements. 
Finally, in Section 5.7 provides recommendations, based on the studies that 
have been performed up to now. 
 
 
5.2 The Long-Term Agreements in the Netherlands: 
Institutional aspects, measures and goals 
 
As a result of increasing environmental awareness in the late eighties the 
Dutch government decided to give stronger and new policy impulses to energy 
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conservation and the application of renewable energy resources. This decision 
was embodied in new measures, including Long-Term Agreements, announced 
in the National Environmental Policy Plan-plus (NEPP-plus, 1990) and the 
First Memorandum on Energy Conservation (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1990). The goal set by the government was to stabilise national CO2 emission 
in 1994-1995 at the 1990 level and reduce CO2 emissions by 3-5% by the year 
2000 relative to 1989/1990. In order to achieve these environmental objectives, 
the manufacturing industry had to make a substantial contribution towards 
reducing energy consumption. In the First Memorandum on Energy 
Conservation the target formulated for the manufacturing industry was a 20% 
energy-efficiency improvement42 by the year 2000 relative to 1989. On the 
basis of new economic growth forecasts this target was lowered to 19% in the 
Second Memorandum on Energy Conservation (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1993).  
The LTAs are considered as the most important policy instrument leading to 
energy conservation in the manufacturing industry. The government formulated 
two important targets regarding the LTAs: 
- Long Term Agreements have to cover 90% of the total industrial energy 
consumption of the Netherlands. 
- The energy-efficiency of the industry has to improve by 20% in 2000 
compared to 1989 level. 
Target groups for the LTAs are all industrial branches with an energy use 
over 1 PJ per year. Firms joining an LTA must improve energy-efficiency as 
far as practically and economically feasible. In return the Dutch government 
agreed not to introduce new regulation on energy-efficiency and give financial 
support.  
 
Process leading to an LTA 
The process leading to an LTA can roughly be divided in two phases. The 
first phase leads to the declaration of intent signed by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the branch organisation(s). The declaration of intent only confirms 
the wish of both parties to come to an agreement. The second phase start with 
an inventory on energy reduction options within the sector. Results of the 
inventory are the input to get to a long-term plan for energy conservation for 
the industrial sector and a quantitative target for energy-efficiency 
improvement, which both form the key element of the LTA. At the end of the 
second phase the LTA is signed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
                                                     
42
 Excluding feedstocks. 
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industrial branch organisation(s) and in some cases co-signed by Novem, the 
Association of Provinces or individual firms. This is the starting point for 
implementation of the LTA on the individual firm level. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
the process leading to an LTA.  
 
 Process on Long-Term Agreements 
Strategic talk between  Novem, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Industrial Branch. 
Signing of a  Declaration of Intent 
Inventory of organisational and technical energy 
conservation measures (within some or all firms in 
the branch). 
Signing of the  Long Term Agreement .
Implementation of the Long Term Agreement 
Supported by 
subsidy schemes, 
tax reduction 
 and advice 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Process on Long-Term Agreements in the Netherlands (Glasbergen et al., 1997). 
 
 
Contents of an LTA 
An LTA holds the agreements and obligations for the firms and the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. The responsibilities and tasks of Novem and the branch 
organisation are not officially stated in the agreement. 
Firms can join the agreement by signing a letter of accession. The firms are 
obliged to: 
• Target and timetable on the improvement of the energy-efficiency for the 
industrial branch. General targets set in the LTAs are an energy-efficiency 
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improvement of 20% in 2000 compared to 1989 level. An energy-efficiency 
improvement of 20% means a reduction of the EEI by 20% (see Box 5.1). 
• Plan of action on how the branch is going to increase their energy-
efficiency. The contents of company energy plans and economic viability of 
the plans have to be added. 
• The way in which the agreement will be monitored. Long Term Agreements 
are monitored by determining the decrease in energy-use per unit of 
physical product output (the so-called energy-efficiency index (EEI)). In 
general more than one product is produced; then one aggregated EEI is 
calculated per sector (see Box 5.1). 
• Firms must annually report their results on energy-efficiency improvement 
to the Dutch energy-agency Novem. 
• Individual firms can be excluded from the LTA if the fail to provide an 
energy conservation plan and annual monitoring results. Firms will be 
subject to existing regulations, i.e., environmental permits. 
 
In the LTA the Ministry of Economic Affairs officially agrees to give 
financial support the LTA program and maintain the financial assistance within 
the framework of the LTA. The Ministry is furthermore responsible for the co-
ordination of regulatory measures aimed at energy efficiency in industry, 
including requirements to obtain permits and energy taxes. The government 
assures consistency and protection from new regulations aimed at energy-
efficiency improvement. 
 
The Branch association is the contracting party in the LTA. The association 
represents the firms in their sector. The association has mainly an organising 
and co-ordinating role in implementing the LTA. The branch association draws 
the firms’ attention to the need for energy conservation in the sector and 
communicates with and between their members about the LTA. 
 
The Netherlands Agency for Energy and the Environment (Novem) acts as 
an intermediary between on the one hand the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
on the other hand the industrial branch organisations and the firms. In general 
Novem is charged with: 
• the executive responsibility for preparing and advising the firms and the 
branch on the LTAs. 
• co-ordinating and providing technical and financial support to firms and 
branches for energy conservation projects, research and development and 
demonstration and pilot projects. 
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• verifying the aggregate monitoring results in the sector. 
• advising the licensing authorities about the LTA and the environmental 
permit. 
 
Box 5.1 The Energy-efficiency index (EEI). 
 
The monitoring methodology in the LTAs relates the actual energy consumption in a 
specific year to the energy that would have been needed if no change in the aggregate 
specific energy consumption had occurred since the base-year 1989. The actual energy 
consumption is thus compared with the 1989 frozen intensity situation. In formula (for a 
firm with n different products): 
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in which: EEIj is the EEI in year j; Ej is the actual primary energy consumption in year j; 
Eref, j is the reference energy consumption for year j; Pi, j is the physical production amount 
of product i in year j; and SECi, bj is the specific energy consumption of product i in the 
base-year (bj). The factor 100 is introduced for scaling only; by definition the EEI is 100 
in the base-year. The EEI of a whole sector is calculated as the ratio of the total actual 
energy consumption of the firms and the total frozen-intensity energy consumption of the 
firms. In formula for a sector s in year j: 
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Supporting measures and complementary policies 
Besides the LTA (energy covenant) there are several complementary 
policies and supporting measures that influence energy conservation behaviour 
of firms, see Figure 5.2. First of all, there is a set of policy measures which 
support the implementation of the energy covenant. The supporting measures 
are particularly relevant but not exclusively available to firms in the LTA 
scheme.  
 
 
 
Economic
 Affairs, 1993) distinguishes the following set of instruments:
The Second Memorandum on Energy Conservation (Ministry of 
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1. Energy management: energy audits and monitoring systems designed to 
support the firms’ energy management.  
2. Investment subsidies and fiscal incentives: several subsidy schemes and 
fiscal incentives introduced to encourage investment in energy saving 
projects (especially in technologies less familiar to industry), like for 
example energy recovery and heat pumps.  
3. Demonstration: special support schemes drawn up to promote 
technological innovation. 
4. Novem sector programmes: funds made available for the support of energy 
conservation studies, research & development projects and the support of 
monitoring and communication.  
5. Information and consultancy: various subsidy schemes introduced to 
encourage firms to use external consultants providing screening, 
information and consultancy services, including the advisory activities of 
the energy production and distribution sectors within the framework of the 
Environmental Action Plan (MAP) and the Environmental Plan for 
Industry respectively.  
This set of supporting measures is considered to be an integral part of the LTA 
policy mix (see Figure 5.2). 
 
In Figure 5.2 we distinguish two types of government intervention that are 
not part of the LTA policy mix.  
One particularly relevant initiative of the Environmental Action Plan is to 
encourage co-operation between industry and energy distribution companies in 
the field of industrial combined generation of heat and power (CHP). 
According to Blok and Farla (1996), these complementary activities of the 
energy distribution sector and special investment subsidies for CHP made the 
most significant contribution to the growth of the CHP capacity in the early 
nineties. Furthermore, industry has to comply with other regulatory policy 
instruments within the framework of the national environmental policy. These 
instruments, which closely resemble those used in the industrial energy 
conservation policy, include environmental covenants, corporate environmental 
care systems and environmental permits. The environmental permit is 
considered as a ‘fall-back’ instrument if firms refuse to comply with the LTA. 
The complementary effects of these environmental policy instruments on 
energy conservation are however considered to be limited, since recently these 
regulatory instruments have paid only little attention to energy-efficiency 
improvement (Glasbergen, 1997). 
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Environmental policies
LTA policy mix
energy covenant + 
supporting measures
CHP subsidies
Environmental Action Plan
Good Housekeeping
Replacement
Retrofit
Other investments
CHP
Industrial energy conservation 
(investments)
Policies influencing industrial energy 
conservation  
1
2
3
 
 
Figure 5.2 Policies influencing industrial energy conservation (investments).  
 
5.3 The mechanisms: how do negotiated agreements work? 
 
Three main mechanisms along which LTAs influence energy conservation 
behaviour of firms can be identified: 
 
1. Profitability/cost reduction 
An important decision criteria for making investments is the profitability of the 
taken investment and the associated reduction in production costs. The LTA 
policy mix can influence the profitability of the investments or reduce energy 
costs in the following way. First, subsidies linked with the LTA energy 
covenant decrease investment cost and thus increase the profitability of energy 
saving options. Secondly, knowledge diffusion increases the number of 
profitable energy saving options which were not known before. Third, LTAs 
can change the strategic policy and operative business goals of firms. Altered 
business criteria can increase the profitability of energy saving investments  
(Rietbergen et al., 1999). It must be kept in mind that energy saving 
investments still have to compete with alternative (even more profitable) 
investments. 
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2. Learning, energy management and motivation 
Learning implies that the involved actors are involved in a continuous 
improvement of policy aimed at energy efficiency. At firm level a proper 
energy management appears to be an important route along which firms initiate 
new energy conservation projects. Energy management includes the following 
activities: - the monitoring of energy use in specific parts of the (core) process - 
and - a systematic search for new conservation options (e.g., company energy 
plan and new organisational routines). Anchoring energy issues in the overall 
process management increases the attention paid to energy-efficiency 
improvement. Furthermore the direct involvement of firm actors increases 
motivation to reduce energy use. In the branch organizations a similar learning 
process is discernable. The branch organization has become an organ 
responsible for channeling communication to its members and between its 
members and the other in the LTA network. Moreover the branch organizations 
are now also dealing with energy issues more actively than in the pre-LTA 
period (Glasbergen, 1998).  
 
3. Communication/knowledge diffusion 
An important for barrier for investing in energy saving measures can be a 
lack of knowledge on new options for energy conservation. The LTAs appear 
to increase investment in energy saving technologies due to a sharing of 
information and knowledge among firms, sectors and other relevant actors, like 
the energy agency. Several activities - such as drawing up sectoral 
communication plans, generation of new network links and the establishment 
of energy boards - identify the working of this mechanism. The LTAs have 
clearly extended and structured communication and knowledge transfer relating 
to energy (Rietbergen et al., 1999). 
 
 
5.4 Goal achievement in negotiated agreements on energy 
efficiency 
 
In this section we describe the relationship between the original policy goals 
(in terms of energy-efficiency targets) in the LTAs and the goal achievement as 
presented in the LTA monitoring reports. We distinguish the goal achievement 
in the negotiation phase and the actual performance 
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Table 5.1 Long-term Agreements contracted with industry and their results (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2000) 
LTA Contracting Duration Primary Energy eff. Target 
  date Energy 
use (PJ)
Improve-ment 
(%) 
 (%) 
 DD-MM-YY DD-MM-YY 1999 1989-1999 1989-2000 
Potato Processing 17-6-96 1-1-01 8.0 20.5 20 
Breweries 10-3-98 1-1-01 3.9 24 27 
Cacao 7-11-98 1-1-06 2.3 12.3 18 
Soft Drinks  11-7-96 1-1-01 0.8 17.4 21 
Fruit and Vegetables  17-12-97 31-12-00 2.6 9 17 
Coffee Roasting  26-11-96 1-1-01 0.8 21.7 19 
Margarine/Fats/Oils 2-4-96 1-1-01 8.3 18.5 22 
Sugar 3-9-93 1-1-01 6.1 23.5 20 
Meat Processing 8-9-93 1-1-00 4.7 10.7 20 
Dairy 17-4-98 1-1-01 17.3 12.6 20 
Food and drink ind. 16.8  
Asphalt 6-11-95 1-1-01 2.6 10.7 20 
Cement 1-3-98 1-1-01 4.1 22 20 
Fine Ceramics 26-4-94 1-1-00 2.2 7 20 
Glass 17-7-92 1-1-00 12.9 13.6 20 
Construction Ceramics 13-10-93 1-1-00 9.2 11 20 
Sandlime Brick 27-2-97 1-1-01 1.2 12 23 
Building materials 13.2  
Plastic/Rubber 22-11-94 1-1-00 10.9 17.8 20 
Philips 1-5-93 1-1-00 8.0 35 25 
Paper and Cardboard 4-6-96 1-1-01 31.3 20.9 20 
Textile 8-3-96 1-1-01 3.4 21 20 
Other industries 17.4  
Non-ferrous 2-12-96 1-1-01 9.6 15 15 
Iron and Steel 21-12-95 1-1-01 58.9 16 20 
Basic Metal Ind. 15.7  
Cold Storage  15-3-96 1-1-01 2.1 21.7 28 
Industrial Laundries 16-6-94 1-1-01 1.3 23.5 20 
Surface Treatment 14-3-96 1-1-01 2.2 15 20 
Carpet 26-6-96 1-1-01 1.0 15.7 20 
Iron Foundry 23-6-95 1-1-01 2.4 7 16 
Other Industry 24-6-96 1-1-01 13.7 11.3 20 
Light industries 13.3  
Chemicals 24-11-93 1-1-01 323.0 22.6 20 
Refineries 1-9-95 1-1-01 145.0 13 10 
Total (excl. refineries) 700 20.4* 18 
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The negotiation phase 
The government pursued the translation of her policy goals into individual long-
term agreements during the negotiations with many industrial sectors. Between 
1993 and 1999 up till 30 industrial agreements were concluded. As we can see in 
table 5.1 it turned out to be possible to agree on a 20% decrease in energy 
intensity with most of the sectors in the manufacturing industry in the year 2000 
compared to the level in 1989. This homogeneous 20% goal is rather strange 
when we know that an exploratory survey was conducted in most of the sectors 
to find the (profitable) potentials for energy intensity decrease before the LTA 
was contracted. From studies on these potentials (De Beer et al., 1994) we 
know that these may vary significantly by sector.  
The LTA for the refineries has an energy intensity reduction target of 10%. 
Because of this relatively low target for a sector with a large share of the 
(industrial) energy consumption the energy-weighted average for the 30 sectors 
is calculated to be 18%.  
 
The total primary energy consumption in 1989 that is covered by the sectors 
that negotiated an agreement amounts to 653 PJ. The industrial primary energy 
consumption (including refineries and coking plants) according to CBS 
amounted to 868 PJ in 1989.43 The industrial energy consumption (1989) in the 
Memorandum on energy conservation (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1990) 
amounts to 902 PJ.44 This implies that 72-75% of the industrial energy 
consumption in 1989 is covered by the LTAs.45  
 
An overview of the energy consumption by industry group and the share 
that is covered by the LTAs is given Figure 5.3. The data for this figure were 
taken from the national energy statistics (CBS, annual publication) and from 
the monitoring results of the LTAs (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999). In 
                                                     
43
 The energy consumption in 1989 according to CBS (annual publication) is corrected on the 
basis of new information on the energy consumption of the chemical industry in that year. 
44
 The correction that we applied to the CBS statistical data (cf. previous footnote) is also applied 
to the data from the Memorandum on Energy Conservation (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
1990). To the data from the Memorandum on Energy Conservation we added the electricity 
conversion losses, based on the share of electricity consumption in the CBS data.  
45
 The long-term agreement with the oil and gas (exploration) industry is not included in our data. 
The reason is that this sector was not considered part of the manufacturing industry in the 
Memorandum on energy conservation. Adding this LTA would not lead to a higher coverage of 
the 1989 energy consumption by the LTAs because the energy consumption in the oil and gas 
industry would have to be added both in the numerator and the denominator of the coverage 
ratio. 
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this figure we show in which clusters of industry the largest differences 
between the actual primary energy consumption and the coverage by the LTA 
occurred. Further examination of these differences, teaches us that there are 
three reasons for a low coverage: 
• Some sectors did not conclude an LTA. We calculated that approximately 
90% of the primary energy in 1989 was consumed in the sectors with which 
an LTA has been concluded.46 
• Some firms do not participate in the LTA that is concluded for their sector.47 
On average, the firms that participate in the LTAs cover 92% of the primary 
energy in their sector. 
• Definitions of ‘energy consumption’ in the LTAs are in some cases different 
from the definitions by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
These differences cause the overall effect that another 10% of the primary 
energy consumption in the LTAs’ firms is not taken into account by the 
LTAs. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Overview of the 1989 primary energy consumption by cluster of industry and the 
coverage by the LTAs (situation 1997). 
 
                                                     
46
 This figure of 90% is regularly quoted by Novem and the government as the overall coverage 
of the energy consumption by the LTAs. 
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The cumulative effect of the above three reasons leads to the 
aforementioned 72-75% coverage of the primary energy consumption by the 
LTAs.  
The most important example of a difference in the definition of energy 
consumption is found in the basic metal industry. About half of the energy 
consumption in that sector has been categorised as non-energetic use of energy 
carriers, unlike the categorisation in the national energy statistics (CBS, annual 
publication) and in the Memoranda on energy conservation (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 1990, 1993). The non-energetic use according to the LTAs 
concerns the use of coal and coke in the reduction step of the iron production, 
and the electricity consumption in electrolytic production steps in the non-
ferrous metal industries. A target to decrease the energy intensity by 20% 
(1989-2000) would not have been possible for the basic metal industry – on the 
basis of known profitable energy intensity measures (Worrell et al., 1993) – if 
the total energy consumption (including coal, coke and electricity used for 
electrolysis) had been taken into account.  
 
 
Actual performance 
Up till 31 December 1999 30 LTAs have been concluded with the 
manufacturing industry48 (see Table 5.1). Currently more than 1350 firms are 
participating in the industrial LTAs. The total primary energy use, excluding 
feedstocks, covered by the industrial agreements amounted to 700 PJ in 1999. 
In the period 1989-1999 the total amount of saved energy compared to a frozen 
efficiency energy consumption was about 142,5 PJ (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, 2000).49 In 1999 the average energy-efficiency improvement in 29 
industrial sectors amounted to 20.4% compared to the 1989 level, 
corresponding to an annual average energy-efficiency improvement of 2.3%. 
Thus, on the basis of these figures the average target of 20% reduction in 
energy intensity has already been reached. The results for different clusters of 
industry, however, vary considerably. The chemical industry, accounting for 
more than 53% of the energy consumption of the Dutch manufacturing 
industry, is performing better than average, whereas clusters like light industry 
                                                                                                                                 
47
 For instance, one refinery does not participate in the LTA. 
48
 Including refineries.  
49
 The frozen efficiency energy consumption is the amount of energy that would have been used 
if the energy intensity of (production) processes and activities had not changed. The frozen 
efficiency energy consumption takes into account structural changes and activity growth within 
the sectors and firms. 
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and building materials are far behind schedule. However, the energy consump-
tion covered by these LTAs is a relatively small fraction of the total energy 
consumption of the industrial LTAs. In Figure 5.4 we see that especially 
sectors in which many firms are included are lagging behind.  
The simple-average goal achievement over all the sectors (relative to the 
interpolated target) is 84% in 1997. If we weigh the sectors by their energy use, 
we find an average goal achievement of approximately 100%.  
Figure 5.5 shows that there is not a clear relationship between energy 
intensity and the goal achievement of industrial sectors. Energy-intensive 
sectors that lag behind are those in the cluster building materials. These sectors 
are energy intensive but do not perform very well. For the remaining sectors the 
rule “the higher the energy intensity the better the performance” is valid. 
 
• Some issues on the measurement of primary energy use were open to 
dispute, e.g., the conversion of electricity to primary energy; whether fossil-
derived waste should be included; and which part of the energy use should 
be defined as feedstock. 
• The definition of aggregate production in most long-term agreements was 
not transparent.  
• Both for energy use and for aggregate production the trends in the 
monitoring results differed from those reported by the national bureau of 
statistics CBS. Especially uncertainties remain for the chemical industry, 
which is a problem because of the importance of this sector in the 
Netherlands' industrial energy use. 
• Correction factors could be used for matters like changes in product 
specification, regulation, outdoor temperature. It turned out that these 
correction were applied unidirectional, i.e. only if they could improve the 
reported results. However, the total effect on the results is small. 
• Errors occurred in the monitoring reports. 
 
We recommend - for future negotiated agreements - to use better monitoring 
guidelines and to require more detailed monitoring reports. Furthermore, 
independent verification of the monitoring results is necessary. 
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Figure 5.4. Goal achievement in 1999 relative to the interpolated target, as a function of the 
number of firms that belong to a sector (logarithmic scale). The figure is based on (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2000). 
   
 
Conclusions on goal achievement 
On the basis of the previous subsections we conclude that LTAs have been 
agreed upon for industrial sectors that together cover 90% of the (primary) 
energy consumption in manufacturing industry. However, because not all firms 
in these sectors participate in the LTAs and because of differences in the 
definition of energy consumption, only about 75% of the energy consumption 
is actually covered by the LTAs and the monitoring of the LTAs. According to 
the results that are reported annually in the LTA monitoring reports, the 
average target for energy-intensity reductions in the year 2000 has already been 
reached in 1999. On the other hand, a large number of LTAs - that together 
cover a relatively small part of the industrial energy consumption - is 
substantially lagging behind the agreed energy intensity reduction rates. 
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Figure 5.5 Goal achievement in 1999 relative to the interpolated target, as a function of the 
energy intensity (energy/production value) of industrial sectors (logarithmic scale). The figure is 
based on (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2000) and CBS (annual publication). 
 
 
5.5 Effectiveness of Long-Term Agreements 
 
Now that we have estimated to what extent the goals set out were achieved, 
the next step is to estimate to what extent the long term agreements contributed 
to these achievements. 
One way to isolate the contribution of the LTAs to energy-efficiency 
improvement is to investigate the additional investment and the related energy 
savings made by industry. The following three-step bottom-up method has been 
developed to estimate the effect of LTAs on industrial energy consumption. In 
this analysis, the LTA is considered as a mix of policies of which the energy 
covenant (negotiated agreement) is the main element. The energy covenant is 
supported by accompanying measures like subsidies and fiscal incentives 
which are assumed to be an integral part of the LTA policy mix. The 
complementary effects of other energy and environmental policies on energy 
conservation are not attributed to the LTAs (see Figure 5.2). 
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Step 1. In the first step, an inventory is made of all the energy-saving 
measures taken at sector level. The energy-saving measures are attributed to 
different investment categories, which have been derived from the 
classification used in the Dutch annual LTA progress reports. The LTA 
progress reports generally distinguish between the following investment 
categories: 
• Good housekeeping/energy management. This category concerns energy-
saving measures that have a relatively short pay-back period and do not 
require large investment.  
• Replacement investments. These investments are aimed at the replacement, 
maintenance or extension of industrial equipment. Replacement investments 
are made primarily for strategic reasons. The profitability of these 
investments does in general not depend on the energy conservation 
potential. Energy conservation, related to these investments, often has a 
process-integrated character. 
• Energy-saving investments (retrofit). Energy-saving investments concern 
measures aimed primarily at the improvement of energy efficiency. Hence, 
the profitability of these investments depends largely on the conservation 
potential of the energy-saving measure. Examples of such investments are 
insulation, adjustable speed drives and heat recovery.  
• Combined heat and power generation (CHP). Investments in co-generation 
are considered as a separate conservation category, since CHP can lead to a 
considerable saving of fuel. 
• Other measures. Finally, some activities come under the heading of ‘other 
measures’; these include the closing down of firms and NOx emission 
reduction measures, which can also improve energy efficiency. 
 
Step 2. In the second step it is judged whether and to what extent firms’ 
investments are encouraged by the agreements. The firms’ investment 
behaviour is assessed from the perspectives of both experts (a) and firm actors 
(b). 
 
a) In this study the expert opinions about the investment behaviour of 
firms are judgements made by the research team about the investment 
behaviour of firms as well as the judgement made by the steering committee of 
the project ‘Evaluatie Meerjarenafspraken over energie-efficiency’ set up by 
Glasbergen et al. (1997). In general, the following guidelines for the assessment 
procedure are observed: 
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• Investments in energy-saving measures in the category good 
housekeeping/energy management are assumed to be stimulated almost 
entirely by the agreements, since the measures do not invoke excessive 
costs; the measures could have been taken anyway. 
• Since replacement projects are not primarily implemented for the purpose 
of energy-efficiency improvement, these investments are considered to be 
stimulated only slightly by LTAs. 
• According to the experts the investments in CHP are promoted to a slight 
extent, since CHP investment is already considerably encouraged by the 
MAP drawn up by energy distribution companies as well as by the special 
subsidies for the promotion of CHP investment). 
• Since measures in the category retrofit investments are aimed at the 
improvement of energy efficiency and require considerable investment, the 
experts assume that these measures are largely stimulated by agreements. 
• Investments in the category ‘other activities’ are assumed not to be 
stimulated by the agreements. 
In particular cases energy-saving measures can also be ‘considerably 
stimulated’ by an LTA. For more details on the assessment procedure followed 
the reader is referred to Glasbergen et al. (1997). 
 
b) In a survey conducted by de Groot et al. (1999), firm actors were asked 
to assess to what degree agreements have promoted investment in ‘good-
housekeeping measures’, ‘replacement projects’, retrofit measures’ and ‘CHP-
installations’. The survey yielded a data set for about 60 Dutch firms with an 
LTA on energy efficiency. The data set includes firms in nine different 
industrial sectors. Figure 5.6 shows the survey response. 
More than 90% of the respondents point out that energy-saving measures in 
the category ‘good-housekeeping’ are slightly to largely stimulated by the 
LTAs. This judgement contrasts sharply with the opinion of the experts, who 
assume that good-housekeeping measures are stimulated almost entirely by 
LTAs. According to 50% of the firms replacement investments are stimulated 
slightly by the LTAs. This result corresponds very closely to the opinion of the 
experts. The firms are of the opinion that the retrofit investments are slightly to 
largely stimulated by the LTAs. This differs from the opinion of the experts 
who assume that the investments are largely stimulated by the LTAs. More 
than 65% of the firms with a CHP plant indicate that the CHP investments are 
largely to almost entirely promoted by the LTAs. The survey response contrasts 
with the opinion of the experts. The high response in the category ‘not’ 
  
 
 
 
88 CHAPTER 5   
  
 
 
stimulated can probably be attributed to the fact that a large number of firms 
had invested in CHP installations before LTAs were concluded. 
 
Step 3. In the third step the qualitative judgements are translated into a 
weighting scheme in order to calculate the effectiveness of the LTAs in terms 
of saved energy. The sensitivity of the weighting scheme is tested by 
considering a low and a high variant.  
Table 5.2 shows the three weighting schemes: 
 
Table 5.2 Weighting schemes used in the sensitivity analysis.1 
 
Degree of stimulation High Average Low 
Not stimulated 10% 0% 0% 
Stimulated to a slight extent 30% 20% 10% 
Considerably stimulated 60% 50% 40% 
Largely stimulated 90% 80% 70% 
Entirely stimulated 100% 100% 90% 
1 
 
energy is the actual effect of the agreement in the case where investments are ‘largely 
stimulated’. If investments are stimulated to a slight extent, only 20% of the saved energy is 
encouraged by the agreement, etcetera. The actual effect of all the investments on energy 
conservation is calculated in this way and aggregated on a sector level. 
 
Results 
The method outlined in the previous section was applied to the following 
five industrial LTAs: chemical industries; paper & board industries; glass 
industries; iron & steel industries and margarine, fats & oils. In 1996 the share 
of the five sectors in the energy consumption covered by the 29 industrial 
LTAs was nearly 80%. The analysis of the effects of changes in investment 
behaviour on industrial energy conservation covers the period 1989-1996.  
The total energy saved in the five evaluated industrial sectors amounted to 
64 PJ in the period 1989-1996. The average energy-efficiency improvement in 
the five sectors amounted to about 13.1% in 1996 compared to the level in 
1989. This is slightly better than the average result (12.5%) as reported by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the estimated contribution that energy savings in the five 
investment categories made to the total savings of the five evaluated industrial 
sectors in the period 1989-1996. The energy-saving data per investment 
Table 5.2 must be read as follows. The average weighting scheme assumes that 80% of the saved 
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category were derived from the annual LTA progress reports of the individual 
sectors. Investment in the replacement of existing equipment contributes the 
most to the overall energy savings (32%). The investment categories ‘retrofit’ 
(18%), ‘CHP investments’ (22%) and the category ‘other activities’ (22%) 
contribute almost equally to the overall energy savings. The remaining 9% of 
the energy savings can be identified as good housekeeping measures. 
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Figure 5.6 Survey response. 
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Figure 5.7 Total and stimulated energy savings per conservation category1,2 
1
  The Sum of the energy savings is plotted against the secondary axis. 
2
 Error bars indicate the stimulated energy savings when the low and high weighting schemes 
were used. 
 
On the basis of the firms’ and the experts’ judgement, it can be concluded 
that about 30-40% of the energy savings are considerably to almost entirely 
stimulated by the LTAs, whereas 60-70% of the total energy savings are 
slightly or not stimulated by the LTAs. The firms indicated that more than one 
third of their energy savings are not stimulated at all by the LTAs. The experts 
are of the opinion that about 50% of the energy savings are slightly encouraged 
by the LTAs. The stimulated energy savings per investment category are 
depicted in Figure 5.7. The error bars indicate the stimulated energy savings 
when the other weighting schemes were used. Large differences between the 
stimulated savings from the perspective of the firms and the experts can be 
observed in the investment categories ‘good housekeeping’, ‘retrofit’ and 
‘CHP’. The total stimulated savings from both perspectives however do not 
differ very much. The estimations based on the expert opinions indicate that 
about 27-44% (17-28 PJ) of the energy savings can be attributed to the 
implementation of the LTAs. When the assessment is based on the firms’ 
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survey response, the percentage of energy savings promoted by the LTAs is 
about 29-44% (18-28 PJ).  
 
Discussion 
The design of the method requires clarification. First, it should be 
emphasised that, although the overall assessment results do not differ very 
much, large differences were observed between the firms’ and experts’ 
judgement regarding industrial investment behaviour. In this respect it is 
regrettable that the bias in firms’ survey response and possible 
misinterpretation of survey questions could not be analysed in more detail on 
the basis of the survey data. Secondly, due to a lack of detailed energy-saving 
data and information on the purpose of investments the energy-saving measures 
were classified into only five different categories. A more detailed 
classification of energy-saving measures (for example distinguishing own CHP 
and joint venture CHP) and thus an appropriate assessment would probably 
have led to more accurate results.  
With regard to the quality of the results, it should be mentioned that the 
results depend for a large part on the energy-saving investments made in the 
chemical industry. The chemical industry is responsible for more than 70% of 
the total energy savings in the five evaluated sectors.50 However, if the 
chemical industry is not taken into account the effectiveness of the LTAs 
ranges from 41-59% (expert opinion) and 35-52% (firms’ judgement).  
An alternative way of isolating the actual outcome of the LTAs is to 
compare the overall monitored energy-efficiency improvement with the energy-
efficiency improvement in the business-as-usual (BaU) case. The BaU scenario 
reflects the energy-efficiency improvement arising from technological or 
operational changes that would have taken place anyway, even without the 
influence of the LTA policy mix. The energy-efficiency improvement in the 
BaU case can be estimated by simulating the impact that energy investment 
behaviour of industrial firms had on energy-efficiency improvement in the 
absence of the LTAs. We have also applied this alternative method to 
determine the effectiveness; this leads to comparable results, see Rietbergen et 
al. (2002).  
 
 
 
                                                     
50
 In this respect it is regrettable that in this particular sector there are substantial discrepancies 
between the energy consumption data of LTA monitoring reports and national statistics, see Farla 
and Blok (2002). This means that the overall results must be regarded as only preliminary. 
  
 
 
 
92 CHAPTER 5   
  
 
 
Recommendations 
Further analysis of the effects of changes in investment behaviour is in our 
opinion a promising route for further research. This type of analysis can be 
further enhanced in the following ways. First of all, we recommend that the 
definition of investment categories should be improved and the level of detail 
be increased. As suggested in the previous section this could improve the 
quality of the results. Secondly, we believe that more systematic surveys should 
be conducted among firms. Although one has to deal with problems like the 
stated behaviour of firms, we propose to study in more detail the effects of 
LTAs on energy-efficiency investment behaviour. It would be advisable to take 
into account the impact analysis of specific supporting measures and 
complementary policies as well as other incentives for and barriers to further 
energy-efficiency improvement in the survey. Furthermore, we suggest there 
should be an ‘on line’ evaluation of the energy conservation projects, since an 
annual survey would reflect more accurately the dynamic effects of the 
agreements, such as energy management, technological diffusion and 
innovation. 
 
 
5.6 The cost-effectiveness of voluntary agreements 
  
After we have estimated, how much energy saving was stimulated through 
the voluntary agreements, we may try to determine what the cost-effectiveness 
of the long term agreements are. We will do that in terms of the amount of 
money that the government need to spend per unit of carbon emission 
avoided.51 
Before we can make that estimate, we need an overview of the costs of the 
long term agreement scheme. The costs are given in Table 5.3. The total costs 
in the period 1989 to 1999 amount to 650 million US$, including all subsidy 
schemes. It should be noted that especially the subsidy schemes contribute 
substantially to the costs of governments’ industrial energy conservation  
policies: the CHP subsidy in the early nineties, and the EIA (see Chapter 3) up 
from 1996.  
                                                     
51
 An analysis of the cost-effectiveness taking into account firms investments, societal costs and 
benefits could not be made due to the limited amount of data. 
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Table 5.3 Cost components of the Long-Term Agreement scheme in the period 1989-1999 
(Glasbergen et al., 1997; Rietbergen et al., 1999). 1 US$ was approx. 2 NLG in the period 
concerned. 
 
Type of expenditure Expenditure in the 
period 1989-1995 
(million US$) 
Expenditure in the 
period 1989-1999 
(million US$) 
Subsidy regulations for 
feasibility studies and 
demonstration projects 
85 130 
Activities to support the long-
term agreements (internal 
projects by companies, 
external consultants, etc.) 
65 114 
Personnel and associated costs 
of the energy agency Novem 
18 32 
Subsidies for combined 
generation of heat and power 
(CHP) 
100 106 
Tax schemes (EIA) - 268 
Total 268 650 
 
 
Total savings in industrial energy use amounted to 63 PJ upto 1995. It was 
found that 18-29 PJ were stimulated through the LTA policies and 7 PJ through 
the CHP policies (including the subsidies) (Glasbergen et al., 1997). In 1999 
the total savings had increased to PJ 142.5. Taking into account the fraction of 
27-44% stimulated by the long-term agreement policies (see section 5.5) we 
find total stimulated savings of 38 – 62 PJ. 
 Using the stimulated savings (section 5.5) and an average emission factor 
of 73 kg CO2 per GJ primary energy52, we can estimate an avoided CO2 
emission: 2.0 – 2.8 Mtonnes (of which 0.7 Mtonnes through CHP) until 1995 
and 3.0 – 4.9 Mtonnes until 1999. Now the specific costs of the instrument can 
be calculated. We assume that the saving effect lasts for 10 years and that a 
social discount rate (i.e. 5%) can be used. The result is an estimated specific 
                                                     
52
 This is equivalent to the average specific emission for the energy carriers used in Netherlands' 
industry. For savings achieved through combined generation of heat and power, avoided 
emissions of 100 g CO2 per GJ saved primary energy were taken (Blok, 1991). 
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costs of  14 – 21 US$ per tonne of carbon dioxide emission avoided for all the 
schemes for industrial energy efficiency improvement together until 1999. 
However, if we strip the costs of the subsidy parts (which anyway is justified 
for the non-CHP part of the policies until 1995) cost levels around 10 
US$/tonne of carbon dioxide result. 
This compares favourably with the costs of pure subsidy schemes directed 
at the same sectors (see also Table 5.4). Although also for these instruments the 
estimation of the cost-effectiveness is not easy, the estimate is that on average 
the costs for subsidy instruments typically are twice as high than for the long 
term agreements. Nevertheless, in their evaluation, Glasbergen et al. (1997) 
expect that it must be possible to operate long-term agreements with lower 
costs than those in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 5.4 The cost per stimulated unit of carbon dioxide avoided for three different 
instruments. Apart from the long term agreements, in italics results are given for three 
subsidy schemes (Farla et al., 1995; De Beer et al., 2000, see also Chapter 3). All figures are 
converted to the same basis: 5% discount rate, depreciation over 10 years, 1 US$ = 2 NLG. 
 
Instrument Specific costs 
($/tonne CO2) 
Specific costs 
($/tonne of 
carbon) 
Long-term agreements (until 1995) 10 – 16 40 – 60 
CHP subsidies (until 1995) 17 60 
Total industrial policy: long-term 
agreements + CHP policy (until 
1995) 
11 - 16 40 - 60 
Total industrial policy: long-term 
agreements + CHP policy + fiscal 
support EIA (until 1999) 
14 - 21 50 - 80 
Ibid., excluding costs of EIA and 
CHP subsidies 
7 – 11 30 - 40 
   
Investment Account Act  
(1980 – 1987) 
35 130 
Energy Investment Tax Discount 
(EIA, as of 1996, results until 2000) 
25 – 50 
(range 7 – 500) 
85 – 180 
(range 25 – 1800) 
EINP (for non-profit sectors) 75 – 110 275 – 400 
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5.7 Recommendations on negotiated agreements 
 
The results of our studies on voluntary agreements in the Netherlands 
(Glasbergen et al., 1997; Rietbergen et al., 2000) and a comparative study on 
the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of agreements on energy efficiency in 
several European countries (Krarup and Ramesohl, 2000) indicate that such 
agreements can help limiting the growth of energy use in manufacturing 
industry. The positive and negative experiences obtained from these studies 
lead us to the following set of recommendations for the design of successful 
voluntary agreements. 
 
1. Voluntary agreements require a clear negotiation position and a negotiating 
attitude of the government in order to reach ambitious targets. 
2. The targets should be well described with respect to energy-efficiency 
target and target year. 
3. Voluntary agreements require an intensive and long-lasting effort of the 
government to guarantee the actual realisation of the energy-efficiency 
improvement. Such additional effort can consist of support of the branch, 
free energy audits, organisation of information exchange and subsidies for 
demonstration projects. 
4. Monitoring of the improvement of the energy-efficiency improvement 
should be done by using physical energy-efficiency indicators (e.g. 
GJ/tonne of product).  
5. The monitoring guidelines should be clearly described and the monitoring 
procedure for each sector should be public. The use of correction factors 
should be limited. 
6. Independent verification of the monitoring results is necessary. 
7. Voluntary agreements are not always successful for energy extensive 
sectors with a large number of companies involved. 
 
 

  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
6 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION STRATEGIES IN 
STIMULATING THE R&D OF ENERGY-
EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGIES53 
 
 
6.1 Industrial energy-efficiency improvement in the long term  
 
Thus far, the attention in this book was directed to stimulating the adoption 
of commercially available technologies. Such options may prove sufficient to 
reach short and medium term targets. Reaching longer term targets, like those 
for a period of 50 to 100 years ahead requires not only the further adoption of 
the technologies mentioned, but also the development and adoption of 
innovative technologies. Blok et al. (1996a), De Beer (1998) and Martin et al. 
(2000) have shown that the long-term potential for energy-efficiency 
improvements in various energy-intensive manufacturing industries is 
considerable. 
De Beer (1998) for instance analysed the opportunities for future energy-
efficiency improvement according to a structured method, including: (i) process 
and energy analysis; (ii) technology identification; (iii) technology 
characterisation. The results of this work provide for an overview of the 
potential for energy-efficiency improvement for selected sectors in 
manufacturing industry (see Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1 shows that it is possible to bridge about half of the gap between 
the present best technologies and the thermodynamic minimum with identified 
new technologies. 
The identification of such technologies and the needs for energy-efficiency 
R&D is one thing, stimulating their development and contributing towards a 
successful introduction of such options is another. A strong R&D effort in the 
area of energy end-use efficiency is required to facilitate the adoption of 
existing options on the one hand and to develop innovative technologies which 
are more-and-more energy-efficient on the other hand (Blok et al., 1996b). 
Stimulating the development of such technologies is an interesting government 
option: if government can effectively contribute towards the development of 
such technologies the final effect can be large, because once the technology has 
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 This chapter was written by Esther Luiten.  
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achieved a proven state of performance it can be adopted in a large number of 
firms. The potential impact on energy consumption is large. 
 
Table 6.1 Overview of present best-practice technology, and identified potential for 
improvement in terms of specific energy consumption (in GJ/tonne) for some industrial 
energy functions. 
 
Specific energy consumption levels 
(SEC) 
 
Present 
best 
practice 
techno-
logy 
Thermo-
dynamic 
minimum 
Combination 
of best 
identified 
future 
technologies 
Relevant future 
technologies 
Paper/board 
(paper drying) 
2.3 – 8.6 0.0 0.6 – 4.3 Impulse 
technology* 
Condebelt drying 
Dry sheet forming 
Airless drying 
Primary iron 
and steel 
production 
19.0 6.6 12.5 Smelt reduction* 
Strip casting* 
Secondary steel 
production 
7.0 0.0 3.5 Combination shaft 
furnace 
Strip casting* 
Ammonia 
production 
33.0 24.1 28.6 Membrane reactors 
Nitric acid 
production 
26.8 3.2 15.3 Gas turbine or 
SOFC integration 
 
 
Government R&D support is the traditional policy instrument for governments 
to stimulate R&D. This is also the case in stimulating industrial energy-
efficiency R&D.54 The current situation in energy R&D is not very shining. 
Government R&D expenditure has been declining since the mid-1980s in 
response to lower real energy prices, budget austerity and changing attitudes to 
                                                     
54
 See for instance the overview study of International Energy R&D in Industrialised Countries 
(Ashton and Dooley, 1994); the database constructed by Meuleman et al. (1996); and the more 
recent country studies on Energy R&D (see http://energytrends.pml.gov).   
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the role of government in the economy55 (IEA, 1996; IEA, 1997). The trend of 
liberalisation in the energy sector is likely expected to further suppress energy 
R&D expenditure and to direct R&D towards shorter-term R&D (Graaff et al., 
2000; Dooley, 1998). In spite of these trends in energy R&D, government 
energy-efficiency R&D programmes have experienced the most consistent 
budget growth of all energy R&D technology areas (see Table 6.2 and Figure 
6.1).56 Industrial energy-efficiency R&D programmes appear to be receiving 
preference over building or transport related energy-efficiency R&D 
programmes (Dooley et al., 1998, WEA, 2000, Luiten and Blok, 1999). 
 
Table 6.2 Overview of government energy R&D expenditure in several energy technology 
areas (IEA, 1997).57 
 
million US$ (1995 prices) Technology area 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Industrial energy-efficiency R&D 201 135 154 383 
Other energy-efficiency R&D 731 520 290 567 
Other energy R&D 14087 10410 8396 8026 
 
                                                     
55
 The performance of energy R&D is highly concentrated in a very small number of countries. 
The top 9 countries account for 95% of the industrialised world’s supported energy R&D. The 
US and Japan are the two countries with by far the largest government energy R&D expenditure 
(Dooley et al., 1998; IEA, 1997). 
56
 The International Energy Agency (IEA) collects and reports public R&D expenditure in energy 
R&D within the OECD countries (IEA, 1997). The IEA data are the best energy R&D data 
available, although it should be realised that there are difficulties in data collection and data 
processing (see Dooley et al., 1997). The energy R&D data are at best an input measure and say 
nothing about productivity. Furthermore, it should be noted that that ‘R&D that affects energy 
end-use’ is not the same as ‘energy-efficiency R&D’ as distinguished in IEA statistics (Dooley, 
2000). 
57
 Countries included are Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the US. On average 85% of the reported industrial 
energy-efficiency R&D is included; in the case of energy-efficiency R&D and energy R&D 87 
and 89% respectively were included (IEA, 1997).  
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Figure 6.1 Government energy R&D expenditure trends 1980 and 1995  (IEA, 1997). We have 
only included the eleven OECD countries for which data were available for each year. 
 
Blok et al. (1996b) compared the R&D needs for energy-efficiency 
improvement and the actual government R&D support. They find that current 
R&D practice on industrial energy efficiency covers only part of the innovative 
technologies identified. Hence, they conclude that the amount of government 
expenditure on industrial energy-efficiency R&D is far from sufficient. It is 
also recommended that government should support developments over long 
time frames in order to guarantee continuity independent of economic cycles. 
This conclusion of Blok et al. (1996b) – in combination with governments’ 
interest in supporting energy-efficiency R&D – underline the need for an 
evaluation of government intervention strategies to develop the long-term 
potential for energy-efficiency improvement. 
In Chapter 2 it was stated that a good understanding of the behaviour of 
firms in implementing commercially available technologies is required for 
developing and designing effective policy instruments. An ‘extended’ net 
present value framework was presented in order to understand the paradoxical 
behaviour that cost-effective energy-efficient technologies are not widely 
implemented. A similar statement can be made regarding R&D towards 
energy-efficient technologies. A good understanding of firms’ behaviour and 
decisions in developing innovative energy-efficient is required for developing 
and designing effective policy instrument for steering R&D. The framework 
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presented in Chapter 2, including the suggestion that this framework can be the 
starting point from which the effectiveness and efficiency of policy instruments 
can be assessed, is, however, not directly applicable to R&D and technological 
development. Whereas Chapter 2 reflects that understanding the behaviour of 
firms in implementing energy-efficient technologies is steadily growing, such 
insight is not yet available regarding the R&D development of innovative 
technologies. Why do actors initiate, pursue or stop the R&D development of 
innovative energy-efficient technologies? What affects actors’ decisions in such 
R&D activities? And, of course, how susceptible are actors to governments’ 
attempts to stimulate or direct such technologies? 
In this chapter we move beyond the identification of innovative energy-
efficient technologies and R&D needs as for instance done by De Beer (1998) 
and Blok et al. (1996a). The aim of this chapter is to gain insight into actors’ 
behaviour and arguments for developing innovative energy-efficient 
technologies. We increase our understanding in order to make a preliminary 
evaluation of government intervention strategies. We will also shortly explore 
the possibilities of alternative intervention strategies than government R&D 
support. 
In Section 6.2 we introduce four detailed technology case studies. Three of 
the four case studies were identified by De Beer (1998) (see the * in Table 6.1). 
The fourth one is a ‘historical’ industrial energy-efficient technology that has 
been commercially available for 20 years. In Section 6.3 we elaborate upon the 
possibilities for government intervention. 
 
 
6.2 Innovative industrial energy-efficient technologies 
  
6.2.1 Four technology case studies  
 
Table 6.3 introduces the four technology case studies. All four technologies 
are sector-specific technologies that affect the core of the conventional energy-
intensive production process. This explains why they are identified as major 
innovative technologies for the potential energy-efficiency improvement in the 
first place (in studies such as De Beer et al., 1998; Martin et al., 2000). In this 
chapter, we focus on two manufacturing industries: paper and board making 
and iron and steel making. A more extended description of the case studies can 
be found in Luiten (2001). 
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Table 6.3 The four industrial energy-efficient process technologies. 
 
Technology 
case study 
Sector Start R&D 
 
What does the 
technology do to 
the conventional 
production 
process? 
How does the 
technology improve the 
specific energy 
consumption (SEC)? 
Shoe press 
technology 
Paper/ 
board 
around 1970 
innovation 
1980 
Replaces part of the 
wet pressing section 
of a paper machine. 
More water removed in 
a mechanical way, so 
less energy needed for 
evaporation. 
Impulse 
technology 
 
 
Paper/ 
board 
1975-1980 Replaces part of the 
wet pressing section 
of a paper machine. 
More water removed in 
a mechanical way, so 
less energy needed for 
evaporation. 
Strip casting
technology 
 
Primary + 
secondary 
steel 
1975-1985 Links casting and 
rolling of liquid 
steel.  
Reheating of cast steel 
is no longer needed. 
Smelting 
reduction  
technology 
Primary + 
secondary 
steel 
1980-1985 Replaces blast 
furnaces and coke 
ovens in iron-
making. 
More energy-efficient 
reduction process. 
Avoiding coke ovens 
and sinter plants. 
 
Each of the four technology case studies tells its own story about the way a 
specific energy-efficient technology developed. Box 6.1 – Box 6.4 give a 
description of the four technology case studies. For each technology case study, 
1) the composition of the networks, 2) the materialisation of the technology and 
3) the arguments for developing the innovative technology were analysed. 
These three issues will be dealt with in a cross-case study analysis in the 
remainder of this section (see section 6.2.2 till 6.2.4). 
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continued to believe that such a new press design could be engineered. The shoe press 
implied a major change to the conventional roll press from an engineering point of 
view. In spite of the various setbacks and the difficulties in achieving an engineering 
solution, the R&D activities were continued with dedication and belief. When Beloit 
had implemented a shoe press in their pilot paper machine, a board manufacturer and a 
fabric supplier – both well-known business partners to Beloit – became involved. The 
fabric supplier was involved to come up with a feasible belt at the moment that the first 
commercial shoe press for a board machine was already decided upon. They succeeded 
in time. Without the belt, innovation (1980) would have been delayed.  
Only by then, three other major machine suppliers started R&D activities. They 
developed improved shoe press designs with a ‘closed’ belt. Their designs were 
introduced in 1984, 1986 and 1990. The closed shoe press design proved a better 
performance at higher machines speeds. This is important because since paper-making 
has become a continuous operation machine speeds have increased (they will continue 
to do so into the future).    
The major argument for developing shoe press technology was to increase the machine 
capacity of existing board machines and to reduce the capital intensity of new board 
machines. During the eighties, the innovative technology was applied to board grades 
only. Although machine suppliers claimed advantages for other paper grades too, the 
first shoe press was implemented in a lightweight paper machine in 1994 only. When 
conventional wet presses limited a further increase of machine speeds the shoe press 
became a proven technology in paper machines too.  
Beloit addressed the US Department of Energy to cover the risk of innovation in 1980. 
They were interested because of the technology’s energy-efficiency improvement, 
though they were too slow in fulfilling the request. Beloit, the major innovator and 
continuous believer in the feasibility of shoe press technology, was eager to introduce 
the technology anyhow.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 6.1  Shoe press technology: Small network – continuing success. 
 
A shoe press can replace part of the conventional pressing section in a paper machine. 
Instead of a steel roll a flexible belt is used. This increases residence time and improves 
dewatering performance of the press section. Energy is saved through the reduced heat 
demand in the subsequent drying section.   
The development of the technology took about 13 years (1967-1980). The technology 
network consisted of one micro-network and for a long time even of one firm. 
Although the idea for extending pressing time was acknowledged by other paper 
researchers and engineers, only the people at the US paper machine supplier Beloit 
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Figure 6.2 Technology network of shoe press technology. Cursive = suppliers. Normal = paper 
manufacturers.  
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Figure 6.3 Technology network of impulse technology. In italics = suppliers. Normal = paper 
manufacturers. Underlined = (national pulp and paper) research institutes and universities. 
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Box 6.2 Impulse technology: Government R&D support allows continued R&D effort. 
 
Douglas Wahren conceived the idea of impulse technology in 1970. He anchored 
impulse R&D activities at the US national pulp and paper research institute 10 years 
after his first idea of impulse technology. The institute’s vice-president was excited 
about the new mechanisms of dewatering; impulse technology was thought to ‘drive’ 
water out of the paper sheet by combining heat and mechanical pressure in wet 
pressing. Wahren contacted people at Beloit. Impulse technology was seen as a logical 
next step after the shoe press. A first micro-network emerged when the US machine 
supplier Beloit and the Canadian national pulp and paper research institute also 
initiated R&D activities. Both research institutes claimed an increased energy-
efficiency to acquire government R&D support. The US government granted 60 to 65% 
of the US institute’s R&D activities. The Canadian government financed 45% of the 
Canadian institute’s R&D activities. Within the North-American micro-network, four 
attempts to commercialise the technology failed (1989, 1993, 1994 and 1999). In the 
first attempt, delamination of the paper sheet turned out to be a stumbling block. In 
later attempts, paper manufacturers could not be convinced to take the risk; it turned 
out that more R&D was needed, delamination was not completely solved (1993); light-
weight paper machine makers were not used to using shoe presses yet (1994); and the 
advantages of the current design were not convincing for board grades (1999). Due to 
these failures, Beloit’s interest in the technology was gradually lost. Beloit’s 
researchers managed to continue R&D, though with a lower priority and backed-up by 
both IPST’s and Paprican’s R&D efforts. The North-American micro-network came to 
an end when Beloit’s mother firm  filed for bankruptcy (in 1999). 
A second micro-network emerged in Sweden from 1990 onwards. A Swedish 
government representative offered the national pulp and paper research institute 
financial R&D support in starting the development of this energy-efficient technology. 
After six to seven years of planning, talking and negotiating, a major R&D programme 
was started. The Swedish government financed roughly 40% of the R&D programme 
and the rebuilding of the pilot paper machine at STFI. In 2001, only the Swedish micro-
network is still active.  
The major argument for developing impulse technology was an increased machine 
capacity in existing paper and board machines and a reduced capital intensity in new 
paper and board machines. Wahren’s original dewatering claims became less strong 
over time. Actors’ arguments for investing in impulse technology, thus, also changed. 
Paper properties were increasingly stressed. However, more than 25 years of R&D 
activities have not yet resulted in a proven technology. 15 years of government R&D 
support did accelerate the technology’s development, though the national institutes’ 
R&D activities drove government R&D support instead of the other way around. In 
fact, the technology’s prospects are unclear; its energy-efficiency improvements are 
uncertain; its feasibility – in its current design – is debated. 
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Box 6.3 Strip casting technology: Serious efforts at the edge of breakthrough. 
 
The original roots of strip casting technology go back to the 19th century. Bessemer, 
one of the classical inventors of the steel industry, applied for a patent in 1857. 
Between 1857 and 1975 some localised R&D efforts took place, though only after 1980 
a robust and large technology network emerged. The eleven micro-networks were 
remarkably homogeneous, generally being composed of a large steel-maker - in most 
micro-networks a stainless steel manufacturer or a integrated steel maker with a 
stainless steel division - and a machine supplier or engineer (see Figure 6.4). The steel 
manufacturers took the lead. Six of the eleven micro-networks are still active. Three of 
them operate strip casting technology at an industrial scale. They needed about fifteen 
years to achieve this state. 
The major argument for developing strip casting technology has been to reduce the 
capital intensity of hot rolling. Bessemer was already aware of the huge advantages of 
direct casting in terms of shortening the steel production process. The introduction of 
conventional continuous casting (1952), maturing of this conventional technology, the 
steel crises in the seventies, and the rise of stainless steel and mini-mills had to occur 
before strip casting technology became the centre of casting R&D activities. Between 
1975 and 1985, researchers and engineers started looking for more compact casting 
technologies. During the early eighties, a process emerged in which a number of factors 
– among others the claim of success of one of the leading US stainless steel producers – 
added momentum to strip casting R&D activities.  
Six of the eleven micro-networks received government R&D support. In three micro-
networks, government R&D support was more than 40% of the total expenditure. 
However, these three micro-networks stopped their R&D activities or deliberately 
continued R&D activities at a pilot scale. The three micro-networks that are ahead in 
developing strip casting technology did not get (or only marginal) external financial 
R&D support. The effect of government R&D support in developing strip casting 
technology has been minimal. The development proved to have a strong momentum of 
its own. Strip casting affects the core of steel business and its development was only 
loosely motivated by energy-efficiency considerations or by the availability of external 
R&D support. The three most ‘advanced’ micro-networks may commercialise strip 
casting technology within two or three years (most likely in carbon mini-mills or 
stainless steel firms). All the other micro-networks and the steel industry in general are 
waiting to see how their casters will perform. 
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Figure 6.4 Technology network of strip casting technology. In italics = suppliers. Normal = steel 
manufacturers (note that Nucor is a mini mill steel operator). Underlined = research institutes. 
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Figure 6.5 Technology network of smelting reduction technology. Corex, AusIron and Tecnored 
are initiated my machine suppliers or engineers. Romelt is developed by a Russian research 
institute. HIsmelt is developed by a mining firm. DIOS, CCF, DSM and Jupiter are initiated by 
integrated steel manufacturers. In three micro-networks, mini-mill steel operators became 
involved in a later stage of the technology’s development. 
 
Box 6.4 Smelting reduction: A double perspective – ‘locked out’ and ‘niche’ application. 
 
The idea of smelting reduction technology has been known since the 1930s. Only from 
1975 a technology network emerged. By then, the performance of other innovative 
iron-making technologies disappointed and the threat of future (capital-intensive) 
replacement of obsolete coke ovens became pressing. From 1975 onwards, R&D 
efforts were undertaken. Only one of these early efforts achieved commercial 
application, i.e., Corex. Corex is still the only smelting reduction process that is 
commercially available, though its techno-economic characteristics limit wide-scale 
operation. Some of the early efforts evolved into micro-networks that studied ‘second 
generation’ processes. The technology network, consisting of nine micro-networks, was 
heterogeneous (see Figure 6.5). Integrated steel manufacturers dominated four micro-
networks. Machine suppliers, mining firms and research institutes were also involved. 
= bench / lab scale (< 100 t/day)
= pilot scale (> 100 and < 750 t/day)
license to mining company
1980 1990 2000
AusIron 
HIsmelt
Jupiter
Romelt
Corex
DIOS
DSM
Finex
Tecnored
CCF
 innovation C-1000
= demonstration scale (> 750 t/day)
= co-operation
 2nd unit sold C-2000
= no actual R&D / planning or
engineering activities
Stop
Stop
Stop
mini-mill operator interested
one integrated steel firm continues
private R&D 
SASE
Italians continue separately
mini-mill operator interested
CleanSMelt
Germany, Austria
Korea, Austria
USSR
Australia, Germany,
US
Japan
Netherlands, UK
Italy
US, Canada, Mexico
France, Germany
Australia
Brasil, US
  
 
 
 
 STIMULATING ENERGY-EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGY R&D 109   
 
 
Various types of actors had various technical preferences due to earlier (R&D) 
experiences. Not all smelting reduction processes are likely to improve the specific 
energy consumption of iron-making. 
Three micro-networks stopped R&D activities; these were all initiated by integrated 
steel manufacturers. The composition of the technology network, thus, changed over 
time. Integrated steel manufacturers lost interest whereas mini-mill steel makers 
became in later stages. The major argument for integrated steel firms to develop 
smelting reduction technology was to produce hot metal at lower costs. A lower capital 
investment – one avoids expensive coke ovens and replaces the capital intensive blast 
furnace – and the use of less expensive non-metallurgical coals promised a substantial 
reduction in cost price. Energy-efficiency improvements and avoided capital 
investment for reducing other environmental harmful emissions merely provided 
integrated steel manufacturers with additional arguments. Integrated steel firms lost 
interest because the existing capital stock was continuously improved and they did not 
need additional iron-making capacity. The cost price reduction of smelting reduction 
technology decreased over time. The threat of replacing capital intensive coke ovens 
early in the 21th century was postponed. Smelting reduction technology was ‘locked 
out’ by continuous improvements in the existing capital stock of integrated steel firms. 
The future of smelting reduction technology is still open; mining firms and steel mini-
mills are still interested.  
Environmental regulation was not decisive in initiating R&D efforts. Eight of the nine 
micro-networks were financially supported by various governments. In three micro-
networks – DIOS, CCF and DSM –, R&D support has been larger than 40% of the total 
expenditure. Two of these three micro-networks were multi-partner co-operative R&D 
efforts. Government R&D support did enlarge the technology network. Governments 
also supported smelting reduction processes that are likely to be energy-efficient. 
However, R&D support did not accelerate the technology’s development so far. Actors’ 
intentions for being involved in multi-partner government supported co-operative R&D 
efforts were different from actors intentions in pursuing a R&D effort on their own. To 
conclude, the changes in the technology network reflect the dynamics in the 
development of smelting reduction technology. The case study illustrates the dominant 
influence of the existing capital stock in constraining technological development in 
integrated steel making; this limited the effect of government R&D support (so far).  
 
 
In the remainder of this section we compare the four technology case studies 
regarding three issues: networks (6.2.2), materialisation (6.2.3) and promising 
performance characteristics and the technology networks’ momentum (6.2.4). 
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6.2.2 Networks 
 
The composition of the technology networks within which the four energy-
efficient technologies were developed is summarised in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 Technology network and micro-network characteristics. 
 
Technology 
case study 
Shoe press 
technology 
Impulse 
technology 
Strip casting 
technology 
Smelting 
reduction 
technology 
Size of technology 
networks (measured in 
number of micro-
networks) 
1 2 11 9 
Total expenditure 
(million US$) 
5 35-40 500-700 600-700 
Leading micro-
networks in R&D 
Not relevant 1 3 3 
Micro-networks still 
active 
(2)1 1 6 6 
Composition 
technology network 
Machine 
suppliers: 
85% 
Machine 
suppliers: 
30% 
National 
P&P research 
institutes: 
55% 
Steel firms: 
75% 
Machine 
suppliers: 
20% 
Steel firms: 
30% 
Machine 
suppliers: 
40% 
Mining 
firms: 15% 
Research 
institutes: 
15% 
Exchange between 
micro-networks? 
No Primarily 
through 
patents 
and 
publications 
Contacts → 
active 
monitoring 
Contacts → 
active 
monitoring 
In how many micro-
networks did actors co-
operate? 
1 2 9 8 
1
 After Beloit introduced the shoe press to the market, two more micro-networks emerged. 
Beloit is no longer in business (its mother firm filed for bankruptcy). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 STIMULATING ENERGY-EFFICIENT TECHNOLOGY R&D 111   
 
 
Table 6.4 illustrates that the two paper technology networks and the two 
steel technology networks differ in their size and in the total expenditure on 
R&D.58 The number of actors that is able (both technically and financially) to 
continue such an R&D effort and actually commercialise an innovative 
technology is smaller in the paper industry than in the steel industry. The 
manufacturing firms in these two sectors also differ in their ‘pattern’ of 
innovation. The large integrated steel manufacturers actively invested in R&D, 
whereas the paper firms ‘waited’ for technologies to be delivered by the 
international machine suppliers. 
The four technology case studies illustrate that it is not likely that there is 
such a thing as a minimum size of the technology network in order to guarantee 
commercialisation of the technology. The smallest technology network was the 
most successful. Smaller technology networks are, however, more vulnerable 
for disruptures. 
Table 6.4 indicates that in all four technology networks, firms played an 
initiating and dominant role. Note that the direct contribution of universities 
and public research institutes in developing the four energy-efficient 
technologies was marginal. 
The micro-networks were rather stable entities that continued R&D over 
fairly long time periods. Whereas there was some knowledge exchange among 
various micro-networks, R&D activities were organised in micro-networks (see 
6th row in Table 6.4). The actors in micro-networks are usually aware of the 
other-micro-networks; they monitored other micro-networks’ R&D activities, 
their (claims of) successes and their failures.  
Finally, Table 6.4 shows that in the majority of the micro-networks, firms 
co-operated. Co-operation extended itself most often beyond national borders. 
Actors did not have large problems in finding competent actors to co-operate 
with. If there were problems, this typically occurred in the demonstration stage 
of a technology’s development. 
 
6.2.3 Materialisation  
 
A second issue is the materialisation of the technology. How much time did 
it take to develop the four technology case studies (so far)?  
                                                     
58
 Note that not all micro-networks in developing the two steel technologies did spend a similar 
budget. The most ‘advanced’ micro-networks spent the most (typically around 100 million US$). 
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Table 6.5 indicates the current stage of development of the four innovative 
technologies. The shoe press is a proven technology59.  Both impulse and strip 
casting are operational at such a scale that commercial application is the logical 
next step. Whereas this is a likely thing to happen in developing strip casting, 
prospects are more uncertain in developing impulse technology. The majority 
of the smelting reduction processes still have to prove feasibility at an 
industrial scale before commercial application can be considered (apart from 
the Corex process). 
 
Table 6.5 Materialisation characteristics. 
 
Technology 
case study 
Shoe press 
technology 
Impulse 
technology 
Strip casting 
technology 
Smelting 
reduction 
technology 
Stage of development 
[still active micro-
networks / number of 
micro networks] 
commercial  
 
[2/2] 
pilot paper 
machine 
[1/1] 
industrial 
scale facility 
[3/6] 
commercial 
(Corex) 
[1/6] 
pilot scale 
(2nd 
generation) 
[2/6] 
Technology network 
stage 
13 years > 20 years about 20 
years 
10 years 
(Corex) 
> 20 years 
(2nd gen.) 
Exploration stage 15 years 10 years 120 years 45 years 
Number of steps in 
upscaling 
2 2 3 2 (Corex) 
3 (2nd gen.) 
 
The second row in Table 6.5 shows the number of years that were needed to 
achieve these current stages of development within the four technology 
networks. For both impulse technology and smelting reduction, it is difficult to 
assess when the technology may be commercialised. If Valmet sees any 
perspective in continuing the Swedish micro-network’s R&D activities (this 
depends on Valmet’s stakes in other innovative technologies and the R&D 
results), innovation may take place in 2003-2004 at the earliest. If not it will 
take at least till 2010, if R&D activities are continued at all. Application of 
smelting reduction technology in integrated steel firms may take place between 
                                                     
59
 The technology was first introduced to board machines (1980-1994). It took 14 years for the 
technology to be applied to light-weight paper grades.  
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2005 and 2010 if the technology is proven within mini-mils and if there are 
steel firms that need to expand their iron-making capacity. Otherwise 
application will be delayed till after 2010 (till the time that existing coke oven 
really have to be replaced). 
 
It is quite remarkable that all four innovative energy-efficient technologies 
were ‘known’ before the technology network really took off. The third row in 
Table 6.5 indicates the duration of the so-called exploration stage. It took 
decades (up to more than a century) before a robust technology network 
emerged. A combination and mutual reinforcement of factors was needed for 
actors to acknowledge that an innovative technology may be an interesting 
‘next-step-to-take’. We suggested four factors to explain why a technology 
network emerged at a certain moment in time. A first factor is that actors 
recognise the economic advantage of the innovative technology. This is a 
critical condition, though not a sufficient one. A second and very important 
factor is the technical need or match with the existing conventional production 
process. All four innovative technologies were closely linked to the 
conventional sequence of process technologies. A third factor is progress in 
R&D and, finally, contingent elements play a role. The technology network 
only emerges when the technology falls within an actor’s or actors’ horizon as 
an improvement that is economically attractive and technologically feasible for 
improving the performance of the conventional production process (see also 
Table 6.3). 
Once a technology network emerged, commercialisation was still not 
around the corner. In most cases, two or three steps in up-scaling the 
technology had to be taken to prove its feasibility (see last row in Table 6.5). 
This is the only way to gain manufacturers’ confidence in the performance of 
the technology. Each step takes at least five years; a duration of ten to twenty 
years is not extraordinary. 
 
 
6.2.4 Promising performance characteristics and the technology 
networks’ momentum  
 
The second column in Table 6.6 summarises the major ‘promising’ 
performance characteristics of the four innovative energy-efficient 
technologies. All four technologies promised a reduction in costs of a ton 
product. However, the reduction in energy costs was only of marginal 
importance for developing the four ‘energy-efficient’ technologies (see third 
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row in Table 6.6). All four technologies affect the core of the production 
process; in developing such process technologies, improvements in energy 
efficiency are most often no more than a positive side-effect.  
 
Table 6.6 Promising performance characteristics. 
 
Technology 
case study 
What was the 
promising 
performance 
characteristic? 
 
Was energy-
efficiency a 
decisive 
argument? 
How does the 
technology match to 
the historic direction 
in technological 
development? 
Shoe press 
technology 
Increased dryness in 
wet pressing  
→ increased 
machine speed or 
reduced capital 
intensity 
→ reducing cost/ton 
No Reinforces the 
historic trend of 
continuously 
increasing paper 
machine speed 
Impulse 
technology 
 
 
 
 
Increased dryness in 
wet pressing  
→ increased 
machine speed or 
reduced capital 
intensity 
→ reducing cost/ton 
No Reinforces the 
historic trend of 
continuously 
increasing paper 
machine speed 
Strip casting 
technology 
Compact casting 
technology  
→ reduced capital 
intensity (both MM 
and IM)  
→ reducing cost/ton 
No Preference for more 
compact IM / 
steelmaking 
processes since 1970s  
→ strip casting fits in 
for IM 
→ opportunity for 
compact MM route 
Smelting reduction 
technology 
Compact iron 
technology  
→ reduced capital 
intensity (IM) or 
higher quality raw 
material (MM) → 
reducing cost / ton 
 
No 
(but design 
characteristic) 
Preference for more 
compact IM / 
steelmaking 
processes since 1970s  
→ smelt reduction 
fits in for IM 
→ new iron source 
for MM route 
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In all four technology case studies, actors referred to the dominant business 
logic of the majority of steel and paper firms to explain the dominance of 
reducing production costs on the R&D agenda for developing process 
technologies. In achieving these lower costs through technological 
development, actors were heavily constrained by the sunk investments in the 
existing paper-making or steel-making production process. This brings 
regularity in technological development in manufacturing industries; the 
existing system is further optimised (see fourth column in Table 6.6). Whereas 
all four technologies optimise the existing system – they are seen as a next-
step-take –; they promise a step-wise improvement of the overall performance 
of the existing production process. If the promise of increasing machine 
capacity (in paper) and of a more compact production facility (in steel) had 
been too small, the major and complex R&D efforts would not have been 
undertaken. 
 The last column in Table 6.6 shows that there was the least doubt in the 
perceived performance of the technologies that developed the most smoothly. 
This observation is related to differences in momentum among the four 
technology networks; not all four technologies developed with the same drive 
(see Figure 6.6 and the technology case descriptions in Box 6.1 - Box 6.4). We 
introduced the concept of momentum - known in innovation studies from the 
analysis of large technical systems - to characterise the overall dynamics of a 
technology’s development. A technology network has a large momentum when 
it causes the observers to assume that an innovative technology materialises 
autonomously (Hughes, 1983). 
Although the concept seems simple, it is not easy to measure momentum. In 
our analysis, we assume that the network around a technology has a high 
momentum if: R&D activities are continued; actors continue to see the 
technology as an obvious next-step-to-take; actors continue to articulate 
confidence in the performance of the technology; and if the technology is 
further materialised (e.g., regular steps in up-scaling occur).60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
60
 Note that there is no one-to-one relation between momentum and the stage-of-development. 
Even in an early stage of development the momentum may be high and in a later stage it may be 
low. 
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Figure 6.6 Ranking of the four technology networks according to their momentum. In case the 
case of smelting reduction technology and impulse technology, momentum decreased. The grey 
symbols indicate these technologies’ former momentum. Note that the application of smelting 
reduction technology spliced: integrated steel-makers lost interest; application in mini-mills is the 
most likely next step. 
 
The momentum of a technology reflects the confidence of actors in the 
future perspectives of the innovative technology. It reflects the confidence of 
actors that a technology continues to be an interesting option to be developed.  
The technology remains the ‘next-step-to-take’ in spite of possible 
developments in the conventional production process and trends and changes in 
the manufacturing industry. 
For a technology network to maintain its momentum, actors have to be 
confirmed and reconfirmed regularly in their expectations regarding the 
perceived promising performance characteristics. The (gradual) materialisation 
of the technology, R&D results, claims of success (of other actors), large 
difficulties and failures, but also improvements in conventional process 
technology and changes in the industry, affect actors’ confidence in the future 
perspectives of the technology, and, thus, affect the momentum of a technology 
network. 
 
 
6.3  Government intervention strategies 
 
In this section we turn to the effect of government intervention in 
stimulating the development of the four energy-efficient technologies. 
Financial R&D support was the most widely used intervention strategy. The 
understanding that technological development is the result of interaction 
between actors instead of a linear sequence from science to market, creates 
Momentum
Shoe
press
 Strip
castingImpulse
 Smelt
red./ IM
 Smelt
red./MM
   Smelt
reductionImpulse
Low High
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possibilities for alternative intervention strategies.61 Such intervention 
strategies are scarce in our case studies (see bottom row Table 6.7), and, 
therefore, leads to some tentative indications only. 
 
Table 6.7 Government intervention. 
 
Technology 
case study 
Shoe press 
technology 
Impulse 
technology 
Strip 
casting 
technology 
Smelting 
reduction 
technology 
Total expenditure 
(million US$) 
5 35-40 500-700 600-700 
Government R&D 
support 
(million US$) 
 
- 
0% 
 
15 
~ 40-45% 
 
403 
~ 5-10% 
 
1653 
~ 25-30% 
Number of micro-
networks supported 
- 2/2 6/11 9/9 
Other intervention 
strategies 
- Co-
operative 
R&D1 
Co-
operative 
R&D1 
Co-
operative 
R&D1 
Regulation 
Agreement2 
1
 Impulse technology - IEA Annex on Impulse Technology within the Implementing Agreement 
on Pulp & Paper. Strip casting technology - Bessemer Consortium, Canada (50% government 
R&D support); CMU project, US (70% government R&D support); European Coal and Steel 
Community RTD Programme, Europe (financial R&D support en networking meetings). 
Smelting reduction technology - Steel Initiative / DSM process, US (75% government R&D 
support); DIOS, Japan (67% government R&D support); ECSC RTD programme (CCF / 
Hoogovens and British Steel, 40% R&D support). 
2
 Agreement on generating economic added value to iron resources by new technologies (mining 
company HIsmelt, Australia). Agreement on industrial energy-efficiency (Hoogovens / now part 
of the Corus Group, The Netherlands). 
3
 Note that support by the European Coal and Steel Community RTD Programme (ECSC) is 
included in these budgets. The budget for the ECSC’s RTD programme is gathered by a levy on 
the steel price in Europe. 
 
                                                     
61
 We distinguish a matrix of government intervention strategies: push (R&D) – pull (market); 
generic – specific. All policy instruments, such as voluntary agreements, technology forcing 
standards, facilitating and network initiatives, etc., can be characterised along these two 
dimensions. A third important dimension is the degree to which the interaction among various 
actors in R&D and innovation and to which stakeholders or actors are involved in formulating 
and designing intervention strategies (think for instance of setting R&D priorities).  
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It is not likely that regulation on environmental issues and energy efficiency 
is of decisive impact on developing core process technologies as the ones being 
analysed. The case study on smelting reduction technology illustrates that the 
incentive generated by environmental regulation (on coke ovens) provided the 
integrated steel firms with an additional cost advantage for the innovative 
technology. However, the incentive was too small to initiate the considerable 
R&D effort. The fact that energy-efficiency was not an important argument for 
developing the four process technologies (see Table 6.6) reinforces the 
impression that the incentive of regulation should be considerable to have any 
effect in stimulating or R&D. Regulation did provide researchers within a firm 
with an additional argument for creating firm-internal support for initiating or 
continuing R&D.  
The case study of smelting reduction technology also provided some 
tentative evidence for possibilities of agreements on technological 
development. Firms that had a direct agreement with the government showed a 
certain commitment to the government. This suggests that it may be an 
interesting route to come towards R&D agreements with a selective number of 
firms in order to develop technologies for improving energy-efficiency in the 
manufacturing industry. The empirical research makes also very clear that such 
R&D agreements only make sense in case of specific actors (that have a clear 
stake in R&D in relevant areas). 
Furthermore, in the majority of the co-operative R&D programmes - all of 
them were financially supported by government -, firms merely aimed at 
exploring the possibilities of a technology’s promising potential rather than 
bringing the innovative technology towards commercialisation. Insisting on co-
operating was not always a feasible strategy. Co-operation was most effective 
in pre-competitive R&D; at this stage, actors’ stake was to learn in interaction 
with other competent actors. 
Table 6.7 shows that government R&D support has been substantial in 
developing impulse technology and smelting reduction technology (more than 
25% of the total expenditure). In the other two case studies, the share is zero or 
marginal (though not in absolute terms). It is interesting to note that 
government started R&D support only when the innovative technology was 
already in the so-called technology network stage (see Section 6.2.3). Energy-
efficiency improvement was a major argument for government to grant R&D 
support in all four case studies. As was noticed already, energy-efficiency 
improvements were not a decisive argument for developing the technologies. 
The ‘promise’ of an improved energy-efficiency was used in all four 
technology case studies to mobilise external (government) R&D support. 
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Table 6.8 Effect of government R&D support. 
 
Technology 
case study 
Shoe press 
technology 
Impulse 
technology 
Strip casting 
technology 
Smelting 
reduction 
technology 
Additionality - 2/2 3/11 5 (3)/91 
Acceleration - yes no not so far 
Effectiveness - debate likely IM: likely 
MM: 
depending on 
what raw 
material is 
replaced 
1
 In five micro-networks R&D support was additional. In 3 micro-networks, the smelting 
reduction process is likely to be energy-efficient. 
 
In Table 6.8 the effect of R&D support is evaluated according to three 
specific issues. Did R&D support lead to additional R&D activities (that are 
activities that would not have been performed without financial support)? Did 
R&D support lead towards an accelerated materialisation within the entire 
technology network? And thirdly, is the technology once it is commercially 
available likely to improve specific energy consumption (indicated as 
effectiveness)? 
The descriptions on government R&D support in Box 6.1 - Box 6.4 and the 
evaluation in Table 6.8 illustrate that effective spending of government R&D 
support is not easy. On the one hand, firms usually recognised the advantages 
of the technology to their business and identified the potential of a technology 
to improve the existing production process. Government R&D support was not 
always additional, or only additional in micro-networks that were 
(intentionally) not operating at the frontier of the technology’s development. 
On the other hand, in some micro-networks government intervention was 
effective; R&D support was additional and led to enlarging technology 
networks.  Figure 6.7 summarizes the discussion on the effect of government 
R&D support. It shows a relation between the momentum of a technology 
network (see also Figure 6.6) and the effect of R&D support. The four 
technology case studies are located on the curve. 
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Figure 6.7 The effect of government R&D support as a function of the momentum of a 
technology’s development. The grey symbols indicate these technologies’ former momentum. 
 
The momentum of the technology networks developing strip casting 
technology and shoe press technology was high, so that government R&D 
support barely had an effect. The momentum of the technology networks 
developing smelting reduction technology and impulse technology was lower. 
The additionality of government R&D support was higher if firms were less 
inclined to develop and commercialise the technology themselves. 
 
 
6.4 Conclusions  
 
Energy-efficient technologies – methodological findings 
If we look at energy-efficient technologies a first important finding is that 
indicating innovative technologies as ‘energy-efficient’ technologies implies 
that specific characteristics of a technology are stressed and made explicit 
whereas others are not. There may be technologies that are ‘pure’ energy-
efficient technologies, though large number of (commercially available and 
innovative) energy-efficient technologies do more than saving energy alone. 
This is not a remarkable new insight, though the four case studies all stress the 
Momentum
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un-importance of energy-efficiency as a reason for developing them. When 
analysing or stimulating energy-efficient technologies one should better take 
into account the ‘other advantages’ of energy-efficient technologies. 
Researchers have to be aware how their way of looking at energy-efficient 
technologies affects their assumptions, analyses and final recommendations. 
A second finding is that data availability on technology’s energy-efficiency 
improvement and especially investment cost is most often limited. Research on 
energy-efficiency should use the data that are available, though they should be 
precise in the value and reliability of the data used. Often data available are 
indicative – it is often simply not possible to make a full cost account; lab and 
pilot scale energy data are often only indicative of energy use in a commercial 
facility - and flawed with optimism (the actors developing the innovative 
technologies have their reasons for doing this) or surrounded by large 
uncertainties. 
A third important finding is that the difference between retrofit and 
replacement is most often fuzzier than is often assumed in research efforts as 
for instance De Beer et al. (1994). In industrial practice, upgrading existing 
facilities is much more common than building entirely new production 
locations (although there is a difference among various geographical regions).62 
In a way each innovative technology in the manufacturing industry is an 
‘incremental’ improvement of the existing production process. The incremental 
improvements can be more or less ‘radical’. The ‘radical incremental’ 
improvements can be locked out by the more ‘incremental incremental’ 
improvements simply because technologies performance changes over time. 
This has for instance consequences for the reference technology defined by 
energy analysts. It would be useful to develop a more thorough understanding 
on the differences among energy-efficient technologies and how this affects 
investment behaviour for firms. 
 
Understanding R&D development in mature industrial sectors  
In this chapter we tried to move beyond the identification of innovative 
energy-efficient technologies.  The aim of this chapter was to gain insight into 
actors’ behaviour and arguments for developing innovative energy-efficient 
technologies.  
                                                     
62
 If we look at the total number of shoe presses implemented (since 1980), we estimate that 25-
35% of the shoe pressing is installed on entirely new paper or board machines. 
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The detailed analysis of four sector-specific innovative process technologies 
for the manufacturing industry and the insights generated by comparing them 
lead to some important policy-relevant conclusions. 
First, technological development in the manufacturing industry is heavily 
constrained by the existing production process. The innovative technology has 
to be recognised as the ‘next-step-to-take’. The development of innovative 
technologies tends towards ‘system optimisation’ rather than complete renewal 
of the production process.  
Second, technological development in the manufacturing industry is a slow 
process; it takes considerable time. It is striking that all four technologies were 
known (long) before a robust technology network emerged. The capital 
intensity of the sectors and the business pressure typically slow down 
technological development of manufacturing industries. The number of 
innovative technologies being developed (for a specific stage in a production 
process) is limited. The number of firms able to commercialise such 
technologies is not extremely large. Note that the direct role of universities and 
public research institutes in developing the energy-efficient technologies has 
been limited. There is no business logic in developing a large number of 
innovative technologies at the same time. The majority of the manufacturing 
firms become interested when the technology is ‘proven’.  
Third, stimulating the development of industrial energy-efficient 
technologies effectively is not easy. We delivered quite some evidence that 
firms were willing and perfectly capable of doing these jobs themselves. 
Government has not shown to be the initiator in formulating long-term R&D 
needs for the development of innovative energy-efficient technologies. 
However, effective intervention occurred too.  
Fourth, there is considerable variety in technology networks. The general 
promise of innovative industrial energy-efficient technologies veils a large 
heterogeneity. There was variety in the size of the technology networks, the 
type of actors involved, the geographic distribution of R&D activities, and the 
momentum of the technology networks. There is no ‘one size fits all’ strategy 
for effectively stimulating the development of industrial energy-efficient 
technology. 
It is important to note that the scope of our analysis: ‘innovative process 
technologies in mature industries’ limits the validity of the conclusions. It may 
well be that for specific technologies (like cross-cutting technologies) or 
specific sectors (e.g., light industries) the outcome of a similar analysis would 
be different. However, it should be emphasised that the heavy industries still 
represent about half of world industrial energy use and that innovative process 
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technologies represent the majority of the future energy-efficiency 
improvements in these sectors.  
 
Increasing the effect of government intervention? 
The key-question clearly is how can government improve the effect of 
various intervention strategies. 
Taking into account the conclusions about R&D and technological 
development in manufacturing industries there are two important dilemmas 
regarding the role of government in stimulating technological development that 
should be mentioned briefly.  
First, should government stimulate the development of such energy-efficient 
process technologies at all? One may argue that R&D was primarily driven by 
market considerations and, thus, developing these innovative technologies is a 
primary job for the firms operating in these markets.  
Second, if government decides on intervention, should government adopt a 
generic or specific intervention strategy? The empirical evidence suggests a 
dual position regarding this issue. On the one hand, it occurred several times 
that government did not have the knowledge to evaluate the performance and 
perspective of the innovative energy-efficient technology. The risk of 
government failure in implementing specific intervention strategies is large. On 
the other hand, the conclusions above imply the need of more specific 
intervention strategies to increase the effect of government intervention.  
In spite of these dilemma’s the societal importance of further improvements 
in industrial energy-efficiency and the somewhat disappointing effect of 
government intervention in stimulating the development of such technologies 
encourage us to look for suggestions on how to improve the effect of 
government intervention. 
The diversity between the manufacturing industries and various technology 
networks call for government intervention strategies that are better tailored to 
the networks of a specific industry. Government should have knowledge of the 
(international) technology networks and of the role and capacities of actors that 
government can address before deciding if and how to intervene. We, thus, 
come with the following recommendations for improving the effect of 
government intervention directed at technological development for the 
manufacturing industry. 
 
• Government has to consider its access to actors that are able to make a 
difference in developing industrial energy-efficient technologies. It is 
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important to know in what research areas or technology fields a country 
can make a difference in the international arena.  
• National governments can increase their access to actors by joining their 
forces at an international level. A suggestion is to come to R&D contracts 
or R&D agreements with actors that can make a real difference in the 
energy-efficiency performance of innovative technologies for the 
manufacturing industry. One can also think of international R&D 
programmes. Another international strategy might be that international 
bodies map the technology networks of major energy-efficient process 
technologies.  
• If national governments do not have direct access to micro-networks, 
government may deploy indirect intervention strategies. Government can 
for instance choose for more stringent voluntary agreements on industrial 
energy-efficiency or create a regular information provision about the 
performance of innovative energy-efficient technologies to the national 
manufacturing industry (and to themselves). It is still a question whether 
such indirect intervention strategies really stimulate (or accelerate) the 
development of new energy-efficient technologies. 
• Information about the momentum of various technology networks is a 
valuable first proxy for the question whether government should intervene 
at all. For effective government intervention, momentum should not be too 
low neither too high (see Figure 6.8). 
 
  
Figure 6.8 Schematic representation of the influence of momentum on the effect of government 
intervention. 
Momentum
Effect
government
intervention Intervention may be considered
Too low momentum
→ No effect
Too high momentum
→ No effect
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Long-term government R&D commitment is required for developing 
energy-efficient technologies. If government is granting long-term R&D 
support, it has to be attentive to changes in the international technology 
network. Such monitoring information is needed to decide whether to continue 
R&D support or not. 
The fact that actors’ and governments’ agenda differ is not a reason not to 
stimulate the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies. 
However, governments have to protect their own agenda. Government should 
have a thorough - and independent - insight into energy-efficiency 
improvements and into the other (more) promising performance characteristics. 
One has to be critical in evaluating claims on energy-efficiency improvements; 
claims should not be taken for granted and not be evaluated in isolation. 
In stimulating the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies 
governments need a certain degree of flexibility in designing a tailor-fit 
strategy. It is, for instance, not in each manufacturing industry recommendable 
to involve or to focus on the energy end-users in granting R&D support. Or, in 
specific cases, it should be possible to support (expensive) demonstration 
facilities. 
Intervention strategies that affect the demand for technological innovation 
(such as for instance regulatory and economic instruments) are not likely to 
induce an accelerated development of energy-efficient process technologies. 
Such instruments articulate the importance government attributes to industrial 
energy-efficiency. 
Intervention strategies that initiate networks and require co-operation 
between different types of actors can be useful, but have their own pitfalls too. 
One has to consider the stakes of the actors and the target group of actors 
addressed in order to evaluate what the added value of co-operation and 
interaction may be. 
There is much to gain for government if they can accelerate the moment that 
a robust technology network emerges. It would, thus, be interesting for 
governments to find a way to activate R&D towards technologies that are still 
in the exploration stage. A suggestion is to stimulate ‘variation’ in a protected 
environment by financially supporting researchers with a thorough knowledge 
of the manufacturing process and with a success record in developing process 
technologies. 
To conclude, stimulating the development of industrial energy-efficient 
technology remains an opportunity for government in mitigating greenhouse 
gas emissions. However, the fact that an innovative technology is labelled as 
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energy-efficient is not enough ground for effective government intervention. 
One has to look beyond industrial energy-efficiency. It is of great importance to 
develop government intervention strategies that support, strengthen and affect 
actors and networks and, in this way, redirect technological development in the 
manufacturing industry to less energy-intensive directions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 7 
7 INSTRUMENT CHOICE AND ENERGY- 
EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT BY FIRMS:          
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS63 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Environmental quality and resource management has become a prominent 
challenge in a modern economy. The complexity involved has prompted a 
series of diverse policy initiatives, ranging from market oriented instruments 
(like taxes, subsidies and tradeable permits) to command and control measures 
(ranging from voluntary agreements to standards). Some of these instruments 
were illustrated in Chapters 3-6 of this book and discussed in terms of their 
effectiveness and desirability when considered in isolation (see Tietenberg et 
al., 1999, for a general overview). In practice, many policy initiatives are 
hindered by much uncertainty (see, for example, Roberts and Spence, 1976, 
and Adar and Griffin, 1976), so that a clear choice for price-based instruments 
– as opposed to quantity-based instruments – is difficult to make.  
Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to investigate how 
investment behaviour, responsiveness and attitudes towards environmental 
policy, as well as barriers to the adoption of readily available energy-efficient 
technologies, vary over sectors and with firm characteristics. The results are 
based on a survey among Dutch firms. Detailed systematic empirical studies at 
a sectoral or firm level are rather scarce in the Netherlands. Some years ago, 
Velthuijsen (1993) and Gillissen et al. (1995) performed a questionnaire among 
firms, in which they also focused on energy use and related investments. Our 
research broadens their scope in that we do not only focus on investment 
behaviour, but also on the stated response to and attitudes towards a set of 
specified policy instruments. Our new data set allows in addition for a more 
detailed analysis of the role of various types of uncertainty in investment 
decisions, which, according to investment theories as developed by, for 
example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994), may be a major explanatory factor for 
seemingly irrationally high revealed internal discount rates in investment 
evaluation (see, for example, Johnson, 1994, and Chapter 2). It thereby aims at 
broadening our understanding of decision-making on energy use in companies 
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 This chapter is based on De Groot, Verhoef and Nijkamp (1999). Research assistance by 
Caroline Rodenburg is gratefully acknowledged.  
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and energy gaps as have been widely documented in the literature (see Chapter 
2 for a review).  
The survey was held in the spring of 1998 among Dutch firms. These firms 
were randomly selected from the register of the Chambers of Commerce and 
were more or less equally distributed among the most energy-intensive sectors 
of the Dutch economy, namely the chemical industry, basic metals, metals and 
machinery, food, paper, horticulture, construction materials, and textiles. The 
extensive survey contained a detailed set of questions about energy use, 
investments, the firm’s competitive position in the market, internal decision 
making, its attitude towards and adoption of energy-efficient technologies, as 
well as its attitude towards and responsiveness to Dutch environmental policy. 
The statistical results also incorporate a body of empirical knowledge on the 
expected effects and social acceptability of energy policies, two major 
determinants for the choice of environmental and energy policies. 
Our analysis is presented in five separate sections. Section 7.2 discusses the 
survey and gives a description of the firms and sectors included in the sample. 
Section 7.3 considers the investment behaviour of firms, along with the 
perceived barriers to investing in cost effective energy-efficient technologies 
(in the context of the so-called energy-efficiency paradox). In Section 7.4, 
attention is shifted to the firms’ stated reactions in response to an increase in 
energy taxes on a national level (with no rebatements). Section 7.5 discusses 
the attitudes towards environmental policies in the Netherlands. Section 7.6 
contains an evaluation of the results and presents the policy conclusions 
emerging from our empirical analysis. 
 
 
7.2 The survey  
 
The survey resulted in a data set of 135 companies (i.e., plant locations) 
established in the Netherlands. Firms in nine sectors of the economy were 
randomly selected, and received a 15 page survey in May 1998. Confidentiality 
was guaranteed. The survey asked firms about their characteristics (such as 
size, profitability, sector to which it belongs, number of employees, and export 
share), their energy use (in monetary and volumetric equivalents), their 
investments (in general, and purely aimed at energy-efficiency improvements), 
their position in the market (measured by, for example, strength of competition, 
location of competitors, how the firm compares to competitors in terms of size, 
sales, profitability), their focus in policy making (importance of short- and 
long-run profitability, reduction of labour and energy costs, improvement of 
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environmental image, increase in sales, etc.), their expectations about the 
development of costs of inputs, their knowledge, implementation and use of 
energy-efficient technologies, their attitudes towards and willingness to accept 
energy policies of various types (such as voluntary agreement, taxes at national 
and international level, subsidies, standards), and their R&D behaviour 
(expenditures, degree of co-operation and outsourcing, size of R&D staff, 
criteria for project selection, etc.). Firms were divided over the following nine 
sectors: the chemical industry, basic metals, metals, machinery, food, paper, 
horticulture, construction materials, and textiles. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we will distinguish 7, more aggregate sectors, namely the chemical 
industry (18 % of the sample; further labelled as CHEM), basic metals (10 %; 
BASEMET), metal products (11 %; MET), food (14 %; FOOD), paper (7 %; 
PAPER), horticulture (24 %; HORT), and the rest (REST) consisting out of 
machinery, construction materials and textiles. 
The overall response rate was 4.2 %. Response rates per sector differed 
considerably. They ranged from 1.46 % in the textile industry to 8.73 % in 
horticulture. Although admittedly low, such a response rate is common for this 
kind of extensive survey research (compare, for example, Vicini, 1998). A first 
rough analysis of the data gives no reason for suspecting serious selection 
biases in the sample. Furthermore, for the ultimate goal for which the survey 
was held, namely studying how decision making, barriers and attitude towards 
policy vary over different firms and sectors, we suspect no serious effects of a 
potential selection bias. Clearly, some caution is needed when generalising the 
results. Data on size in terms of employees, energy intensity, and profitability 
were confronted with available evidence from the Dutch Statistical Bureau 
(CBS) in ‘De Nederlandse Energiehuishouding, Deel 2’ (Table 9). Although 
the data are not fully comparable (our measure of size is the number of people 
working in a firm, independent of whether they work part-time or not, and the 
CBS reports gross returns before taxation while we have data on net 
profitability), they suffice to express some confidence in the representativeness 
of our data set. The means reported in Table 7.1 do not differ significantly from 
the reported sector averages by the CBS for energy intensity and size (at a 
significance level of 5 %). Also, the relative order of magnitude of these 
variables according to the CBS is comparable to the order of magnitude in our 
sample. From the respondents within the firms, 75% was associated with 
energy, investment and/or technological management. Only 11% of the firms 
that responded had an energy co-ordinator, from which we may conclude that 
firms which are already explicitly working on their energy management are not 
over-represented in the sample (compare Gillissen et al., 1995; Table 6.3). 
  
 
 
 
130 CHAPTER 7  
 
 
More detailed information on this analysis is available upon request from the 
authors.  
Table 7.1 summarises relevant information on some key characteristics of 
the firms in the various sectors under investigation. The categories according to 
which firms are distinguished are their share of energy costs in total sales, their 
investments as a share of sales, their profits as a share of sales, the number of 
employees, their perception of competition (ranging from limited (score 1) to 
intensive (score 3)), and the location of their competitors (ranging from mainly 
in the Netherlands (score 1) to virtually all abroad (score 4)). A first statistical 
experiment concerned the explanation of the above set of firm characteristics 
from a set of sector dummies. Statistical significance in the table indicates that 
a particular firm characteristic deviates significantly from the sample average in 
the industry under investigation. The parameters reported in the table were 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, where the dependent 
variable was the deviation of a firm’s score from the sample average, and the 
 
Table 7.1 Sectoral firm characteristics compared to sample average. 
 
FIRM 
CHAR. 
Sample 
averag
e 
CHEM BASE 
MET 
MET FOOD PAPER HORT REST 
OBSERV 135 24 13 15 19 10 33 21 
ENQ 0.10 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 +0.14*** -0.08 
INQ 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 +0.09 +0.09** -0.05 
PRQ 0.03 +0.02 +0.05 +0.03 +0.08 +0.08 -0.17 +0.10 
LABOUR 279 +285 +758** -233 +111 -218 -253 -227 
COMP 2.42 +0.13 +0.17 -0.28* -0.05 -0.12 +0.21* -0.30** 
COMPIN 2.23 +0.99*** +0.85*** -0.23 -0.87*** +0.33 -0.16 -0.70** 
*/**/***: significant at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in OLS regression with sector 
dummies 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS64 
OBSERV Number of observations;  
ENQ  Energy intensity (expenditures on energy as fraction of sales);  
INQ  Investment ratio in 1997 (total investments as fraction of sales); 
                                                     
64
 A complete overview of all variable descriptions is given in Appendix II. 
PRQ  Profit ratio (total profits as fraction of sales); 
LABOUR Number of employees (full time and part time); 
COMP  Degree of competition on sales market (1=limited, 2=average, and 3=strong); 
COMPIN Location of competitors (1=mainly in Netherlands, 2=less than 50% abroad, 
3=more than 50% abroad, 4=virtually all abroad). 
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 From this table, it is evident that horticulture is the most energy intensive 
sector with relatively small firms, and invests - relative to profits - significantly 
more than firms in other sectors. In addition, competitive forces in horticulture 
are perceived as strong (especially on the national market). The chemical sector 
and the sector producing basic metals can both be characterised by larger-sized 
firms and by the fact that most of their competitors are located abroad. In 
contrast, firms in the food sector and machinery, construction materials, and 
textiles indicate that most of their competitors are located in the Netherlands.65  
7.3 Investment behaviour and barriers to investment 
 
We will now turn to the stimuli and barriers concerning firm investments in 
energy-efficiency improvement. In one of the central parts of the survey, firms 
were asked about their investment behaviour, and the factors that they 
perceived as preventing them from investing in energy-efficient technologies 
that were considered, but that were nevertheless not (yet) adopted. 
The share of total investments that is spent on technologies that are purely 
aimed at energy-efficiency improvement is on average slightly below 10%. 
Although low at first sight, these shares do not significantly differ from the 
share of energy costs in total sales. This result seems to suggest that energy-
efficiency improvement is just one of the criteria on which a new technology is 
                                                     
65
 The column variables reported in Table 7.1, referred to as ‘firm characteristics’ in the sequel, 
appear to be often strongly correlated. Especially the degree of competition and the location of 
competitors are strongly positively correlated, while the profit rate and the energy intensity are 
strongly negatively correlated. This may create statistical problems in the multiple regression 
estimation of models, due to the presence of multi-collinearity. We will evade this problem in the 
remainder of this chapter by restricting the reported results to simple regressions. The focus is 
therefore on the overall impact, not the marginal effect, of these variables on the response 
variables studied. In the same vein, we will report separate estimations of the effect of (the full 
set of) sector dummies on the response variables. In the context of the type of questions studied, 
the advantage of this approach is that the ‘full’ effect of the independents on the dependants is 
determined. The interpretation of marginal effects is probably less relevant from a policy 
perspective, in particular because the independents considered simply are correlated in reality. 
The estimation results obtained with multiple regressions would cloud these correlations. 
Moreover, it should of course be acknowledged that the data set is simply too small to allow for 
multiple regressions taking all possibly relevant variables on board, in particular if more 
advanced statistical techniques such as 2SLS were used. 
independent variables were all sector dummies (note that no constant was used, 
as deviations from the sample average were considered). A comparable 
procedure will be used below, when the variation over sectors is considered. 
The sum of the sample average and the sector-specific effect yields the average 
score of a specific variable in that particular industry. 
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judged and that there are other complementary benefits such as increased 
capacity and improved product quality that are considered along with energy-
efficiency (see also Chapter 6). Still, most firms in the survey indicate that 
energy efficiency is an important factor in their investment decisions. 
Furthermore, Figure 7.1 reveals that, at least in the firms’ own perception, there 
is no systematic under- or overestimation of the relative importance of energy 
efficiency in overall investment decisions. It is therefore possible that further 
energy-efficiency improvement may still take place by incorporating energy 
efficiency as a decision variable when installing new machines or buildings. 
This conclusion was further confirmed by asking firms about their future 
investment behaviour. It turned out that most firms expect the total investment 
budget to remain largely constant (or to increase slightly). This also holds, but 
to a lesser extent, for investments purely aimed at increasing energy efficiency. 
However, the importance of energy efficiency in investment decisions is 
expected to increase (albeit slightly). One may therefore conclude that, 
according to the respondents, energy efficiency gradually becomes an 
integrated and important aspect of the overall evaluation of investment 
opportunities (we will return to this below when we discuss barriers to 
investments).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Relative importance of energy efficiency in general investment decisions. 
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Before proper investment decisions can be made, adequate knowledge is 
required on the various alternative investment opportunities. Lack of 
information is a principal source of market failures that can account for sub-
optimal investment behaviour (see Chapter 2). To obtain knowledge on suitable 
technologies, most firms turn out to rely on specialist publications. Also direct 
contacts with suppliers, the industrial board and colleagues appear to be 
intensively used to gather information. Formal organisations like the 
government and NOVEM (the Netherlands agency for energy and the 
environment) play only a minor role in providing firms with information on 
energy-efficient technologies. As far as perceived knowledge is concerned, 
about 30 % of the firms indicate that they are not, or only to a minor extent, 
aware of existing new technologies that are not yet being used in practice by 
any firm. Of course, a smaller percentage of 20 % has only limited knowledge 
on technologies that are currently used by other firms. These results suggest 
that future policy can improve upon the situation by providing firms with 
relevant information on investment possibilities in energy-efficient 
technologies. The public-goods nature of information provides good arguments 
for such a governmental role in providing and disseminating information. At 
the same time, firms’ perceptions on the role of NOVEM in stimulating the 
diffusion of information cast some doubt on the potential effectiveness of the 
government as a driving force behind information dissemination. This suggests 
that the government should use existing intermediaries closely related to the 
sector such as branch organisations to this end. 
It is often argued that small firms are in a particular disadvantageous 
position in obtaining strategic information on new and already existing 
technologies. In order to obtain information on whether the perceived 
knowledge varies over sectors and over firms with particular characteristics, we 
have regressed the perceived knowledge on sector dummies and firm 
characteristics. The results are shown in Tables 7.2a and 7.2b. In Table 7.2b, 
we report simple ordered probit estimates.66  
 
 
                                                     
66
 Ordered probit estimation properly takes account of the fact that the independent variable can 
take on only discrete values. The interpretation of the coefficients in the Table 7.2b, however, is 
difficult (this is a notorious problem with ordered probit estimates; see for example Greene, 
1997). This is exactly the reason for using OLS when considering the sector dummies: the 
estimated parameters can easily be interpreted as the sector-specific difference in average score 
(compared to the entire sample). In the text, when discussing ordered probit results, we restrict 
the analysis to the sign and significance of the obtained parameter values. More detailed 
information on the estimates is available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 7.2a Perceived knowledge on available technologies: sectors, OLS. 
 
KNOW-
LEDGE 
Sample 
average 
CHEM BASE 
MET 
MET FOOD PAPER HORT REST 
Know_exist 3.18 +0.28 -0.35 -0.58** +0.01 +0.04 -0.32 -0.07 
Know_new 2.79 +0.33* -0.04 -0.39 -0.38* +0.01 +0.15 +0.01 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in OLS regression 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Know_exist knowledge on already existing technologies that are currently being used by 
competitors (5 pt. scale; 1=no knowledge, 3=reasonable knowledge, 5=good 
knowledge); 
Know_new knowledge on new technologies that are not yet being used in practice (5 pt. 
scale; 1=no knowledge, 3=reasonable knowledge, 5=good knowledge). 
 
ordered probit. 
KNOWLEDGE Sample 
average 
Energy 
quote 
Invest-
ment 
quote 
Profit 
quote 
Size Compe-
tition 
Inter-
national 
orientation 
Know_exist 3.18 +0.34 +1.44** +0.03 +0.11** +0.25* +0.20*** 
Know_new 2.79 +0.61 +1.23** -0.04 +0.10** +0.29** +0.27*** 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in simple ordered 
probit regression. Bold estimates indicate that the sign of a significant parameter in the simple 
regression is ‘robust’: no significant parameter of the opposite sign is found for this variable in 
multiple regressions. 
 
Several results shown in the tables are noteworthy. First, the firms’ 
knowledge (as experienced by the firms themselves) on both new and already 
employed technologies is particularly high in the chemical industry, while it is 
low in the metal and food industry. Second, such knowledge is especially high 
in large firms that invest heavily and are faced with strong competition. This 
last result is particularly interesting, as it reveals that there is some truth in the 
argument that competition indeed functions as an incentive generating 
mechanism, forcing firms to obtain strategic information. Although it has to be 
acknowledged that the causality might run both ways, the positive correlation 
between knowledge and total investments is also conform our expectation. 
These results are in clear contrast with Gillissen et al. (1995), who conclude 
that the information gap is largely sectorally determined. Our analysis reveals 
that the information gap is particularly large in small firms facing limited 
competition and spending relatively little on investments. There is some 
sectoral effect in that firms with these characteristics are over-represented in 
the food and basic metals industry, and underrepresented in the chemical 
Table 7.2b Perceived knowledge on available technologies: firms’ characteristics, simple     
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industry. Our results are largely in line with Gruber and Brand (1991) who 
performed a study on, among others, knowledge on technologies in German 
small and medium-sized firms. For the government it is important to know that 
knowledge dissemination can be focused on specific categories of firms.  
Although knowledge about and expected profitability of available 
technologies are necessary conditions for implementation of new technologies, 
they are not sufficient. There may be a host of barriers that could prevent the 
firm from (immediately) investing, thus resulting in an ‘energy gap’. The 
optimal timing of the adoption of new technologies is an important issue in the 
economic literature (see, for example, Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Choi, 1994; 
Koski and Nijkamp, 1998). The evolution of the installed base of adopters of a 
new technology and the associated costs and benefits of waiting for a new 
technology are a major source of uncertainty. Figure 7.2 shows the relative 
importance of barriers to adoption. Scores range from 1 (barrier is completely 
unimportant) to 5 (barrier is very important). The responses shown here 
concern technologies about which firms had indicated earlier in the survey that 
they are aware of their existence, that were considered as being profitable, but 
that were not implemented yet. Three main categories of barriers can be 
distinguished, namely (i) general barriers related to the overall decision-making 
process of firms with respect to production and investment, (ii) financing 
constraints, and (iii) barriers that are related to uncertainty about, for example, 
future technology, prices and policy developments, and the quality of the new 
technology. 
The most important barrier for firms is the existence of other investment 
opportunities that are considered more promising or important. Also resistance 
to replace existing machinery turns out to be an important obstacle. This 
suggests that in the future, considerable improvements can still be made, once 
old machinery is going to be replaced due to obsolescence (compare Fawkes 
and Jacques, 1987). Also, the relatively small amount of money spent on 
energy is acting as a barrier to investing in new technology. This can be an 
indication that the costs of acquiring information and incorporating the new 
technologies within the firm often exceed the expected savings on the energy 
bill. Or, stated alternatively, energy-extensive firms apparently have no 
incentive to consider the possibilities for energy-efficiency improvement. Lack 
of financial means to finance the investments turns out to be a problem of 
relatively minor importance; once a technology is considered to be 
(sufficiently) profitable, firms are able to collect the necessary funds to make 
the investment. Uncertainty is of intermediate importance. A fear that firms 
have is that future technologies will be significantly better or cheaper. This 
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tends to induce a postponement of investments (see Chapter 2). Part of the 
uncertainty is also related to policy and results from uncertainty about future 
subsidies or environmental requirements. Again, this type of uncertainty results 
in the postponement of investment. These results all suggest a decision-making 
process that is rational and consistent with cost-benefit analysis (as explained in 
Chapter 2). This suggestion is further reinforced by Figure 7.3 showing that 
cost savings due to lower energy use are the most important driving force for 
investing in energy-efficient technologies. Policy measures like subsidies and 
fiscal arrangements may therefore be supportive in steering investments 
towards higher energy efficiency.67 
                                                     
67
 Note that this result is not inconsistent with earlier statements that energy costs are just a small 
part of total investment costs and are only one aspect of a technology that is taken into account 
when deciding on whether or not to adopt a particular technology. It does, however, indicate that 
coherent and extensive cost-benefit analyses including complementary effects are required for a 
proper understanding of actual adoption behaviour.  
The next step in our analysis is to test whether the barriers to investing in 
energy-efficient technologies differ between sectors (Table 7.3a), and 
according to firm characteristics (Table 7.3b). The estimation technique used in 
Table 7.3a is comparable to the technique underlying Table 7.2a, while the 
estimation technique employed in Table 7.3b is comparable to the one in Table 
7.2b.  
It is evident from Table 7.3a that there are only a few barriers that play a 
systematically different role in different sectors. The only two sectors that stand 
out somewhat are the basic metals sector and horticulture. The general barriers 
play a relatively important role in the sector producing basic metals. It appears 
from the results that current installations are thought to be sufficiently efficient 
from an energy point of view and that the willingness to replace them is 
(therefore) fairly low. An opposite pattern can be found in horticulture. In this 
sector, current installations are thought to be insufficiently energy efficient and 
there are no problems in that current installations initially have to be replaced 
which can be explained from the high energy intensity of this sectors. Problems 
do exist in this sector however, in that organisational constraints prevent the 
introduction of new technologies. Organisational constraints can be thought of 
as difficulties in incorporating the technology in the existing production 
process due to, for example, a lack of capable employees, a lack of internal 
knowledge or a lack of physical space. The importance of organisational factors 
for understanding the energy-efficiency paradox has been stressed by, for 
example, DeCanio (1993).  
The extent to which barriers to invest to invest in energy-efficient 
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Figure 7.2 Barriers confronting firms when introducing new technology (score 1 is ‘totally 
unimportant’, score 5 is ‘very important’). 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Maybe new technology will not satisfy
future standards 
Better to await experience of colleagues
No good overview of existing technologies
Technology will become cheaper
Better to wait for subsidies
Uncertainty regarding the quality
UNCERTAINTY
Problems with external financing
Internal constraints on the budget
FINANCIAL
Difficult to implement due to internal
organisation 
Currently introducing a new technology
Current installations are sufficiently
efficient 
Energy efficiency has low priority
Energy costs are not sufficiently important
Technology can only be implemented after
existing technology has been replaced
Other investments more important
GENERAL
Average score (5 pt. scale)
  
 
 
 
138 CHAPTER 7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Relative importance of motives in deciding whether to implement new energy-saving 
technologies (score 1 is ‘totally unimportant’, score 5 is ‘very important’).  
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Long-range plans (MJA's) within
sector 
Special financing possibilities
for investments 
Investment subsidies
Fiscal arrangements
POLICY RELATED
Cost reductions resulting from
lower energy use 
Green Image of corporation
Direct installation of equipment
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MARKET RELATED
Average score (5 pt. scale)
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technologies vary with firm characteristics is described in Table 7.3b. The 
results in this table shed light on the sources of heterogeneity that are important 
for understanding differences in firms’ investment behaviour (see, for example, 
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) who have emphasised the importance of heterogeneity 
for understanding the energy-efficiency paradox and the pattern of diffusion of 
conservation technology). As one would expect, the general barriers play less 
of an important role in energy-intensive firms (except for the organisational 
barriers, which is strongly driven by the fact that horticulture is energy 
intensive and faced with organisational barriers). A surprising result is that 
weight attached to barriers by firms making large profits is relatively large. 
Especially the barriers associated with uncertainty seem to refrain profit 
making firms from investing. A potential explanation for this result is that the 
profitable firms in our sample tend to be the energy extensive firms. As we saw 
before, these firms attach more weight to the various potential barriers to invest 
in energy-efficient technologies. Another (theoretic) explanation may be that 
more profitable firms do consider uncertainty more explicitly when making 
investment decisions. Economically better management would then jointly 
explain both the high profitability and the consideration of uncertainty. A 
similar argument could explain why these firms less often state that energy 
efficiency is less important per se. 
Similarly surprising is the fact that large firms attach a relatively large 
weight to general barriers (except for organisational barriers, which may again 
reflect the fact that horticulture is characterised by organisational barriers and 
relatively small firms). Finally, competitive forces turn out to affect the 
importance of reasons for not adopting energy-efficient technologies. In 
particular, more competitive firms tend to be faced relatively stringently with 
organisational barriers and also tend to abstain from technology adoption due to 
various sources of uncertainty (especially the fact that technologies may 
become cheaper in the future which makes it advantageous to wait). 
 
7.4 Responsiveness to policy changes 
 
Having discussed the investment behaviour of firms, we now turn to a 
discussion of how firms state that they would respond to the introduction of an 
energy tax. In particular, we asked firms to state the likelihood that they would 
react to an increase in energy taxes on a national level, with no rebatements of 
the revenues generated, by: lowering or increasing production, changing the 
production mix towards less energy intensive goods, charging customers with 
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the increased costs, introduce and adopt energy-efficient technologies, develop 
energy-efficient technologies, change to other energy sources (wind or solar 
energy), leave the market by either shutting down or evade the tax by moving 
abroad, or do nothing and accept the loss. In the next section, we will consider 
the related question on the extent to which firms find particular policies 
acceptable. 
 
 
Figure 7.4 gives some insight into the expected reactions (under the 
assumption of no rebatements). Firms are likely to react by (faster) introduction 
of energy-efficient technologies or charging the customers with the additional 
costs. Also changes in the product mix are considered as a useful option. In any 
case, taxes will result in a reaction of firms given that the ‘no reaction’ option 
received the lowest score. 
Tables 7.4a and 7.4b yield insights into whether the reactions on an energy 
tax vary with firm and sector characteristics. 
  
 
Table 7.4a reveals that the reactions on the introduction of an energy tax 
are significantly different from the average reaction in the chemical sector and 
the horticulture. More specifically, the employment of alternative energy 
sources is a less viable alternative for the chemical sector than for other sectors, 
while it is more viable in horticulture. There is a strong tendency in the 
chemical sector to either decrease production in reaction to the introduction of 
an energy tax or to evade the tax by moving abroad. In horticulture, charging 
customers with the costs is no alternative, which can be understood from the 
fact that firms in this sector are strong price takers, prices being determined on 
the auction. This price-taking behaviour in the horticulture is further illustrated 
by the fact that especially in this sector, firms are more strongly inclined to 
increase rather than decrease their production after imposition of a tax. For a 
practical price-taker, a tax means that the profit margin decreases, and a larger 
turnover is necessary to cover fixed costs.  The alternative of moving abroad is 
also strongly considered in the paper industry. This alternative is not seriously 
considered by the food industry and the machinery and textiles, which can be 
68
                                                     
 The result that a production increase is, in general, considered a more appropriate response to 
an energy tax than a production decrease seems at odds with textbook models of a firm’s 
response to environmental taxation (for example, Baumol and Oates, 1988). It could reflect that 
firms anticipate a larger equilibrium production level, due to other firms leaving the market. A 
less academic explanation would be the one given in the main text: firms would have a certain 
target profit level, and will try to sell more after imposition of a tax. This would reflect that firms 
consciously or unconsciously assume that their average variable costs are constant, and do not 
consider the fact that higher sales with a given demand curve require lower prices. It would 
validate the ‘folkloristic claims’ that firms do not think and act marginally. 
68
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Table 7.3a Barriers for implementation of energy-efficient technologies: sectors, OLS. 
 
BARRIERS Sample 
average 
CHEM BASE
MET 
MET FOOD PAPER HORT REST 
GENERAL         
OthIm 3.74 -0.10 +0.48 -0.03 +0.59 -0.24 -0.44 -0.34 
AftRe 3.51 +0.09 +0.71* -0.34 -0.01 -1.01 -0.61* +0.74 
EnCo 3.35 +0.35 +0.03 +0.08 +0.15 -0.35 -0.17 -0.55 
LoPrio 3.08 +0.10 +0.17 -0.23 +0.25 -1.08 -0.31 +0.52 
CurEf 3.00 -0.20 +0.63* 0.00 -0.67* -0.50 -0.08 +0.75 
NowIm 2.96 -0.16 -0.33 -0.79 +0.24 +0.04 +0.29 +1.38 
Organ 2.83 -0.20 +0.29 -0.33 -0.67 -0.33 +0.87** -0.43 
FINANCE         
IntBu 2.66 -0.10 +0.45 +0.63 +0.17 +0.34 -0.46 -1.16* 
ExtBu 2.22 -0.22 -0.34 +0.62 +0.58 +0.28 +0.08 -0.62 
UNCER-
TAINTY 
        
UnQua 2.71 -0.31 +0.67 -0.38 -0.14 -0.21 +0.09 +0.09 
Sub 2.54 -0.14 -0.17 -0.38 -0.11 +1.46* -0.04 +0.66 
Cheap 2.48 +0.02 +0.27 -0.48 +0.38 -0.48 +0.22 -0.68 
Overv 2.38 -0.48 0.00 +0.20 +0.29 +0.63 -0.08 +0.23 
Wait 2.35 -0.45 +0.27 -0.52 +0.36 -0.35 +0.35 +0.05 
Norms 2.33 +0.07 +0.17 -0.73 +0.51 +0.17 -0.03 -0.33 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in OLS regression 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
OthIm Other investments more important; 
AftRe Technology can only be implemented after existing technology has been replaced; 
EnCo Energy costs are not sufficiently important; 
LoPrio Energy efficiency has low priority; 
CurEf Current installations are sufficiently efficient; 
NowIm Currently introducing the specific technology; 
Organ Difficult to implement due to internal organisation; 
IntBu Internal constraints on the budget; 
ExtBu Problems with external financing; 
UnQua Uncertainty regarding the quality; 
Sub  Better to wait for subsidies; 
Cheap Technology will become cheaper; 
Overv No good overview of existing technologies; 
Wait Better to await experience of colleagues; 
Norms Maybe new technology will not satisfy future standards. 
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Table 7.3b Barriers for implementation of energy-efficiency improving technologies: firms’ 
characteristics, simple ordered probit. 
 
BARRIERS Sample 
average 
Energy 
quote 
Invest-
ment 
quote 
Profit 
quote 
Size Compe-
tition 
Inter-
national 
orien-
tation 
GENERAL        
OthIm 3.74 +0.32 -0.65 -7.65*** +0.14* +0.24 +0.01 
AftRe 3.51 -1.17* +0.14 +2.35 +0.08 +0.05 +0.01 
EnCo 3.35 -1.21* -0.02 +1.10 +0.04 -0.13 +0.14 
LoPrio 3.08 -0.84 +1.17 +0.53 +0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
CurEf 3.00 -0.73 +0.54 +2.25 +0.06 -0.26 +0.15 
NowIm 2.96 -0.37 +0.74 +3.26 +0.04 +0.13 -0.01 
Organ 2.83 +1.45* +0.65 -0.46 -0.12 +0.63** -0.08 
FINANCE        
IntBu 2.66 -0.60 -0.47 +0.28 +0.17** +0.11 +0.15 
ExtBu 2.22 -0.43 -1.17 +0.27 -0.01 -0.24 -0.09 
UNCERTAI
NTY 
       
UnQua 2.71 -0.73 +0.39 +2.35 -0.05 +0.18 -0.09 
Sub 2.54 -1.31 +0.10 +7.51*** -0.03 +0.22 +0.16 
Cheap 2.48 -0.80 -0.93 +4.02** -0.00 +0.60** +0.01 
Overv 2.38 -0.96 -0.39 +1.09 -0.04 -0.17 -0.09 
Wait 2.35 -0.65 -0.47 +8.02*** -0.03 +0.47* +0.01 
Norms 2.33 -1.91 +0.12 +0.58 +0.03 +0.09 -0.04 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in simple ordered 
probit regression; 
Bold estimates indicate that sign of significant parameter in simple regression is ‘robust’: no 
significant parameter of the opposite sign is found for this variable in multiple regressions. 
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Figure 7.4 Behavioural response to an increase in national energy taxes with no rebatements 
(score 1 is ‘totally unlikely’, score 5 is ‘very likely’).  
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Decrease production
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Employ other sources of energy
Start producing a less energy intensive
product mix
Move (parts of) f irm to foreign country
Ow n development of energy saving
technologies
Increase prices of f inal product
Introduce energy saving technologies
Average score (5 pt. scale)
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Table 7.4a Reactions on introduction of energy tax on national level with no rebatement: 
sectors, OLS. 
 
REAC-
TIONS 
Sample 
average 
CHEM BASEMET MET FOOD PAPER HORT REST 
AltEn 2.47 -0.51** -0.01 -0.11 +0.28 -0.47 +0.39* +0.08 
Shut 2.14 +0.19 -0.45 +0.29 +0.05 +0.53 +0.07 -0.44 
DevET 2.64 -0.14 +0.36 -0.26 -0.33 -0.22 +0.29 +0.06 
ImpET 3.49 -0.31 -0.07 +0.05 +0.32 +0.08 +0.15 -0.14 
Price 3.19 -0.41 +0.35 +0.67* +0.34 +0.52 -
0.88*** 
+0.46 
PrMix 2.55 -0.09 +0.07 -0.19 +0.20 -0.12 +0.28 -0.35 
Nothing 1.56 +0.05 -0.02 -0.28 -0.06 -0.13 +0.14 +0.04 
IncPr 2.39 -0.62*** -0.00 -0.31 +0.02 -0.10 +0.51** +0.16 
DecPr 2.06 +0.65*** +0.10 -0.44 -0.18 +0.44 -0.16 -0.34 
Migr 2.60 +0.58** -0.60 -0.03 -0.60* +1.40** +0.23 -0.55* 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in OLS regression  
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTOINS 
AltEn  Employ other sources of energy; 
Shut  Shutting down; 
DevET Own development of energy-efficient technologies; 
ImpET Introduce energy-efficient technologies; 
Price Increase prices of final products; 
PrMix Start producing a less energy intensive product mix; 
Nothing No reaction and incur the loss; 
IncPr Increase production; 
DecPr Decrease production; 
Migr Move (parts of) firm to foreign country. 
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current profitability could partly be explained from a relatively favourable 
current location, where a firm, for instance, benefits from a successful 
exploitation of local comparative advantages (labour markets, accessibility, and 
so forth). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that that especially firms with a relatively strong 
international orientation are hesitant to simply shift the burden from the 
national energy tax to their customers. This is also conform our prior 
expectation. 
 
 
 It is interesting to confront the sectoral dependency of the migration-response with the study 
by van Beers and van den Bergh (1997). They show that the reduction in exports as a 
consequence of stricter environmental policies is stronger in non-resource based industries than 
in resource based industries. The fact that the firms that argue to likely react by migrating are 
industries with many foreign competitors may be seen as evidence that these firms are not 
primarily based in the Netherlands for reasons of resource availability and may thus be seen as an 
explanation for the fact that especially these firms argue to react by migrating.  
 Results on the responsiveness to international increases in energy prices, national energy taxes 
with rebatements, and the imposition of stricter standards are also available.  
 
69
70
7.5 Attitudes towards environmental policy 
 
When barriers exist and restrain firms from investing, there is a potential 
role for the government. The barriers found in our survey may provide a 
justification for the active role the Dutch government has recently played in 
coping with environmental problems, and the type of actions undertaken. 
Acceptability and support for the various policy measures are a prerequisite for 
their success. We have therefore asked firms on their opinion about various 
types of environmental policy. Figure 7.5 summarises the main findings. As 
one would expect, subsidies are preferred to taxes. Voluntary agreements are 
also appreciated, in contrast to standards. These results reveal that firms want to 
maximise the freedom in deciding how to cope with the desire of the 
government to increase the quality of the environment (see also Chapter 5). 
Obviously, the acceptance of energy taxes strongly increases if measures are 
understood from the lack of external competitors (see Table 7.1 and Table 
7.4b).   
The results in Table 7.4b reveal that the responsiveness to an increase in 
energy taxes is particularly high in competitive industries.  The threats from 
competitors clearly force firms in these industries to react, and the more so the 
stronger the international orientation. It is interesting to note that more 
profitable firms have a low tendency to move abroad. This may be explained 
from the fact that this (probably more drastic) response is not considered 
necessary when a firm is currently profitable. A related reason could be that 
69
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Table 7.4b Reactions on introduction of energy tax on national level with no rebatement: 
firms’ characteristics, simple ordered probit. 
 
REAC-
TIONS 
Sample 
average 
Energy 
quote 
Invest-
ment 
quote 
Profit 
quote 
Size Compe-
tition 
Inter-
national 
orien-
tation 
AltEn 2.47 +0.15 -0.48 +0.76 -0.04 +0.07 -0.06 
Shut 2.14 +0.29 -0.11 -0.02 +0.03 +0.28* +0.10 
DevET 2.64 +0.02 +0.36 +0.07 -0.03 +0.10 +0.08 
ImpET 3.49 -0.15 +0.56 +0.19 -0.02 +0.04 -0.08 
Price 3.19 -1.90* -0.56 +0.11 -0.05 -0.09 -0.23*** 
PrMix 2.55 +0.19 -0.06 +0.09 -0.01 +0.05 -0.05 
Nothing 1.56 +0.53 NA NA NA NA NA 
IncPr 2.39 +0.59 +0.81 -0.13 -0.15*** -0.17 -0.10 
DecPr 2.06 +0.31 -0.03 -0.03 +0.10** +0.37** +0.15* 
Migr 2.60 +0.37 -0.60 -2.94** +0.21*** +0.38** +0.30*** 
 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in simple ordered 
probit regression;  
Bold estimates indicate that the sign of a significant parameter in simple regression is ‘robust’: 
no significant parameter of the opposite sign is found for this variable in multiple regressions. 
 
 
taken that minimise the adverse effects on the firms’ competitive position and 
profitability. Examples are energy taxes with direct recycling of the tax 
revenues through lower labour taxes, and energy taxes on a European level. 
Clearly, it is not the efficiency or effectiveness of energy taxes per se (the 
effect on relative input prices) that worries firms most, but much more the 
distributional effect (the money transfer), inducing adverse effects on the 
competitive position of the firm.  
when this is taking place in an international setting. This again points at the 
importance of taking into account and sustaining the competitive position of 
firms when judging energy policies.  
Finally, we return to the question whether the acceptability of energy 
policies in general and policy measures in particular did vary between sectors 
and with firm characteristics. The results are summarised in Tables 7.5a, 7.5b, 
7.6a, and 7.6b. 
Another issue in energy policy is whether additional policy measures to 
reduce energy use are acceptable for firms, or only so under certain conditions. 
The majority of firms indicated to accept government interference, especially 
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Figure 7.5 Opinion on environmental policies (score 1 is ‘very bad’, score 5 is ‘very good’). 
 
1 2 3 4 5
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Energy taxes with complete recycling
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Energy standards: maximum energy use
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STANDARDS
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Average score (5 pt. scale)
 
We may conclude from Tables 7.5a and 7.6a that the acceptability of policy 
measures is relatively high in the chemical sector and the sector producing 
basic metals. It is evident from Tables 7.5b and 7.6b that this result is likely to 
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Table 7.5a Acceptation of energy policies in general: sectors, OLS. 
 
ACCEP-
TATION 
Sample 
average 
CHEM BASE
MET 
MET FOOD PAPE
R 
HORT REST 
Acc 2.95 -0.05 +0.13 +0.26 +0.36 +0.05 -0.32 -0.07 
AccForm 3.29 +0.36 +0.28 +0.21 +0.31 -0.15 -0.29 -0.51 
DaccF 0.48 +0.40 +0.24 -0.35 -0.18 -0.33 +0.00 -0.14 
AccSec 3.55 +0.40* +0.31 -0.17 +0.45 -0.17 -0.20 -0.65** 
DaccS 0.69 +0.44* +0.31 -0.69* -0.02 -0.44 +0.11 -0.29 
AccAbr 3.74 +0.26 +0.12 -0.18 +0.17 -0.11 +0.01 -0.63* 
DaccA 0.94 +0.43 +0.06 -0.61 -0.24 -0.44 +0.24 -0.28 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in OLS regression 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Acc  Acceptable in any case; 
AccForm  Acceptable provided policy is in a particular (unspecified) format; 
DaccF  Difference between acceptability of policy in particular format and 
acceptability in any case; 
AccSec  Acceptable provided policy applies to all sectors; 
DAccS  Difference between acceptability of policy applied in all sectors and 
acceptability in any case; 
AccAbr  Acceptable provided policy also applies abroad; 
DaccA  Difference between acceptability of policy applied abroad and acceptability 
in any case. 
be driven by the fact that large internationally operating firms that face strong 
competition make up these sectors. Another possible explanation is that these 
sectors are already accustomed to energy policies (notably Voluntary 
 
oppose against subsidies and voluntary agreements, which may be seen as 
measures that put relatively weak competitors in a comparatively advantageous 
position.  
  
 
This chapter has presented and interpreted the results of a survey among 
Dutch energy-intensive firms. The survey has provided us with a unique data 
set that helped us to obtain a better understanding of how investment decisions 
are being made, how they vary between heterogeneous firms and sectors, and 
how they can potentially be influenced by environmental policy. These insights 
are important for the development of effective and acceptable environmental 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
policies in a small open economy like the Dutch one. 
From our investigation, we may conclude that energy-efficiency 
improvement increasingly becomes an integrated and normal part of the 
business operation of Dutch firms. The economic potential for cost savings is 
Agreements). Acceptability is fairly low in the horticulture, machinery and 
textile industry, which have characteristics exactly opposite to those of the 
chemical and basic metals industry. A surprising result is that the acceptability 
of some policy measures is low for profitable firms. These firms especially 
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Table 7.6a Acceptation of specific types of energy policies: sectors, OLS. 
 
ACCEP-
TATION 
Sample 
average 
CHEM BASE 
MET 
MET FOOD PAPER HORT REST 
TaxNL 2.02 -0.16 +0.28 +0.11 +0.25 +0.08 -0.27 +0.08 
TaxNLR 3.01 -0.10 -0.01 +0.13 -0.15 +0.09 -0.27 +0.58** 
DtaxNLR 1.03 +0.12 -0.33 -0.03 -0.31 -0.03 -0.06 +0.54* 
TaxEU 2.90 +0.02 +0.03 +0.17 -0.15 +0.40 -0.28 +0.21 
DtaxEU 0.89 +0.20 -0.27 +0.04 -0.26 +0.31 -0.05 +0.06 
StanTec 2.22 -0.04 +0.24 -0.15 +0.34 +0.11 -0.05 -0.28 
StanUse 2.31 -0.12 +0.46* -0.24 +0.16 +0.29 -0.05 -0.20 
InvSub 3.43 +0.21 +0.03 +0.17 +0.13 +0.13 -0.33* -0.03 
RDSub 3.49 +0.38* -0.03 +0.05 +0.07 +0.07 -0.15 -0.29 
Volag 3.20 +0.27 +0.30 +0.08 -0.08 -0.20 -0.20 -0.08 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in OLS regression  
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
TaxNL  Acceptability of energy tax in Netherlands; 
TaxNLR  Acceptability of energy tax in Netherlands with rebatement of tax revenues; 
DTaxNLR Difference in acceptability between energy tax in Netherlands with and 
without rebatement; 
TaxEU  Acceptability of energy tax on European level; 
DTaxEU  Difference in acceptability between energy tax in Europe and in Netherlands; 
StanTec  Acceptability of technology standards; 
StanUse  Acceptability of emission standards; 
InvSub  Acceptability of investment subsidies; 
RDSub  Acceptability of R&D subsidies; 
Volag  Acceptability of voluntary agreements. 
the most important driving force behind investment decisions. The existence of 
other, more attractive, investment opportunities and the incomplete 
depreciation of the existing capital stock are important impediments for not 
(yet) investing in energy-efficient technologies. A more strict environmental 
policy is acceptable for most firms, provided that this measure will not 
negatively affect profitability and the competitive position of firms. Taxes, 
especially with tax-recycling schemes and carried out in a wider international 
context, are even preferred to detailed policy guidelines on how to achieve 
policy goals. To conclude, we found strong evidence for considering sector- 
and firm-specific factors in explaining investment behaviour and 
responsiveness to and acceptability of policy measures. The latter result is of 
importance for environmental policy making since it constrains the 
applicability and desirability of generic policies. Especially firm size, energy 
intensity and competitive position were found to be important distinguishing 
factors in explaining differences in behaviour and attitude towards policy. 
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Table 7.5b Acceptation of energy policies in general: firms’ characteristics, simple ordered 
probit. 
 
ACCEP-
TATION 
Sample 
average 
Energy 
quote 
Invest
ment 
quote 
Profit 
quote 
Size Compe-
tition 
Inter-
national 
orien-
tation 
Acc 2.95 -0.25 -0.78 -0.03 +0.06 +0.14 -0.05 
AccForm 3.29 +0.10 -0.51 -0.09 +0.14** +0.33* -0.02 
DaccF 0.48 +0.33 +0.20 -0.07 +0.12** +0.32* +0.09 
AccSec 3.55 +0.18 -0.51 -0.06 +0.16*** +0.28 +0.01 
DaccS 0.69 +0.38 +0.34 -0.06 +0.14** +0.41** +0.12 
AccAbr 3.74 +0.01 -0.24 -2.44* +0.17*** +0.51*** +0.18** 
DaccA 0.94 +0.23 +0.17 -0.03 +0.14*** +0.52*** +0.24*** 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in simple ordered 
probit regression; 
Bold estimates indicate that sign of a significant parameter in simple regression is ‘robust’: no 
significant parameter of the opposite sign is found for this variable in multiple regressions. 
 
 
Table 7.6b Acceptation of specific types of energy policies: firms’ characteristics, simple 
ordered probit. 
 
ACCEP-
TATION 
Sample 
average 
Energy 
quote 
Invest-
ment 
quote 
Profit 
quote 
Size Compet
ition 
Inter-
nationa
l orien-
tation 
TaxNL 2.02 -0.39 -0.18 +0.01 -0.11** -0.15 -0.15* 
TaxNLR 3.01 -0.09 +0.48 +0.01 -0.06 -0.18 -0.09 
DtaxNLR 1.03 +0.27 +0.55 -0.01 +0.04 -0.06 +0.03 
TaxEU 2.90 -0.46 +0.66 +0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
DtaxEU 0.89 -0.19 +0.69 +0.08 +0.08* +0.14 +0.12 
StanTec 2.22 +0.45 -0.13 -0.15 +0.09* -0.06 +0.11 
StanUse 2.31 +0.17 +0.41 +0.02 +0.09* +0.15 +0.06 
InvSub 3.43 +0.08 -0.36 -2.47*** +0.09* -0.09 +0.01 
RDSub 3.49 +0.50 -0.56 -0.12 +0.18*** +0.05 +0.13* 
Volag 3.20 +0.37 -0.11 -3.67*** +0.26*** +0.02 +0.15** 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 0.1/0.05/0.01 level (two-sided t-test) in simple ordered 
probit regression;  
Bold estimates indicate that sign of a significant parameter in simple regression is ‘robust’: no 
significant parameter of the opposite sign is found for this variable in multiple regressions. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 8 
8 POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR TECHNOLOGY 
ADOPTION: A MODEL FOR ANALYSING THE 
DIFFUSION OF ENERGY-EFFICIENT 
TECHNOLOGIES72 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
As we saw in previous Chapters, analysing the effectiveness of policy 
instruments in achieving improvements in energy-efficiency is a difficult task. 
It requires a careful analysis and description and a deep understanding of 
decision-making processes at the firm level and at the same time a careful 
analysis of general-equilibrium mechanisms that are especially relevant for 
understanding the economy-wide effects, including rebound-effects, etc.  
Existing policy models do not simultaneously satisfy these requirements.73 
Some of them take a bottom-up perspective focusing on technologies and their 
characteristics, largely neglecting general equilibrium mechanisms. A good 
example of such a model is SAVE (developed at ECN, the Netherlands Energy 
Research Foundation; see, for example, Boonekamp, 1994, and Van Dril et al., 
1994). It aims at analysing developments of energy use and future energy-
saving options for end users. Other models take a more top-down perspective 
and model technological progress in a highly aggregate way, but focus more 
explicitly on general equilibrium mechanisms. A good example is NEMO 
(developed at the CPB; see Koopmans et al., 1999, and Koopmans and Te 
Velde, 2001). It aims at relating energy use to energy prices and economic 
growth in order to analyse policies aimed at fostering energy saving and 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Both types of models have in common 
that they focus on economic policy instruments and take rational behaviour of 
economic agents for granted. At the other extreme are models that do not 
                                                     
72
 This chapter was written by Henri de Groot, Jan Ros, Robert Engelen (both affiliated to 
RIVM/LAE, Bilthoven), Martijn Rietbergen and Esther Luiten. This chapter builds on a series of 
meetings in the context of the NOP project on Policy Instruments for Energy Efficiency 
Improvement and of RIVM/LAE’s interest to develop a model for the effect of policy 
instruments on industrial energy-use. Jakomijn van Wijk, Bart Wesselink, Hans Elzinga, Hilbert 
Booij, Mark van Oorschot and Remko Roodselaar (all affiliated to RIVM/LAE, Bilthoven), Peter 
Mulder (VU, Amsterdam) and Erik Alsema (Department of Science, Technology and Society, 
Utrecht University) are gratefully acknowledged for their contributions to these meetings.   
73
 For a discussion, comparison and classification of existing policy models, we refer to Mulder 
et al. (1999). 
  
 
   
 
 
heavily rely on economic rationality, but instead rely on more quantitative 
mechanisms along which policy instruments affect behaviour (such as 
information dissemination, responsiveness to strictness of monitoring, etc.). 
These models are thereby able to consider the effects of a much wider array of 
economic policy instruments. An example is MEI (Model Effectiveness of 
(Policy) Instruments, developed at RIVM; see Booij et al., 1999).  
The aim of this chapter is not to develop a model that combines all the 
attractive features of the before-mentioned models and simultaneously cures all 
their problems. Integrating top-down and bottom-up approaches has proven an 
extremely difficult task and is beyond the scope of this book. Instead, we 
describe a model that acknowledges the relevance of economic factors in 
steering adoption behaviour, but at the same time also considers other factors 
that are relevant for understanding the diffusion of technologies, but that do not 
neatly fit in traditional economic models.       
This chapter proceeds in a straightforward manner. Section 8.2 describes 
the basis-diffusion curve that is at the heart of the policy model MEI-energy74. 
Section 8.3 subsequently elaborates on the incorporation of the ‘non-economic’ 
factors in the model. Some preliminary policy analyses with the model are 
discussed in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 concludes. 
 
 
8.2    The basis-diffusion curve  
 
The aim of this section is to introduce the essence of the MEI-energy model 
in a non-technical way. Interested readers are referred to background material 
in which technical details of the model are presented and discussed (RIVM, 
2001; Van Wijk et al., 2001; Roodselaar, 2001). At the heart of the MEI-energy 
model is the basis diffusion curve. This curve describes the way technologies 
diffuse through sectors over time.75 It is called the basis diffusion curve since 
only standard economic factors affecting the cost-benefit analyses made by 
firms enter into the determination of the location of the basis diffusion curve.  
 
                                                     
74
 The model builds on the previously developed MEI model. For a discussion of similarities and 
differences between MEI and MEI-energy, we refer to RIVM (2000). 
75
 Calculations are performed for individual economic sectors. The sectoral classification 
coincides with the classification in the technology database ICARUS which forms the major 
source of empirical information used to quantify key-parameters in the model and identify 
potential future energy-efficiency improvements. 
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8.2.1 A three-phase diffusion model 
 
Figure 8.1 depicts in a very stylised way the form of the basis-diffusion 
curve. It essentially consists of three parts. Part I is called the preparation 
phase. The length of this phase (tv) is mainly determined by technical factors: 
time elapses between the moment a new technology is ready for the market and 
the moment at which a technology is installed and can effectively be employed 
in existing production processes. In addition, diffusion of information about the 
new technology can be an important determinant of the length of the 
preparation phase.  
 
Figure 8.1 The three-phase diffusion curve: Preparation (tv), acceleration (Sp) and stabilisation 
(at Pt). 
 
The second phase is the acceleration phase (Sp). Upon arrival, an attractive 
technology is not immediately and fully incorporated in all existing production 
processes by existing firms. For instance, existing capital first needs to be 
depreciated before new technologies start to be considered. The speed at which 
the diffusion of technologies takes place essentially depends on three key 
factors, which are taken into account in the model (see Chapter 2 for a more 
Penetration (P)
Time (t)ts
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1
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extensive discussion of the various existing diffusion models). First, it depends 
on the age distribution of the existing capital stock and its average (economic) 
lifetime.76 The relevance of this is easiest seen by confronting a replacement 
technology with an add-on technology. The former requires the replacement of 
existing capital/technology and will only be considered by firms if either the 
new technology is extremely profitable or the existing capital/technology has 
depreciated and is no longer economically viable. The latter can immediately 
be added to the existing capital stock. Diffusion can therefore be instantaneous: 
every firm for which it is profitable will immediately decide to adopt it. 
Second, it depends on the growth rate of the sector under consideration. In case 
the sector grows very fast and production capacity expands for this new 
capacity, the best practice technology can be immediately adopted and the 
share of firms using new technologies may rise relatively fast. Third, the shape 
of the diffusion curve along the acceleration phase depends heavily on the way 
in which knowledge about the new technology is transferred throughout the 
economy. If knowledge about the technology is widely available and the 
technology is relatively standard or straightforward, diffusion starts 
immediately and the technology starts to penetrate in an essentially linear 
fashion. Other technologies are, however, relatively complex and risky. For 
those, it is likely that initial penetration will be very slow and only few firms 
start to experiment with the new technology until the technology turns into a 
proven technology (see the discussion in Chapter 3 on demonstration values).      
The third phase is the stabilisation phase at which diffusion no longer 
continues. The level of stabilisation is determined by the share of firms that 
will ultimately decide to adopt the new technology. In the basis diffusion curve, 
this share is determined on the basis of a standard Net Present Value 
calculation and builds on the theoretical work as was discussed form a 
theoretical point of view in Chapter 2 and from an empirical point of view in 
Chapter 3. As was discussed in Chapter 2, an important reason for incomplete 
adoption of technologies is the existence of heterogeneity among potential 
adopters. This heterogeneity can be related to access to capital markets, firm 
size, solvability, dynamic evolution of the sector, specific energy prices, etc. In 
the model, we account for the relevance of heterogeneity in two ways. First, we 
make a distinction between small and large firms. This distinction builds on the 
                                                     
76
 In the simplest case in which the age distribution of the existing capital stock is uniform, there 
is no growth and the economic lifetime is T years, 1/T of the existing capital stock will be 
replaced with new capital. The longer the average economic lifetime of existing capital and the 
younger the age of the existing capital, the longer the diffusion of new capital will take. 
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empirical studies discussed in Chapter 2 and revealing its relevance. Second, 
we introduce a distribution of critical Pay-Back Periods among firms. This 
distribution reflects the fact that within the groups of large and small firms, 
there may still be heterogeneities which are not accounted for, but which are 
still relevant. Building on this assumption, what results is a share of firms for 
which the critical Pay-Back Period is sufficiently low such that they will adopt 
the technology and a share for which the critical Pay-Back Period is so high 
that they will not adopt the technology. This is illustrated in Figure 8.2. 
 
Figure 8.2 The distribution of the critical discount rate over firms and the fraction of firms that 
will adopt a technology with a given rate of return r. The shaded area equals the fraction of firms 
that will adopt a technology with rate of return r (Pec). 
 
 
8.2.2 Quantifying the basis diffusion curve 
 
In order to quantify the model, we employ various sources of information. 
The first source is the ICARUS-database, which contains information on 
available energy-efficient technologies. The database contains information on 
the date of availability of technologies, the costs and associated energy savings, 
type of technology (add-on versus replacement), etc. The second source 
0
0.5
1
0 8 16
Cumulative distribution
Distribution of critical discount rate
r
P max
155
  
 
 
    
 
 
provides information on the distribution of Pay-Back Periods. This information 
was derived from the reported Pay-Back Periods in the survey which was 
discussed and used in Chapter 3. Finally, information was required on the level 
of critical Pay-Back periods used by firms to evaluate the profitability of 
technologies. Here, we leave open various possibilities to use the model. One is 
to use Pay-Back periods as derived from the survey discussed in Chapter 3. The 
other is to take the market rate of interest as the basis for Net-Present Value 
calculations.77 A third is to use intermediate approaches in which a mark-up is 
put on the market rate of interest. This mark-up may, among others, reflect the 
effect of uncertainty on adoption behaviour (see Chapter 2). In the currently 
available version, all possibilities are left open and depending on the back-
ground of the user, he can chose the option which fits most closely with his 
background.   
 
 
8.3 A description of the full-fledged model 
 
8.3.1 Accounting for ‘other’ factors: incorporating driving forces 
 
The analysis so far essentially described a standard economic perspective 
on technology diffusion. As we emphasised in the introduction, policies affect 
diffusion in a wide variety of ways. The MEI-energy model tries to incorporate 
the role of these factors in a stylised way. This is done by introducing the 
concept of driving forces. These driving forces are complex combinations of 
factors that are relevant for understanding diffusion patterns but difficult to 
operationalise in a standard Net-Present Value framework. We have used 
various sources of information and insights on which the quantification of the 
driving forces in the model is built. On the one hand recent studies (Gillissen et 
al., 1995; De Groot et al. 1999; Velthuijsen, 1995) show a wide range of 
determinants of investment in energy conservation. The most relevant 
determinants are used and reflected in MEI-energy. On the other hand the 
concept of MEI already existed (RIVM, 1999). The concept has been improved 
over the last years by combining the knowledge and effort of several scientists 
                                                     
77
 The advantage of this approach is that one is certain that the discount rate does not incorporate 
other factors that affect adoption behaviour such as lack of knowledge, differences in access to 
capital markets, differences in firm size, etc. which are already accounted for in other parts of the 
model. See especially section 8.3 for a discussion on these other factors.  
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of different disciplines. The driving forces that we distinguish in the model can 
be classified in seven groups.  
 
1. Complexity. This measures the extent to which the complexity of an 
energy-saving measure restricts a successful implementation. There are 
three important characteristics that determine the complexity of a 
technique:  
• Is the measure an ‘off-the-shelf-technique’ or a complex ‘tailor-made 
technique’?  
• Is the measure part of the core production process or not?;  
• Can the technique be implemented during the production or 
maintenance or only during a shut down? 
 
2. Financial economical position of the industrial sector. This measures: 
• The extent to which the sector has financial possibilities to invest;  
• The extent to which negative social-economic consequences can occur 
due to the adoption of the technology; 
This driving force is to be distinguished from the NPV-analysis underlying 
the basis diffusion curve that just measures straightforward profitability. 
 
3. Opportunities and threats in operational management by implementing a 
certain technique (market pressure). This driving force is based on: 
• The degree to which the techniques creates or limits market 
opportunities: e.g. energy saving measures can also be beneficial to 
product quality; 
• The extent to which additional product policies influence market 
opportunities. 
4. Level of (technological) knowledge. This reflects the amount of knowledge 
the sector possesses about energy-efficient technological options. This 
driving force is characterised by: 
• The structure of the sector, which is reflected by the number of 
companies in the sector and the energy intensity of the sector; 
• The degree to which knowledge has been institutionalised and the 
degree to which policy measures can increase the level of knowledge; 
• The role of Information and Communication Technologies in 
increasing knowledge. 
157 
  
 
 
    
 
 
 
5. Political pressure. Industrial sectors are stimulated or forced to save energy 
by various policy instruments. The MEI-model incorporates the following 
types of policy instruments for energy conservation: Benchmarking, Long-
term Agreements, Environmental Permits, taxes and subsidies. This driving 
force is determined by the mix of the policy instruments and the specific 
characteristics of the policy instrument such as the level of ambition, level 
of enforcement and financial support. It is important to emphasise that 
various policy instruments also affect the other driving forces. For 
example, a voluntary agreement has a positive impact on the attitude of a 
sector, but lowers the political pressure in comparison with legislation.  
 
6. Public pressure. This captures the extent to which non-market actors put 
pressure on industrial companies (sectors) to improve the energy 
performance. This is determined by: 
• The degree to which the government provides information and 
knowledge on the problem of climate change; 
• General public opinion regarding climate change. 
 
7. Attitude of (sub-)sector towards environmental issues. The attitude towards 
environmental issues is reflected by: 
• The willingness of a sector to take care for the environment and 
climate; 
• The expected impact of policy instruments on the attitude of sectors 
towards energy and environmental issues.  
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8.3.2 Quantifying driving forces 
 
The previous section has shown that driving forces are complex 
combinations of determinants such as measure characteristics, characteristics of 
policy instruments, sectoral specific data and environmental characteristics (see 
also Figure 8.4). These determinants are for a large part based on qualitative 
expert judgements. The next step is to quantify the driving forces. For a more 
detailed description of the rules for calculating driving forces including the way 
of weighting mutual relations between determinants, we refer to RIVM (2001). 
As an example Box 8.1 shows how the driving force ‘complexity’ is calculated. 
Each driving force gives a score on a 0-10 scale (0 = affects adoption in a 
negative way; 10 = affects adoption in a positive way). 
 
Box 8.1 Calculating the driving force ‘complexity’ 
 
The driving force (DF) Complexity determines the extent to which the complexity of an 
energy-saving measure restricts a successful implementation. The formula for calculating 
this driving force is: 
 
DF (Compl) = 3 – C – S – I  
 
Where 
 
C The measure is part of the core process or not: yes → C = 1, no → C = 0 
 
S  The measure is a standard ‘off the shelf’ technique or a non-standard complex 
‘tailor-made’ technique:  standard → S = 0, not-standard → S = 1 
 
I The technique can be implemented during the production, maintenance, or 
during a shut down: during the production → I = 0, during maintenance → I = 
½, during  shut down → I = 1 
 
The value for the complexity of a technique can vary between 0 and 3. To calculate the 
driving force, the value for complexity is translated to a scale from 0 to 10. 
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Figure 8.3 The effects of improved information dissemination on the basis-diffusion curve. 
 
 
8.3.3 The impact of driving forces on the basis diffusion curve 
 
In the model, the driving forces essentially yield corrections on the basis 
diffusion curve. More specifically, the driving forces affect each phase of the 
diffusion curve (with varying weights) for each measure.  By using a weighting 
scheme, the extent to which a driving force is important for a specific phase is 
allowed to vary. In the preparation phase, complexity, market and political 
pressure are assumed to be the most important driving forces. Market pressure 
is the main factor in the acceleration phase. Finally, the combination of 
‘financial-economic position, market pressure, policy pressure and attitude’ has 
a major impact on the maximum diffusion. It must be mentioned that the model 
distinguishes three different types of techniques: new, retrofit and good 
housekeeping. These techniques require different model parameters and thus 
different weighting schemes.  
Just to give an example of how driving forces impact on the penetration of 
a technology, consider policies aimed at information dissemination. These can, 
for example, shorten the preparation phase and speed up the diffusion process. 
This is graphically illustrated in Figure 8.3. 
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8.3.4 Summary of the MEI-energy model 
 
Figure 8.4 schematically summarises the model set-up as it has been 
discussed so far. At the heart of the model is the basis diffusion curve, which is 
represented in the upper-part of the scheme. Based on technological 
information from ICARUS, information on the development of energy prices 
which is key to energy-saving possibilities in monetary terms, and policy 
information on subsidies and savings, the profitability of a technology is 
determined. This profitability is confronted with behavioural information 
regarding the critical profitability required by firms. The confrontation of these 
two pieces of information yields the percentage of firms that will - on the basis 
of a rational cost-benefit analysis - decide to adopt the technology. The driving 
forces are represented in the center of the scheme. They are made up of 
information about the technologies (such as their complexity), policy 
characteristics such as monitoring intensity and environmental characteristics. 
The combination of  'corrections' of the driving forces on the basis diffusion 
curve and the basis diffusion curve itself results in a description of the 
penetration of technologies. Technological information regarding energy 
savings and macroeconomic information regarding growth and sectoral 
composition then ultimately results in measures for energy-saving and future 
energy use.   
The model is currently operational. For the moment, it is a research model 
rather than a validated model that can be used for evaluating or forecasting the 
effect of policy instruments on investment in energy efficiency. The 
determinants that describe the driving forces, the weighing scheme and the way 
the driving forces affect the basis-diffusion curve are mainly based on expert 
judgement. As such, the current MEI-energy model is a formal representation 
on what is known about investment behaviour of firms in energy-efficient 
technologies. 
Figure 8.5 shows the energy savings in the various policy scenarios for 
paper industries in the Netherlands. The scenarios do not take into account 
physical growth.  
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Table 8.1 Policy scenarios. 
 
 Scenario’s Explanation 
1 BAU - 
2 VA 0 Voluntary agreement with a moderate level of 
enforcement and control 
3 VA 0 + 
subsidy 
Voluntary agreement with moderate level of 
enforcement and control in combination with a subsidy 
25%. 
4 Subsidy An investment  subsidy of 25% 
5 Tax Energy tax on electricity for large firms: 25%. Energy 
tax on electricity for small firms: 7.5%. Energy tax on 
natural gas for large firms: 10%. Energy tax on natural 
gas for small firms: 3%. These percentages are based on 
a levy of  fl 0,5 / GJ. 
6 Double tax Energy tax on electricity for large firms: 50%. Energy 
tax on electricity for small firms: 15%. Energy tax on 
natural gas for large firms: 20%. Energy tax on natural 
gas for small firms: 6%. 
7 Subsidy + 
tax 
Scenario 4 in combination with Scenario 5 
8 EP 0 Environmental permit with moderate level of 
enforcement and control 
9 EP 1 Environmental permit with a high level of enforcement 
and control 
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Figure 8.4 Summary of the MEI-energy model. The model’s calculation steps are 
depicted in dark boxes, whereas the inputs are in light boxes (Roodselaar, 2001). 
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8.4 Some first analyses  
 
The aim of the MEI-energy model is to simulate the effect of various policy 
instruments on investment behaviour of firms. Although various choices in the 
model structure need further refinement and the quantification of mechanisms 
and driving forces requires further testing, it is interesting to present some 
preliminary results of various policy scenario’s derived with a demo-version of 
the model. These analyses are not meant to give reliable predictions on energy-
saving possibilities or the effectiveness of policy instruments, but are merely 
intended to give an impression of the kind of exercises that will be possible 
when using MEI-energy. They also provide information on how to continue 
with using MEI-energy in modelling the effect of policy instruments on the 
adoption of energy-efficient technologies. 
We run some policy scenarios from 1995 till 2010 (see Table 8.1). All 
policy instruments were implemented in 1995 and affected investment 
decisions from that moment onwards. Other parameters than the ones scored 
for the various policy scenarios were kept constant.  
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Figure 8.5 Energy savings (PJ) in the policy scenarios 1 to 9 (see Table 8.1) for the paper and 
board industry.   
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If one looks at the results in Figure 8.5 and compares these with insights 
provided in the earlier chapters, the following observations can be made: 
• Environmental permits (Scenario 8 and 9) lead to higher energy savings 
compared to the scenarios with economic instruments (regardless of the 
level of enforcement and control). The environmental permit includes strict 
standards on energy conservation; firms should implement all energy 
conservation measures with a pay-back period of 3-5 years (depending on 
the type of measure). If full compliance is assumed to occur, this scenario 
leads to considerable energy savings in the sector. The results in Chapter 4 
on standards do not give a complete empirical account on the way 
standards affect the implementation of energy-efficiency measures (in what 
time frame do firms comply, what measures do they take, etc.). Thus, it 
would be interesting to study the impact of the level enforcement and 
control on the compliance of firms in more detail amongst others to 
validate and improve the model. 
• Voluntary agreements (Scenario 2) lead to energy savings comparable with 
the environmental permits (Scenario 8). The effect of combining voluntary 
agreements with an investment subsidy (Scenario 3) is modest. This is 
strange since Chapter 5 shows that the voluntary agreement is typically a 
mix of policy instruments (energy covenant, subsidies and communication 
services). The combination of the instruments is effective. However, the 
results in Figure 8.5 show that the agreement itself (i.e. the energy 
covenant) appears to have a dominating impact on the energy savings. 
Taking into account the results of Chapter 5, this does not seem to be 
realistic. 
• In the case of the paper industry, taxes (scenarios 5 and 6) do not have 
large additional effects compared to the BAU Scenario 1. The type of 
measures included in the ICARUS database likely explains this. The tax 
levels are based on a levy of fl 0,5 GJ (primary energy). This tax level is 
currently being used in Denmark for firms that do not have a voluntary 
agreement. Firms with an agreement pay lower taxes.  
• The effect of investment subsidies (Scenario 4) is higher than the effect of 
taxes. The investment subsidies used in the scenario calculations are a bit 
high (25%) compared to the level that are currently being used in large 
subsidy schemes such as EIA and EINP (16-18%) (see Chapter 3). It is 
remarkable that voluntary agreements (also without subsidies!) do have a 
large effect on energy savings.  
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These preliminary policy scenario analyses using the MEI-energy model 
illustrate the potential possibilities of such a model. They also illustrate that 
further development and validation of the model is absolutely needed if one 
aims at developing a sound and valuable expert supporting system. Important 
points for improving the model are: 
• The data used and the model as such need to be separated. If one develops 
scenarios for a specific sector, the required data can be included (such as 
the ICARUS data and sector specific data). This increases the flexibility 
and transparency of the model. The model also becomes more robust (each 
time the same data are used).  
• In reality, there is no business-as-usual without policy intervention. From 
an analytic point of view, it would be valuable to be able to run a scenario 
without any policy instrument included (as a basis for comparison).  
• It would be interesting to add the cost-effectiveness of policy instruments. 
To do this data are needed on the costs of various policy instruments and 
the energy-efficiency improvements achieved (due to that instrument). 
• Not only various policy instruments (environmental permits and voluntary 
agreements), but also some driving forces (such as political pressure and 
public pressure) need some further thought and testing to come to a model 
representation that is more realistic. 
• It would be interesting to gain a better insight (at the output side of the 
model) into the various steps in which the diffusion curve is calculated. It 
would also be interesting to have a better insight into the mechanisms along 
which various driving forces affect the investment behaviour of firms. This 
is clearly a matter of communication and transparency, but it may be 
important for a further improvement of the model.  
• Finally, some technologies in the ICARUS database exclude each other. 
This needs to be included in a next version of the MEI-energy model. 
 
If agreement can be reached regarding the formula of the various driving 
forces and the scores in the weighing scheme and if the MEI-energy model is 
better validated it may become an interesting tool for evaluating the effect of 
various policy instruments. 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has described the basic structure of a modelling tool aimed at 
assessing the effectiveness of energy policies aimed at fostering the adoption of 
energy-efficient technologies. The model differs from existing models in that it 
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explicitly allows for effects of policy measures that are acknowledged to be 
relevant, but at the same time are difficult to operationalize in 'standard' 
economically oriented policy models.  
The addition of the driving forces to a more standard economic perspective 
on technology diffusion is an appealing step in coming to a formal 
representation of the factors influencing the investment behaviour of firms in 
energy-efficient technology. Various policy instruments may affect various 
driving forces. Recent theoretical insights as described in Chapter 2 were 
thoroughly discussed and included as data availability allowed a quantitative 
representation in the model. As such, the current MEI-energy model is a formal 
representation on what is known about investment behaviour of firms in 
energy-efficient technologies. 
Some first policy analyses were discussed that are intended to illustrate the 
type of instruments that can in principle be analysed with the model. Future 
research is needed to further develop, improve and validate the model. The 
analysis will focus on further exploiting existing empirical insights in 
quantifying the mechanisms, developing measures for cost effectiveness of 
policy instruments that enable the user to compare different policy instruments 
on a uniform measure (total costs of the instrument per ton emission avoided), 
validation of the model, comparison of model outcomes with outcomes derived 
from other policy models such as NEMO and SAVE, etc.  
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CHAPTER 9 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Energy-efficiency improvement – defined as the reduction of the energy use 
per unit of human activity – is an important option for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Much was already known now about the techno-
economic potentials for energy-efficiency improvement in industrialised 
societies. The question in this book was how government can actually stimulate 
energy-efficiency improvement.  
The focus of this research has been on policy instruments for energy-
efficiency improvement in firms. Specific attention was paid to some important 
characteristics of policy instruments: effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. We 
also studied the mechanisms along which various policy instruments affected 
investment behaviour of firms. 
 
 
9.1 The adoption and development of energy-efficient 
technologies in firms 
 
From techno-economic studies it is concluded that many technologies for 
energy-efficiency improvement are cost-effective. We analysed why the 
adoption of such technologies is slower than could be expected from 
straightforward cost-benefit analysis.  
One set of causes is that there are additional costs on top of the direct 
investment costs such as, for example, transaction costs associated with the 
investment and additional annual costs. Or the savings associated with the new 
technology may not be perceived as such, due to, for example, the low share of 
energy costs in the total costs. 
However, there is a set of other factors that may cause firms to refrain from 
adopting new technologies (see Chapter 2). One of them is lack of information: 
firms may not know about new technologies. Second, there is a lack of capital 
that is necessary to invest in new technologies. Third, the fact that most 
investments are to a large extent irreversible creates an 'option value of 
waiting': if market conditions are uncertain it may be attractive for firms to 
postpone investments. Fourth, firms may not always strive for profit 
maximisation, but instead may strive for satisfactory profits. Fifth, there may 
exist so-called network externalities: it may be unattractive for firms to invest 
in a technology if other firms (also) refrain from investing. Related to this is the 
observation that initial costs of a technology are higher than the costs after 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
some penetration; also this provides an incentive to wait. Finally, there are 
agency problems: the firm that invests may not receive the benefits of the 
investment.  
All these factors together can to a large extent explain why firms are not 
adopting energy efficient technology, the so-called energy-efficiency paradox. 
A next step would be to translate these explanations into quantitative models. 
 
In a survey among firms we found that the following reasons for not 
investing in energy efficient technology were mentioned most often (see 
Chapter 7): 
• other investments are more important 
• technology can only be implemented after existing technology has been 
replaced 
• energy costs are not sufficiently important 
• energy efficiency has a low priority. 
If we look at firms’ decision-making processes, there is no intrinsic 
difference between investment decisions in normal technologies and energy-
efficient technologies. 
 
We did not only study the investment behaviour of firms with regard to 
existing technology, but also the investment behaviour of actors in developing 
new, innovative energy-efficient technology (see Chapter 6). The latter is 
important to attain long-term climate policy goals. Four case studies were 
carried out – two in the paper and board industry and two in the iron and steel 
industry - to obtain a better understanding of the way technological 
development in these sectors occurs.  
Development of industrial energy-efficient technologies turns out to be a 
slow process. It is striking that the principles of all four technologies were 
known long before a network of industries started to work on the technologies. 
Only if the new technologies are recognised as the 'next-step-to-take', actual 
development takes of. Still then, the road towards commercialisation is long: it 
may take ten to twenty years - even if the momentum is sufficiently high for 
commercialisation to occur. It was also found that technological development is 
heavily constrained by existing production processes.  
Firms’ decision-making on R&D regarding energy-efficient technologies 
that affect the core of the manufacturing process was driven by other 
considerations than energy efficiency: ‘other’ cost advantages were far more 
important than reduced energy costs. Energy-efficiency improvement is not an 
important reason to develop so-called energy-efficient technologies. In addition 
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to the gradual materialisation of the technology, the claims of success, 
improvements to the conventional manufacturing process and changes in the 
industry’s business affect the time frame of subsequent up-scaling.  
Networks around technologies differ, which is relevant for the choice of 
actors that government intervention should focus on. For instance, in the paper 
and board industry there are only a few paper machine manufacturers that drive 
the entire development. In the iron and steel industry, more groups of 
companies are involved and the role of the iron and steel companies themselves 
is central. The target group of firms (and other actors) that can be addressed for 
developing innovative process technologies is highly international and 
relatively small (compared to the total number of manufacturing firms). 
 
 
9.2 Policy instruments – applicability and effectiveness 
 
Governments can try to stimulate energy-efficiency improvement by 
applying policy instruments like taxes, subsidies, agreements and standards. 
The main aim of the research project that is summarised here was to study 
the applicability (to what extent and how can policy instruments be applied in 
specific situations?) and effectiveness (do policy instruments lead to actual 
energy-efficiency improvement?) of some potentially major policy instruments 
directed at energy-efficiency improvement in firms. We have studied both 
economic instruments (subsidies), voluntary agreements and energy-efficiency 
standards.  
One general finding is that the performance of policy instruments depends 
heavily on the way these are designed, implemented, enforced and monitored. 
In many cases the question which policy instrument is chosen may be less 
important than the question how it is applied.  
 
Economic instruments: subsidies 
 
Subsidies – or fiscal incentives with comparable effect – have been widely 
used, both for stimulating the adoption of energy-efficient technology and for 
stimulating R&D into energy-efficient technologies. Investment subsidies have 
always been an important instrument for stimulating investment in energy-
efficient technology, in many countries, and also in the Netherlands. By 
carrying out a survey among companies and non-profit organisations that made 
use of two subsidy schemes in the Netherlands, we investigated the degree to 
which the subsidy schemes led to additional investments (see Chapter 3). 
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Through the subsidies, government contributes 15 to 20 percent to the 
investment. We found that half to two-thirds of the subsidy receivers are free 
riders: they would have done the investment also in case when no subsidy 
scheme would have been in place and without a delay. The costs for the 
government are estimated to be 20 - 50 $ per tonne of CO2 avoided. For 
specific technologies, these costs may well be a factor ten higher or lower. The 
costs for implementing the scheme make up only a small part (1 - 7%) of the 
subsidies provided. 
We also examined the effect of government subsidies for research and 
development through an analysis of the decision making process in firms for 
the four technology cases in the iron and steel industry and the paper and board 
industry. We found that in two of the cases the momentum of the technological 
development was too high for government intervention to be effective. If 
subsidies were provided in these cases, they did not accelerate the rate of 
development. In the other two cases, government subsidies enhanced the rate of 
development. However, in both cases the development did not (yet) lead to the 
commercialisation of the technologies. 
Despite the free-rider effects, subsidies can be effective instruments: both 
energy-investment activities and R&D activities were beyond what they would 
have been without these instruments (in the case of R&D this does not 
necessarily lead to conserved energy). In both cases, the government costs per 
unit of effect can be decreased if the subsidy schemes are made more specific. 
In the case of investment subsidies, this can be achieved by excluding 
technologies that are already profitable without the subsidy. In the case of 
research and development subsidies, governments should first investigate 
which companies are active in technology development; what type of actors are 
most important and what the momentum of the development is. Subsequently, 
governments can decide whether to subsidise and what the appropriate target 
groups are.  
So, improvement of the cost-effectiveness of subsidy schemes seems to be 
possible, but at a cost: it requires that the government has a more detailed 
knowledge about the characteristics of energy-efficient technologies and the 
actors involved. 
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Voluntary agreements 
 
Voluntary agreements (see Chapter 5), also called negotiated agreements, 
have become a popular policy instrument for improving industrial energy 
efficiency in many countries. They can be considered as one of the major 
innovations in energy policy in the last decade. 
Communication turns out to be one of the key mechanisms that help 
negotiated agreements work. The issue of energy efficiency was actively 
brought to the attention of the firms involved. The agreements have clearly 
extended and structured communication flows and knowledge transfer within 
industrial sectors. Due to sharing of information and knowledge an increase of 
investments in energy-efficient measures can be observed.  
We investigated the effectiveness of the long-term agreements in the 
Netherlands. Long-term agreements have been established with 30 sectors, 
involving 1350 companies. The agreements generally aimed at a reduction of 
the specific energy consumption by 20% in the period 1989 - 2000. This target 
was not reached across industry, mainly due to non-participation of sectors or 
parts of sectors. Within the participating sectors, on average the targets were 
reached.  
We investigated the degree to which the energy-efficiency improvement 
was stimulated by the long-term agreements both by using expert judgements 
and by a survey among companies involved in the long-term agreements. We 
conclude that a quarter to half of the energy-efficiency improvement achieved 
in the period is the result of the long-term agreements. The remainder of the 
energy-efficiency improvement actions would have been undertaken anyway. 
The long-term agreements in the Netherlands were fairly costly. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence that the specific costs for the government (10 - 15 $/tonne 
CO2 avoided) are lower than those of investment subsidies.  
We conclude that voluntary agreements are effective policy instruments for 
energy-efficiency improvement if accompanied by ambitious target setting, 
which requires a good government negotiation position; a transparent 
description of the targets; continuous government support, e.g. through 
additional policy measures; reliable monitoring procedures; and independent 
verification. Voluntary agreements tend to be less successful for sectors with a 
low energy intensity and a large number of companies involved.  
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Energy-efficiency standards 
 
Direct regulation (‘command-and-control’) belongs to the oldest 
instruments in environmental policy. Also in the energy sector such instruments 
have been applied: energy-efficiency standards have shown to be effective for 
very specific equipment, like cars and household appliances, e.g. in the USA. 
However, standard setting is much easier for these fairly homogeneous product 
categories than for the wide variety of energy-using equipment in many 
industrial and service sectors.  
We investigated (see Chapter 4) how general guiding principles like the 
requirement to apply 'best-available-techniques-not-entailing-excessive-costs' 
can be translated into practical guidelines. We found that private sector 
profitability criteria are not a very good choice. National economic criteria (e.g. 
$/tonne of CO2) seem more appropriate, except for energy-intensive firms. 
Setting a maximum to the costs of energy improvement measures as a share of 
total costs  (e.g. 0.2 - 0.5%) may be more suitable for the energy-intensive 
sectors; using the same criteria, fairly far-reaching energy-efficiency 
improvement measures can be asked from firms that are not energy-intensive. 
In order to obtain a better idea of the practical applicability of energy-
efficiency standards, a newly introduced 'general administrative order' on 
energy-efficiency for small and medium enterprises (e.g. hotels and catering) 
was examined. A survey was carried out among the agencies responsible for 
implementing the regulation, i.e. the municipalities. We found that in the 
overwhelming majority of the cases, the municipalities are not very active in 
enforcing compliance: the knowledge about energy conservation in firms is 
limited and the priority given to the issue is low.  
It is recommended that in the design of energy-efficiency regulation the 
issue of how the regulating agencies will implement the regulation is taken into 
account. It must be noted that it is difficult anyway to design effective policy 
instruments for small and medium sized enterprises. 
From a survey among firms we concluded that energy-efficiency standards 
are considered less acceptable than energy and carbon taxes. Subsidies and 
voluntary agreements are preferred most. 
We conclude that – although energy-efficiency standards could be applied 
in practice – the experience so far is not encouraging; much better policy 
designs are necessary to make normative instruments for firms effective. 
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Conclusions on the effectiveness and efficiency of policy instruments 
 
The results of this study have improved the understanding of the way policy 
instruments influence the behaviour of firms regarding the adoption and 
development of energy-efficient technologies. It turned out that there is no 
generic answer to the question which policy instrument is the best; the 
effectiveness of a policy instruments depends on the design, the actual 
implementation and the enforcement (or monitoring). In terms of effectiveness, 
design, implementation and enforcement of policy instruments may be more 
important than the selection of a specific policy instrument as such. Regarding 
this, much can be learned from the experience with existing policies. 
Based on the Dutch experience, we can conclude that both investment 
subsidy schemes and voluntary agreements have increased the adoption rate of 
energy-efficient technologies in the Netherlands and therefore have shown to 
be effective. However, effectiveness should also be judged in comparison with 
the effort required. In both cases we found that substantial effort from the 
government is needed. Comparing both instruments, we found that voluntary 
agreements (that include subsidies) seem to be more cost-effective from the 
government point of view than pure subsidies. However, in both cases, there is 
still room for improvement of the cost-effectiveness. Energy-efficiency 
standards for firms have not turned out to be effective, but this may be due to 
improper design of the instrument. 
 
 
9.3 Further work 
 
In spite of the conclusions drawn, there is still more empirical (quantitative) 
research needed to look for relationships between policy instruments and the 
investment behaviour of heterogeneous firms in the wide variety of energy-
efficient technologies. We identified a number of areas for further research. 
 
1. We have a fairly good knowledge of the range of critical discount rates 
used by firms. However, there is a need for a quantitative explanation of the 
difference between these critical discount rates and market discount rates, next 
to the qualitative explanation provided in Chapter 2. This may also help 
explaining differences in critical discount rates between firms and its 
development in time. Also, it is relevant to investigate investment behaviour of 
the large number of firms that does not apply formal investment decision 
criteria at all. One may suggest all kinds of assumptions on which type of firms 
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do (or do not) deploy critical discount rates – one may for instance assume that 
more capital-intensive firms tend to apply a critical discount rate more strictly - 
though empirical grounding of such plausible assumptions is still lacking.  
2. Lack of knowledge on energy-efficiency options is clearly identified as 
one of the barriers to energy-efficiency improvement. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that the empirical results in Chapter 7 indicate that 20% of 
the firms have only limited knowledge about technologies that currently are 
being used by other firms. The question clearly is whether 20% is much or 
little. One has to take into account that there is no strict definition of having 
‘knowledge of’; it can vary of heaving ‘heard of’ via ‘fairly good knowledge’ 
to a precise insight what the technology will cost and deliver for the specific 
firm. It is important to get a better understanding of the effect that lack of 
knowledge has on, e.g., the delay of investing in technology and how 
knowledge diffuses. 
3. Our research suggests that differences among firms within sectors can be 
more important for technology adoption than the differences between sectors. 
More should be known about heterogeneity of firms, both in physical terms and 
in terms of behaviour, and how heterogeneity influences adoption rates. In 
Chapter 2 it was already indicated that the simple net-present value framework 
is static and therefore cannot explain the most prevalent stylised fact in 
adoption, namely the S-shaped diffusion over time. Thus far, we can indicate 
four explanations:  
• physical heterogeneity (for instance differences in specific products); 
• differences in firms’ attitude; 
• firms’ typical regular major upgrading of production facilities; 
• firm external factors (like policy instruments). 
With regard to these four explanations - that go one step beyond suggesting 
heterogeneity as the explanation - we must say that these are plausible insights 
rather than that they are based on extensive empirical testing, let alone that we 
have a quantitative indication of the effects. 
4. We also learned that the present way of characterisation of technologies 
in techno-economic information systems need improvement. Energy-efficient 
technologies are typically characterised as retrofit or replacement option. There 
is little empirical information on firms and their behaviour in replacing 
technologies. Are technologies replaced when the technology is depreciated or 
are they used until they are technically worn out? One typically uses time 
frames of 15 to 30 years, but there is hardly any empirical insight into the 
typical economic / technical life-times of energy-efficient technologies in 
various manufacturing industries. How often do firms invest in a major 
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upgrading of their facilities? There is no empirical insight into the difference 
between replacement and retrofit. The distinction may not be the way to 
continue in order to get a better understanding of firms’ investment behaviour. 
Anecdotal empirical evidence suggests that industrial production processes are 
continuously improved; the distinction between retrofit and replacement is 
however fuzzier than often assumed. The value of the distinction between 
retrofit and replacement has to be studied for various categories of technologies 
and for various manufacturing industries.  
5. We have learned about the effectiveness of a range of policy instruments 
in specific situations. A next step is to learn more about how the effectiveness 
depends, e.g., on the design of the policy instrument; on the level of ambition; 
and on the accompanying measures. Still, insight into the effect of various 
policy instruments on various mechanisms remains highly qualitative. It is 
neither clear whether similarly designed policy instruments affect the same 
mechanisms in all contexts. In addition, the extrapolation of the effectiveness 
of specific policy instruments to other contexts and the flexibility in the 
ambitions of instruments and the final energy savings achieved are under-
researched. We do not know whether the Dutch energy covenants would have 
had the same success when the ambitions were for instance 30% instead of 
20% energy-efficiency improvement (against the same costs). It is still difficult 
to compare various policy instruments (for instance on cost-effectiveness). 
More knowledge is needed about the effectiveness of policy instruments in 
various contexts. There is no definitive answer on all the firm-, sector- and 
technology characteristics that affect the effectiveness of various policy 
instruments. Furthermore, it is important to perform more evaluation studies in 
order to enlarge the pool of data available on the cost-effectiveness and 
efficiency of policy instrument and to better understand which design 
characteristics of policy instruments may improve the efficiency of government 
intervention.  
It is sometimes assumed that when it becomes clear that as soon as an 
industrial sector complies with the goal formulated in an energy covenant, the 
incentive to invest in energy-efficient technologies will reduce. There is no 
empirical insight into the response of firms to specific policy goals. In what 
kind of energy-efficient technologies do they invest and does this indeed vary 
over time? There is only limited insight into the direct link between a policy 
incentive and the type of energy-efficiency measures taken.  
 
To be able to answer such questions, the range of methodologies needs to be 
expanded. It is especially recommended to do in-depth research by monitoring 
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a number of firms regarding their investment behaviour and the way they are 
influenced by policy instruments. Secondly we suggest to do micro-panel data 
analysis. This type of analysis makes it possible to analyse the energy 
conservation behaviour of firms on the basis of a large number of firm 
characteristics. 
 
From the point-of-view of the government, a continuous effort of policy 
evaluation is important to monitor effectiveness and cost consequences of 
various policy instruments. It is recommended to design policy instruments in 
such a way that (ex post) evaluation is well possible. Too often, evaluation of 
policy instruments is hampered by the design of policy instruments. The 
recommendation can be extended one step further: ideally, policy design should 
be based on an (assumed) understanding of decision mechanisms in firms; this 
understanding should be tested and improved in the evaluation process, leading 
to an improved design of future policy instruments. 
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APPENDIX I.  
 
Net Present Value and Payback period (Chapter 2) 
 
In the literature on adoption of energy-efficient technologies, two indicators of profitability 
of technologies are used. These are the Pay-Back Period (PBP) and the internal discount rate. 
The aim of this Appendix is to show that the two concepts are very closely connected. To show 
this, note that the PBP is the number of periods required for the accumulated (net) benefits to 
exceed the (initial) investment costs, so PBP=I/B, where I is the initial investment cost and B the 
annual benefit net of operation and maintenance costs, etc. The Internal Discount Rate is defined 
as the discount rate for which the Net-Present-Value of a technology equals zero. This discount 
rate is thus derived as r from the equality  
(A.1) ( )∑
=
+
=
N
t
t
r
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1 1
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Confronting the two, it is evident that for the PBP and the Internal Discount Rate to be 
internally consistent for a given investment project, the following equality should hold: 
(A.2) ( )∑
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Relationship (A.2) illustrates that for a given critical pay-back period (PBP), the internal 
discount rate (r) that yields the same outcome for the evaluation of an investment project 
increases with the lifetime (N) of the investment project. 
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Description of Variables (Chapter 7) 
 
ACC  Energy policies acceptable in any case 
ACCABR Energy policies acceptable provided it also applies abroad 
ACCFORM Energy policies acceptable provided it is in a particular 
(unspecified) format 
ACCSEC Energy policy acceptable provided it applies to all sectors 
AFTRE  No adoption because technology can only be implemented after 
existing technology has been replaced 
ALTEN  React on energy tax by employing other sources of energy 
BASEMET Basic metals industry  
CHEAP  No adoption because technology will become cheaper 
CHEM  Chemical industry  
COMP  Degree of competition on sales market (1=limited, 2=average, and 
3=strong) 
COMPIN Location of competitors (1=mainly in Netherlands, 2=less than 50% 
abroad, 3=more than 50% abroad, 4=virtually all abroad) 
CUREF  No adoption because current installations are sufficiently efficient 
DACCA  Difference between acceptability of policy applied abroad and 
acceptability in any case 
DACCF  Difference between acceptability of policy in particular format and 
acceptability in any case 
DACCS  Difference between acceptability of policy applied in all sectors and 
acceptability in any case 
DECPR  React on energy tax by decreasing production 
DEVET  React on energy tax by own development of energy-efficient 
technologies 
DTAXEU Difference in acceptability between energy tax in Europe and in 
Netherlands 
DTAXNLR Difference in acceptability between energy tax in Netherlands with 
and without rebatement 
ENCO  Energy costs are not sufficiently important 
ENQ  Energy intensity (expenditures on energy as fraction of sales)  
EXTBU  Problems with external financing 
FOOD  Food industry  
HORT  Horticulture  
IMPET  Introduce energy-efficient technologies 
INCPR  Increase production 
INQ  Investment ratio in 1997 (total investments as fraction of sales) 
INTBU  Internal constraints on the budget 
INVSUB  Acceptability of investment subsidies 
KNOW_EXIST Knowledge on already existing technologies that are currently 
being used by competitors 
KNOW_NEW Knowledge on new technologies that are not yet being used in 
practice. 
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LABOUR Number of employees (sum of full time and part time employees) 
LLABOUR Log of number of employees 
LOPRIO  Energy efficiency has low priority 
MET  Metal products industry  
MIGR  Move (parts of) firm to foreign country 
NORMS  Maybe new technology will not satisfy future standards 
NOTHING No reaction and incur the loss 
NOWIM  Currently introducing the specific technology 
OBSERV Number of observations  
ORGAN  Difficult to implement due to internal organisation 
OTHIM  Other investments more important 
OVERV  No good overview of existing technologies 
PAPER  Paper industry  
PRICE  Increase prices of final products 
PRMIX  Start producing a less energy intensive product mix 
PRQ  Profit ratio (total net profits as fraction of sales) 
RDSUB  Acceptability of R&D subsidies 
REST   Other industries (machinery, construction materials and textiles 
industry)  
SHUT  Shutting down 
STANTEC Acceptability of technology standards 
STANUSE Acceptability of emission standards 
SUB  Better to wait for subsidies 
TAXEU  Acceptability of energy tax on European level 
TAXNL  Acceptability of energy tax in Netherlands 
TAXNLR Acceptability of energy tax in Netherlands with rebatement of tax 
revenues 
UNQUA  Uncertainty regarding the quality 
VOLAG  Acceptability of voluntary agreements 
WAIT                 Better to await experience of colleagues 
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